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Abstract
This thesis comprises three self-contained essays that deal with inefficient effort
allocations in multi-task agency relations with moral hazard.
The first essay analyzes a multi-task agency framework where the agent exhibits
task-specific abilities. Besides investigating the appendant consequences of applying
incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts, this essay demonstrates
that the provision of incentives—including the optimal aggregation of information—
takes the agent’s task-specific abilities into consideration. It further emphasizes
the relation between job characteristics and the principal’s preference for selecting
specific agents. This essay essentially demonstrates that differences in task-specific
abilities across agents can explain why they are allocated to various jobs; or why
they receive different incentive contracts, even if their jobs are identical.
The second essay considers a multi-task agency model with a risk-neutral and
financially constrained agent. It analyzes the inefficiency of the agent’s induced ef-
fort allocation across tasks when the principal has only access to an incongruent
information system about the agent’s performance. This essay further investigates
the costly acquisition of information aimed at improving the agent’s performance
evaluation, and therefore, mitigating her effort distortion. It contrasts two alter-
natives for the principal: (i) to centrally invest in the information acquisition; or
(ii), to delegate this task to a supervisor. This essay demonstrates that the prin-
cipal generally favors delegation for a sufficiently incongruent information system,
and a centralized investment, otherwise. This can be observed if the supervisor’s
performance evaluation is adequately precise. Otherwise, the contrary implication
applies.
The third essay analyzes incongruent preferences between firms for the charac-
teristics of exchanged goods as an inefficiency of mutual market transactions, and
collusive behavior within firms as an inefficiency of integrated transactions. It in-
vestigates the consequences of both inefficiencies on (i) firms’ decision on whether
to integrate transactions or to utilize the market; and (ii), the properties of contrac-
tual arrangements. This essay proposes two important implications. First, diverg-
ing preferences between firms affect diametrically their benefits of mutual market
transactions. Better aligned preferences are thereby disadvantageous from the de-
manding firm’s perspective since it imposes higher costs to ensure relation-specific
investments. Second, anticipated collusion may force firms to employ market trans-
actions, even if integrated transactions would have been more efficient otherwise.
Nevertheless, potential collusion can be beneficial if it facilitates the achievement,
or improves the efficiency, of superior relational contracts within and between firms
due to a worse fall-back alternative.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation enthält drei eigenständige Aufsätze, welche sich mit Prinzipal-
Agenten Beziehungen in Verbindung mit moralischem Risiko beschäftigen. In diesem
Zusammenhang ist der Agent für die Ausführung von multiplen Aufgaben (Multi-
tasking) verantwortlich.
In dem ersten Aufsatz wird ein Prinzipal-Agenten Modell mit multidimensiona-
ler Arbeitsanstrengung des Agenten analysiert, wobei angenommen wird, dass der
Agent unterschiedliche Fähigkeiten für die Ausführung der einzelnen Aufgaben auf-
weist. Dabei werden die durch die Anwendung von inkongruenten Leistungsmaßen
in Anreizverträgen resultierenden Ineffizienzen in Abhängigkeit von den aufgaben-
spezifischen Fähigkeiten des Agenten identifiziert und analysiert. Der Aufsatz zeigt
dabei, dass ein optimales Anreizsystem—einschließlich der effizienten Aggregation
von verfügbaren Informationen—auf die aufgabenspezifischen Fähigkeiten des Agen-
ten abgestimmt ist. Der Aufsatz stellt weiterhin dar, wie die Eigenschaften eines
Arbeitsplatzes die optimale Auswahl von heterogenen Agenten bestimmt. Es wird
dabei aufgezeigt, dass Divergenzen bei aufgabenspezifischen Fähigkeiten erklären
können, warum heterogene Agenten auf unterschiedliche Arbeitsplätze verteilt wer-
den. Darüber hinaus können aufgabenspezifische Fähigkeiten begründen, weshalb
Anreizverträge zwischen Agenten variieren, selbst wenn ihre Aufgabenbereiche iden-
tisch sind.
Der zweite Aufsatz betrachtet ein Prinzipal-Agenten Modell mit einem risikoneu-
tralen und haftungsbeschränkten Agenten, wobei der Agent wiederum für die Aus-
führung von multiplen Aufgaben verantwortlich ist. In diesem Modellrahmen wird
die Ineffizienz der induzierten Verteilung der mehrdimensionalen Arbeitsanstren-
gung auf die relevanten Aufgaben analysiert, die durch die Verfügbarkeit eines nur
inkongruenten Informationssystems über die Leistung des Agenten resultiert. Dieser
Aufsatz analysiert weiterhin die Generierung von zusätzlichen Leistungsmaßen mit
dem Ziel, die Verzerrung der multidimensionalen Arbeitsanstrengung des Agenten
zu reduzieren. In diesem Aufsatz werden dabei zwei Alternativen für den Prinzipal
herausgearbeitet und verglichen: (i) zentral in die Leistungsmessung des Agenten zu
investieren, oder (ii), diese Aufgabe an einem Vorgesetzten (Supervisor) des Agenten
zu delegieren. Es wird dabei gezeigt, dass der Prinzipal die Delegation dieser Auf-
gabe bevorzugt, sofern das bereits verfügbare Informationssystem in hohem Maße
inkongruent ist. Ist das Informationssystem dagegen hinreichend kongruent, ist im
Gegenzug eine zentrale Investition in die zusätzliche Leistungsmessung effizienter.
Diese Beobachtung ergibt sich unter der Bedingung, dass ausreichend präzise Infor-
mationen über die Arbeitsanstrengung des Vorsetzten verfügbar sind. Andernfalls
können die entgegengesetzten Resultate beobachtet werden.
Der dritte Aufsatz analysiert inkongruente Präferenzen zwischen verschiedenen
Unternehmen bezüglich der Eigenschaften der zwischen ihnen ausgetauschten Güter
als mögliche Ineffizienz von Markttransaktionen. Der Aufsatz berücksichtigt dar-
über hinaus die Möglichkeit von kollusivem Verhalten innerhalb von Unternehmen
als mögliche Ineffizienz von integrierten Produktionen. Dabei erfolgt eine Untersu-
chung der Auswirkungen dieser Ineffizienzen hinsichtlich (i) der Entscheidung von
Unternehmen, erforderliche Transaktionen intern zu organisieren, oder hierfür den
Markt in Anspruch zu nehmen, und (ii), der sich daraus ergebenden Eigenschaften
der vertraglichen Vereinbarungen innerhalb und zwischen Unternehmen. Die Analy-
sen in diesem Aufsatz führen dabei zu zwei wichtigen Schlussfolgerungen. Erstens,
zwischen Unternehmen divergierende Präferenzen hinsichtlich der Eigenschaften von
ausgetauschten Gütern haben einen umgekehrten Effekt auf die jeweilige Rentabili-
tät von bilateralen Transaktionen. Dabei sind stärker übereinstimmende Präferenzen
nachteilig aus der Sicht des nachfragenden Unternehmens, weil dies höhere implizite
Kosten für die Sicherstellung von beziehungsspezifischen Investitionen verursacht.
Zweitens, antizipierte interne Kollusion kann dazu führen, dass Unternehmen erfor-
derliche Güter über den Markt beschaffen, obwohl eine interne Produktion unter
Abwesenheit von kollusivem Verhalten effizienter sein würde. Im Gegensatz dazu
kann antizipierte Kollusion auch vorteilhaft sein, sofern es durch eine schlechtere
Alternative die Einhaltung von profitableren relationalen Verträgen innerhalb und
zwischen Unternehmen ermöglicht bzw. deren Effizienz erhöht.
Schlagwörter:
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Introduction
Employees are generally charged with performing a collection of various tasks that
contribute to firm value differently. The accountability for multiple tasks implies
that employees can not only decide on their effort intensity, but also on how to
allocate their effort across these tasks. This in turn provides them with significant
latitude to place more emphasis on certain tasks relative to others. From firms’
perspective, it would be desirable to assign effort to particular tasks in accordance
to their relative contribution to firm value so as to ensure the implementation of
an efficient effort allocation across all relevant tasks. However, many economic
relationships are subject to moral hazard, i.e. effort is non-contractible such that
firms face an incentive problem. Firms are therefore obliged to apply appropriate
incentive mechanisms to motivate their employees to implement effort.
One frequently applied mechanism is the provision of incentive contracts on the
basis of objective performance measures. As shown by previous agency literature,
the application of verifiable but imprecise measures about an agent’s effort leads
to suboptimal (second-best) contracts, whenever the agent is either risk-averse or
financially constrained.1 Holmström and Milgrom [1991] exposed an additional inef-
ficiency when agents can determine their effort allocation across tasks: the provision
of incentives based on performance measures leads to individual preferences for par-
ticular tasks, thereby potentially inducing an inefficient effort allocation from the
principal’s perspective. Such effort distortion occurs if the individual performance
evaluation does not perfectly reflect the agent’s contribution to firm value [Feltham
and Xie, 1994]. Generally speaking, the agent might be motivated to place more
emphasis on less valuable tasks relative to tasks with higher contributions to firm
value. In some cases, agents focus on activities which have little or even negative
effects on firm value, but are suitable to improve their performance evaluation.
For example, by the spring of 2002, almost every state in the U.S. implemented
school-level tests, initially aimed at comparing students’ performances across public
schools.2 To improve teaching quality, some states further utilized these school-level
tests for rewarding or sanctioning schools and/or individual teachers. The basis for
such evaluations is grounded in the belief that students’ performance in these tests
appropriately reflects teaching quality, i.e. the better teachers are in conveying the
required knowledge and improving their students’ skills, the higher would be their
1For a review of agency literature dealing with moral hazard, refer e.g. to Eisenhardt [1989]
for an early survey, and for more recent surveys, to Prendergast [1999], Lambert [2001], Gibbons
[2005], and Christensen and Feltham [2005].
2See Kane and Staiger [2002] for a detailed description of school-level tests in the U.S. and their
differences among states.
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students’ test score. For instance, the state California spent almost $700 million for
financial incentives in 2001, whereby teachers could get up to $25,000 of bonuses
in schools with the highest performance improvement [Kane and Staiger, 2002].
However, Kane and Staiger [2002] raised concerns about the reliability of school-level
tests since they represent only a small fraction of teaching responsibilities such as
teaching basic rather than advanced knowledge; or they tend to focus on particular
subjects like Math or English, but disregard other essential sciences. Moreover,
Linn [2000] cautioned against potential undesired consequences if school-level tests
are used as incentive devices.
Since empirical studies indicate that individuals are highly responsive to mone-
tary incentives (e.g. Asch [1990], Paarsch and Shearer [1999] and Lazear [2000a]),
it is predictable that the provision of incentives based on students’ achievements in
school-level tests motivates teachers to shift their teaching emphasis to the knowl-
edge and skills covered by the respective tests. In fact, Stecher and Barron [1999]
provide evidence of teachers in Kentucky spending more time on science in fourth
grade when science was tested; and on Math in fifth grade when Math was tested.
Other studies provide further evidence that teachers shifted their teaching emphasis
on tested, at the expense of non-tested knowledge, see e.g. Klein et al. [2000] and
Jacob [2002].
However, some teachers did not only shift their effort allocation to measured and
therefore, rewarded tasks, but also began to manipulate their students’ test scores in
order to enhance their own performance evaluation. For instance, Goodnough [1999]
reported that in New York City alone, several teachers were accused of manipulating
the test scores by encouraging their students to change incorrect answers, or by in-
corporating questions from the actual test in their practice tests.3 Jacob and Levitt
[2003] estimate that at least four percent of classroom tests in Chicago elementary
schools were affected by such manipulations. They further indicated that the fre-
quency of manipulations is highly responsive to minor changes in offered incentive
schemes.
As the above example demonstrates, implementing a reward scheme—initially
intended to motivate teachers—resulted in two inefficiencies. First, teachers shifted
their teaching emphasis on tested, at the expense of untested knowledge and skills.
Generally speaking, they distorted their effort allocation across all relevant tasks with
the objective of improving their own performance evaluation. Second, the provision
of incentives based on students’ achievements in school-level tests induced, in some
cases, dysfunctional behavior: some teachers have chosen actions (manipulation)
which are suitable to enhance their performance evaluation, but do not contribute
to the objective of educating students. Of course, the latter inefficiency applies only
to a small fraction of teachers. However, the first inefficiency—shifting the teaching
emphasis on measured knowledge and skills—also constitutes a serious drawback of
utilizing test scores as incentive devices since students are eventually less educated in
non-tested, but vital fields. Yet ironically, teachers did what they are rewarded for:
improving their students’ test-scores. To achieve this objective, they adjusted their
effort allocation appropriately—a response to the implemented incentive scheme,
which was not intended.
3For further examples of encountered manipulations see Tysome [1994] and Hofkins [1995].
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The preceding example illustrates how the provision of incentives on the basis
of performance measures may induce effort distortion if they do not accurately re-
flect the agent’s contribution to the objective of organizations.4 The first analytical
investigation of this phenomenon by Holmström and Milgrom [1991] attracted the
attention of many researchers who also delved into multi-task agency relationships
by investigating incentive contracts, which aim at ensuring optimal effort alloca-
tions in addition to balancing incentives and the agent’s desire for insurance. Other
important work include Feltham and Xie [1994] and Datar et al. [2001] who, in
particular, focus on the aggregation of performance measures with the objective of
improving incentive contracts in multi-task agencies. However, there are several is-
sues which have been not addressed so far, but are essential for our appreciation of
the nature of contracts in multi-task agency relations. This thesis thus contributes
to contemporary multi-task literature by addressing important issues in agency re-
lations, when the agent can not only decide on her effort intensity, but also on her
relative effort allocation.
Particularly, this thesis comprises three self-contained essays dealing with multi-
task agency relations. The first essay analyzes the provision of incentives when
agents exhibit task-specific abilities. It illustrates how incentive contracts are ad-
justed to these agent-specific characteristics. The second essay analyzes costly per-
formance measurement with the objective of providing the agent with more con-
gruent incentives, and therefore, mitigating effort distortion. The main emphasis
is on the comparison between a centralized versus a delegated generation of addi-
tional performance measures. The third essay considers incongruent preferences for
effort allocations between firms as an inefficiency to employ the market. It contrasts
this inefficiency to potential collusion within firms as an inefficiency of integrated
transactions. Subsequently, I dwell on each essay and summarize their main results.
In the first essay, I analyze a multi-task agency framework with a risk-neutral
principal and a risk-averse agent. The principal has only access to performance
measures which do not perfectly reflect the agent’s individual contribution to firm
value, i.e. these measures are incongruent. Moreover, the agent is characterized by
different task-specific abilities, i.e. she can perform some tasks more efficiently than
others. Besides the characteristics of applied performance measures, diverging ease
for performing relevant tasks additionally affect the agent’s preference for allocating
her effort across tasks. The main emphasis of this essay is on whether and how
incentive contracts are adjusted to agents’ task-specific abilities in combination with
the characteristics of relevant tasks and available performance measures. This essay
further elaborates on criteria which are sufficient to compare information systems in
multi-task agencies.
The first essay demonstrates that the provision of incentives incorporates the
agent’s task-specific abilities. This implies that different agents generally receive di-
verging incentive contracts, even if they are in charge of performing identical tasks.
It further illustrates that the signal/noise ratio—a sufficient criteria to rank perfor-
mance measures in single-task agencies—is only applicable in multi-task agencies,
when performance measures provide identical information about the agent’s relative
4For further illustrative examples refer to Kerr [1975], Gibbons [1998], Prendergast [1999], and
Baker [2000].
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effort allocation across tasks. If performance measures offer different information
about the implemented effort allocation, their relative value additionally depends
on their respective congruity in conjunction with the agents’ tasks-specific abilities.
This essay further analyzes how multiple performance measures are aggregated
to improve the contract efficiency. Besides reducing the incentive risk imposed on
the risk-averse agent, the additional purpose of the optimal aggregation is to mo-
tivate a more efficient effort allocation. As demonstrated, the efficient aggregation
depends on the agent’s particular abilities, thereby implying that different agents
are evaluated by diverse performance measurements, even if they are in charge of
performing identical tasks. This essay further illustrates that the principal can in-
duce the first-best effort allocation if she receives a sufficient quantity of appropriate
performance measures. Nonetheless, this is only efficient if aggregating performance
measures with the objective of motivating the first-best effort allocation contem-
poraneously minimizes the imposed incentive risk. Finally, this essay elaborates
on adverse selection and highlights the relation between job characteristics and the
principal’s preference for selecting specific agents. It indicates that discrepancies
in task-specific abilities across agents can explain why they are allocated to various
jobs; or why they receive different incentive contracts, even if their jobs are identical.
The second essay considers a multi-task agency relationship with a risk-neutral
and financially constrained agent. The principal has only access to an incongruent
information system, i.e. it does not reflect the agent’s contribution to firm value. The
application of this information system to provide the agent with incentives motivates
her to implement an inefficient effort allocation across relevant tasks. The purpose of
this essay is the investigation of costly performance measurement aimed at improving
the incentive congruity, and therefore, mitigating effort distortion. It contrasts two
alternatives for the principal: (i) to centrally invest in the acquisition of additional
measures about the agent’s performance; and (ii), to recruit a supervisor who is
charged with the generation of these measures. However, employing a supervisor
imposes a second moral hazard problem.
This essay first analyzes the consequences of providing a financially constrained
agent with a bonus contract on the basis of incongruent performance evaluations. It
illustrates that the agent extracts an economic rent, which is increasing in the degree
of congruence of her performance evaluation. This further suggests that improving
the congruence of her performance evaluation with the objective of mitigating her
effort distortion incurs implicit costs due to a higher rent.
The second essay demonstrates that the principal’s decision on whether to cen-
tralize or to delegate the information acquisition depends on the relationship be-
tween three factors: (i) the precision of the supervisor’s performance evaluation,
(ii) the supervisor’s comparative cost advantage in generating the required informa-
tion; and (iii), the congruence of the costless available information system about
the agent’s effort. If the supervisor’s performance evaluation is adequately precise,
this essay provides two critical implications. First, a sufficiently incongruent cost-
less information system generally favors delegation. This is because a less congruent
costless information system imposes lower requirements on the supervisor’s relative
measurement efficiency, which is more likely to be provided by a potential supervi-
sor. Second, the more congruent the costless information system is, the more likely
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is a centralized investment in the information acquisition. The rationale is that
delegation—in order to be preferred by the principal—imposes high requirements
on the supervisor’s relative measurement efficiency. This in turn is less likely to be
achieved by a potential supervisor. The reverse observations apply if the supervisor’s
performance evaluation is sufficiently imprecise.
The third essay uses a multi-task agency framework to investigate the properties
of transactions within and between firms. Particularly, it considers two alternatives
for a firm to obtain a required good: (i) through an integrated production; and (ii),
via a market transaction with another firm. In both cases, the firm can either uti-
lize spot contracts based on contractible information, or non-enforceable relational
contracts on the basis of observable but non-contractible information. This essay
analyzes how incongruent preferences between firms with respect to the properties
of exchanged goods determine the contractual arrangements of their relationship.
Tailoring the exchanged good to the demanding firm’s needs thereby requires the
implementation of a different effort allocation than for selling the good on the mar-
ket. This potential inefficiency of engaging in market transactions is contrasted to
potential side-contracting (collusion) as inefficiency of integrated productions.
This essay demonstrates that incongruent preferences between firms affect the
efficiency of market transactions based on relational contracts, which are aimed at
ensuring relation-specific investments. The analysis indicates that more congruent
preferences between firms are disadvantageous from the demanding firm’s perspec-
tive. The rationale for this observation is that more congruent preferences impose
higher costs for motivating the supplier to make relation-specific investments in the
sense of tailoring the exchanged good to the demanding firm’s requirements. In con-
trast, diverging preferences do not affect the value of spot market transactions from
the perspective of the demanding firm. This is because the exchange of less suitable
goods implies a lower transfer price, which compensates the demanding firm for the
lack of perfectly tailored goods.
This essay further illustrates that the effect of potential collusion is ambiguous.
First, it can oblige firms to engage in market transactions even though an integrated
production would have been more efficient otherwise. Second, anticipated collusion
can be advantageous if it deteriorates the efficiency of integrated productions as
best fall-back alternative for relational contracts. In this case, it either facilitates
the achievement, or improves the efficiency, of superior relational contracts within
and between firms. In addition, the third essay considers the consequences on the
efficiency of transactions within and between firms, when the demanding firm re-
ceives verifiable but incongruent performance measures suitable for improving the
efficiency of integrated productions. It illustrates that the availability of sufficiently
congruent performance measures generally leads to integrated productions instead of
market transactions. Nevertheless, they can also improve the efficiency of integrated
productions as best fall-back alternative for relational contracts. As a consequence,
access to adequately congruent performance measures can either compromise the
feasibility of superior relational contracts within and between firms, or deteriorate
their profitability.
Essay 1
Task-Specific Abilities in
Multi-Task Agency Relations
1.1 Introduction
Empirical investigations have offered an abundance of evidence suggesting that indi-
viduals are highly responsive to monetary incentives (see e.g. Asch [1990], Paarsch
and Shearer [1999] and Lazear [2000a]). Nevertheless, the specific effects of re-
ward schemes are somewhat ambiguous when individuals are required to perform a
collection of different tasks. In such situations, Kerr [1975] cautioned against the
consequences of a reward system that inefficiently overemphasizes some tasks while
underemphasizing others. An illustrative example cited by Kerr [1975] is the difficult
trade-off between research and teaching responsibilities encountered by faculties at
universities. Since teaching quality is harder to assess relative to research output,
and prospective promotion decisions mainly hinge on research performance, it is a
common phenomenon for faculty members to focus on research at the expense of
teaching.1 Inefficient effort allocations generally occur when the principal is unable
to inexpensively access a performance evaluation which perfectly coincides with her
objective. If monitoring is too costly, the principal is, to some extent, compelled to
accept that an agent is motivated to allocate her effort inefficiently across multiple
tasks.
This phenomenon has prompted Holmström and Milgrom [1991] to delve into
multi-task agency relationships by investigating incentive contracts which aim at
ensuring appropriate effort allocations in addition to countervailing incentive risk
and the agent’s desire for insurance. Feltham and Xie [1994] also investigate inef-
ficient effort allocations motivated by the application of incongruent performance
measures in incentive contracts. According to Feltham and Xie [1994], incongruity
arises whenever performance measures do not perfectly reflect the agent’s contribu-
tion to firm value. They alluded that the agent is only motivated to improve her
performance evaluation, thereby leading her to focus on less or even non-valuable
tasks, and disregarding more beneficial ones [Feltham and Xie, 1994].2
Previous multi-task literature such as Feltham and Xie [1994], Banker and The-
1See Brickley and Zimmerman [2001] for an empirical study of this example.
2See as well the discussion in Gibbons [1998].
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varanjan [2000], and Datar et al. [2001] focus on performance measure congruity and
its effects on the efficiency of incentive contracts, but absent from these studies is the
possibility that agents may perform some tasks more efficiently than others. Recent
literature, however, emphasizes the role of acquiring human capital for specific tasks
(see e.g. Lindbeck and Snower [2000], Gibbons and Waldman [2003] and Gibbons
and Waldman [2004]).3 Since individuals differ substantially in their learning ap-
titudes, which inevitably lead to discrepancies in skills and abilities [Gibbons and
Waldman, 2003], it is reasonable to infer that different individuals might perform dif-
ferent tasks with varying degrees of ease.4 For example, Sapienza and Gupta [1994]
indicate in their study of principal-agent relations within venture capital-backed
firms that the frequency of venture capitalist (principal) - CEO (agent) interaction
is partially dependent on the CEOs’ venture experience. They provide evidence that
CEOs with prior experiences (i.e. greater proficiency) in start-up ventures would
have a lesser tendency of consulting with their venture capitalist.
In order to understand the nature of contracts in multi-task agency relations,
it is essential to investigate whether and how task-specific abilities influence the
agent’s preferences for her effort allocation and the optimal provision of incentives
in response to these abilities. This essay thus focuses on multi-task agencies in order
to gain new insights into the provision of incentives if performance measures are
incongruent with the principal’s objective and the agent exhibits different abilities
for performing relevant tasks.
This essay investigates how incentive contracts respond to individual task-specific
abilities combined with incongruent performance measures. It further demonstrates
how the value of performances measures can be compared in multi-task agencies.
The analysis indicates that the signal/noise ratio—sufficient to rank performance
measures in single-task agencies—can only be applied if all available measures pro-
vide the same information about the agent’s relative effort allocation. The proposed
ranking criteria is in general contingent on the agent’s specific abilities such that
different agents may imply various orderings of performance measures. This essay
further considers the optimal aggregation of multiple performance measures based
on the agent’s respective task-specific abilities. If the principal has access to a suffi-
cient quantity of appropriate measures, it demonstrates that she can combine them
in order to motivate the agent to implement the first-best effort allocation. This,
however, is only efficient, if the motivation of the first-best effort allocation by the
appropriate aggregation of performance measures contemporaneously maximizes the
precision of the information system, which in turn is determined by the agent’s task-
specific abilities. Finally, this essay illustrates the relevance of adverse selection and
highlights the relation between job characteristics and the principal’s preference for
selecting specific agents.
This essay combines two strands of literature. First, the analyzed framework
builds on the multi-task agency model developed by Holmström and Milgrom [1991],
and incorporates incongruent performance measures as analyzed by Feltham and Xie
3For empirical evidence see Baker et al. [1994b].
4Maher et al. [1979] conceive the term ‘congruence of perception with preferences’ to indicate
the phenomenon that even if an individual possesses the correct perception of different tasks, there
might still be a preference on specific tasks.
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[1994], Baker [2002] and Banker and Thevaranjan [2000]. Second, it incorporates
task-specific human capital in the sense of Gibbons and Waldman [1999], Lindbeck
and Snower [2000], and Gibbons and Waldman [2003, 2004]. The main contribu-
tion of this essay to previous multi-task literature is the incorporation of task-specific
abilities and the investigation of their effects on incentive contracts, when the princi-
pal receives only incongruent performance measures. It broadens our understanding
of incentive contracts in multi-task agency relations by providing three important
implications: First, incentive contracts are tailored to the specific abilities of agents,
thereby implying that the principal does not generally provide identical incentive
contracts when agents differ with respect to their task-specific abilities. Second, the
principal’s preference for agents with specific abilities depends on the characteristics
of relevant tasks and the available information system. Third, the principal can be
indifferent between various agents, but may nevertheless provide them with different
incentive contracts. In general, different task-specific abilities across agents can ex-
plain why they are allocated to various jobs; or why they receive different incentive
contracts, even though their jobs are identical.
This essay proceeds as follows. In section 1.2, I give an overview of the model and
derive the first-best contract in section 1.3. I provide in section 1.4 the second-best
contract and focus on the relation between performance measure congruity and effort
distortion in section 1.5. In section 1.6, I investigate how performance measures can
be ranked in multi-task agencies, in particular when agents are characterized by
task-specific abilities. The optimal aggregation of multiple performance measures as
a device to mitigate effort distortion is analyzed in section 1.7. I further investigate
the role of adverse selection in section 1.8, and expose the principal’s preference for
specific agents. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 The Model
Consider a single-period agency relationship between a risk-neutral principal and a
risk-averse agent. The principal owns an asset and requires the agent’s productive
effort. Once employed, the agent is in charge of performing n ≥ 2 tasks (multi-
tasking). These tasks are tied together, i.e. the principal cannot split and allocate
them to different agents.5 The agent implements an effort vector e = (e1, ..., en)t,
e ∈ E ⊆ Rn+, where ei is the agent’s effort allocated to task i.6 Effort is non-
verifiable and all activities ei ∈ E are measured in the same unit.
To incorporate task-specific abilities for the agent, I adapt Lazear’s [2000b] ap-
proach for a single-task agency model to this multi-task framework. In this sense,
the abilities differ across tasks and determine the absolute and marginal effort costs
borne by the agent. Let Ψ be an n × n matrix representing the agent’s task-
specific abilities. The agent’s effort costs are contingent on Ψ and take the form
C(e) = etΨe/2. For the ease of illustrating the basic relationship between perfor-
mance measure congruity and effort distortion by using geometric interpretations, I
5For considerations on how multiple tasks are efficiently split among several agents, refer e.g.
to Holmström and Milgrom [1991], Corts [2005], and Schöttner [2005].
6All used vectors are column vectors where ‘t’ denotes the transpose.
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assume first that abilities across different tasks are mutually exclusive of one another.
Accordingly, Ψ is a diagonal n× n matrix defined by Ψ = diag (ψ1, ..., ψn), ψi > 0,
i = 1, .., n. I will relax this assumption in section 1.7 and allow the agent to feature
cost substitutes or complements. A higher ability for performing task i is charac-
terized by a lower ψi, i = 1, ..., n, and vice versa.7 I first treat these task-specific
abilities as exogenous in order to illustrate the corresponding incentives contracts
and induced effort distortions for a given type of agent. However, I will emphasize
the principal’s preference for employing particular agents by elaborating on adverse
selection in section 1.8.
The agent’s preferences are represented by the negative exponential utility func-
tion
U(w, e) = − exp [−ρ (w − C(e))] , (1.1)
where ρ denotes the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion and w as the
agent’s wage. For parsimony, let w¯ = 0 be her reservation wage implying a reserva-
tion utility U¯ = −1.
By conducting effort e, the agent contributes to the principal’s non-verifiable
gross payoff V (e) = µte+εV , where εV is a normally distributed random component
with zero mean and variance σ2V , representing firm-specific and economy wide risk.
The n-dimensional vector µ = (µ1, ..., µn)t, µi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n, characterizes the
marginal effect of e on gross payoff V (e). Since V (e) is non-verifiable, it cannot be
part of an explicit single-period incentive contract. The only verifiable information
about e, however, is provided by the performance measure
P (e) = ωte+ ε, (1.2)
where ω = (ω1, ..., ωn)t ∈ Rn+ is the vector of performance measure sensitivities.
The random component ε is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2,
and represents potential effects on the performance measure beyond the agent’s
control.
As pointed out by Feltham and Xie [1994], the performance measure does not
necessarily capture the agent’s contribution to the gross payoff perfectly. Formally,
if there exists a constant λ 6= 0 satisfying µ = λω, performance measure P (e)
is congruent with the gross payoff V (e).8 Otherwise, the performance measure
is incongruent and its application in an incentive contract motivates the agent to
implement an inefficient effort allocation across tasks [Feltham and Xie, 1994, Baker,
2002].
Baker [2002] provided a geometric measure for performance measure congruity.
Since his result is fundamental to the subsequent analysis, it is summarized in the
following definition.
7A similar approach is used by MacLeod [1996], where ψi, i = 1, ..., n, are random variables.
However, his work is different in the sense that he focuses on the relationship between explicit and
implicit incentive contracts rather than on the effort distortion induced by incongruent performance
measurement.
8This phenomenon is described by several terms in the multi-task agency literature: performance
measure congruity [Feltham and Xie, 1994, Bushman et al., 2000, Hughes et al., 2005], non-distorted
performance measure [Baker, 2000, 2002], and goal congruence [Anthony and Govindarajan, 1995,
Banker and Thevaranjan, 2000]. For the sake of consistence, I use the term performance measure
congruity throughout this essay.
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Definition 1.1 The congruence of performance measure P (e) to gross payoff V (e)
with respect to the marginal effect of e is measured by ΥC(ϕ) = cosϕ, where ϕ is the
angle between the vector of gross payoff sensitivities µ and the vector of performance
measure sensitivities ω.
Accordingly, as long as vector µ and vector ω are linearly independent, the perfor-
mance measure does not reflect the agent’s contribution to gross payoff, and there-
fore, is incongruent. Formally, there exists no constant λ 6= 0 satisfying µ = λω,
thereby implying ϕ 6= 0. A more congruent performance measure thereby implies
a smaller angle ϕ and leads to a higher measure of congruity ΥC(ϕ) due to the
definition of the cosine. Finally note that ϕ ∈ [0, pi/2] since µi, ωi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n,
where ϕ is represented in radian measure.
In line with previous multi-task literature, I restrict my analysis to a compensa-
tion scheme w which is linear in performance measure P (e). The payment w takes
therefore the form
w(e) = α+ βP (e), (1.3)
where α denotes the fixed payment and β denotes the incentive parameter. The
transfer α is utilized to split the surplus between the principal and the agent, where-
as β is used to provide the agent with incentives for implementing effort.
Remark As shown by Holmström [1979] and Grossman and Hart [1983], optimal
contracts are not necessarily linear.9 However, linear contracts are widely used in
economic analyzes, particulary in the multi-task agency literature, see e.g. Feltham
and Xie [1994], Bushman et al. [2000], Banker and Thevaranjan [2000], Baker [2002],
and Hughes et al. [2005]. The advantage of using linear compensation schemes in
multi-task agency models is that they provide additional insights in the agent’s
choice for allocating her effort across tasks. Nevertheless, for a continuous time
model with Brownian motion where the agent controls the drift rate, Holmström
and Milgrom [1987] found the optimal incentive scheme to be linear in output.10
Thus, we can interpret a single-period framework as a one-shot consideration of the
continuous time model proposed by Holmström and Milgrom [1987]. However, their
result of linear contracts being optimal applies only to settings with a single perfor-
mance measure and is not valid for settings with multiple measures as considered
in section 1.7. For a general characterization of optimal contracts in a multi-task
agency framework refer to Gjesdal [1982].
Since the compensation scheme is linear, the agent’s utility is exponential, and
the error term is normally distributed, maximizing the agent’s expected utility is
analogous to maximizing her certainty equivalent
CE(e) = α+ βωte− 1
2
etΨe− ρ
2
β2σ2, (1.4)
where ρβ2σ2/2 is the required risk premium in order to compensate the agent for
the uncertainty in her incentive payment βP (e).
9For the analysis of the shape of optimal contracts refer to Hemmer et al. [2000].
10See as well Hellwig and Schmidt [2002] for the approximation of the continuous time model by
a discrete-time model where optimal incentive schemes are also linear.
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The timing of this problem is as follows. First, the principal offers the agent a
contract (α∗, β∗). If this contract guarantees the agent at least the same expected
utility as her best alternative, she accepts. After the agent implemented e and the
random variables ε and εV are realized, the payments take place.
For clarification, I subsequently illustrate the distinction between effort intensity
and effort allocation. Formally, let two arbitrary activities ek and ej vary to eˆk
and eˆj, respectively. If the ratio between both activities remains identical such
that ek/ej = eˆk/eˆj, k, j = 1, ..., n, k 6= j, the relative effort allocation remains the
same. In contrast, if ek/ej 6= eˆk/eˆj for at least one pair (k, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}, k 6= j,
the relative effort allocation varies. The overall effort intensity, however, changes
without affecting the effort allocation, if there exists a constant λ > 0 satisfying
e = λeˆ, where eˆ is the modified effort vector.
For the ease of comparing different effort allocations, it is useful to commit to
the subsequent definition throughout this essay.
Definition 1.2 The agent implements a distorted effort allocation if there exists no
constant λ 6= 0 satisfying µ = λe.
The implemented effort allocation is referred to be distorted if it does not reflect
the agent’s marginal contribution to gross payoff V (e). Note, however, that non-
distortion is not necessarily optimal since this concept does not incorporate the
corresponding costs for implementing an arbitrary effort vector.
1.3 The First-Best Contract
Before I move on to the second-best contract, it is useful to derive the first-best
solution of this problem as a benchmark for the subsequent analyzes. Then, the first-
best effort allocation and intensity can be compared to the second-best environment,
where the agent’s effort is non-contractible so that moral hazard occurs.
Suppose the principal can specify a desired effort intensity and allocation in an
enforceable contract. In this case, she appoints the effort vector e which maximizes
the difference between the expected gross payoff V (e) and costs w = C(e):
max
e
Π(e) = µte− 1
2
etΨe. (1.5)
Let φ ≡ Ψ−1µ = (µ1/ψ1, ..., µn/ψn)t be the vector of the payoff-cost sensitivity
ratios. Then, the first-best effort vector is
efb = φ. (1.6)
The principal maximizes her expected profit by assigning each activity ei in accor-
dance to its payoff-cost sensitivity ratio µi/ψi, i = 1, ..., n. Activities with high ratios
are consequently more intensively conducted relative to activities with low ratios.
Recall that efb is distorted if there exists no constant λ 6= 0 satisfying µ = λefb,
see definition 1.2. This implies that first-best effort is non-distorted if ψi = ψˆ > 0,
i = 1, ..., n, i.e. the agent has no comparative advantage in performing some tasks
relative to others. In contrast, if the agent has different abilities across tasks, it is
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optimal to implement a distorted effort allocation in order to balance the benefits
and costs of all relevant tasks.
By substituting efb in (1.5) and using the relation µtφ = ‖µ‖‖φ‖ cosκ for vector
products, the expected first-best profit becomes
Πfb =
1
2
‖µ‖‖φ‖ cosκ, (1.7)
where κ is the angle between vector µ and vector φ, and ‖ · ‖ denotes the length of
the respective vector.
The agent’s task-specific abilities affect the expected first-best profit in two ways.
The first effect is a result of the overall cost intensity for implementing an arbitrary
effort vector. To illustrate this effect, consider two agents A and B characterized
by ΨA and ΨB, respectively. If ΨA = λΨB, λ > 1, agent A exhibits a less overall
cost intensity than agent B for the implementation of an arbitrary effort vector.
Observe, however, that both agents share the same relative task-specific abilities
across tasks. Therefore, λ‖φA‖ = ‖φB‖, whereas κA = κB. The second effect
follows from the relation between the payoff sensitivities µ and the agent’s relative
task-specific abilities Ψ. Consider for instance the agent’s ability ψi to perform task
i. If this ability is increasing (i.e. ψi decreases) relative to the other abilities, the
agent could implement the same effort vector, but suffers less disutility of effort
for performing task i. In this case, ‖φ‖ increases. However, the effect on κ is
ambiguous. Particularly, decreasing ψi leads to a higher angle κ if ψi < 1, and
to a lower κ, otherwise. For the principal, however, it is optimal to enhance efbi
until the marginal benefit of task i is equal to its marginal costs, i.e. µi = ψiei.
Consequently, Πfb increases. This eventually implies that a potential decline in
cosκ is preponderated by an increase of ‖φ‖.
1.4 The Second-Best Contract
If the principal cannot directly contract over e, she faces an incentive problem for
motivating the agent to implement appropriate effort. Since the gross payoff V (e) is
non-verifiable, the only contractible information is the performance measure P (e).
However, the application of P (e) in an incentive contract may cause two inefficien-
cies. First, the performance measure—and therefore the agent’s compensation—is
uncertain such that the risk-averse agent requires a risk premium for accepting a
contract dependent on P (e). Second, the performance measure can be incongruent
and, therefore, motivate the agent to inefficiently allocate her effort across tasks.
The subsequent analysis focuses on the second inefficiency since the trade-off be-
tween incentive risk and the agent’s desire for insurance is intensively analyzed by
previous literature.11
In a second-best environment, the principal’s problem is to design a contract
(α∗, β∗) that maximizes her expected profit Π = E[V (e)− w(e)] while ensuring the
11For a detailed analysis in a LEN-setting, see e.g. Spremann [1987], Baker [1992], and Pren-
dergast [1999]; and for a general approach Shavell [1979], Holmström [1979], Grossman and Hart
[1983], and Rees [1985].
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agent’s participation. The optimal linear contract therefore solves
max
α,β,e
Π ≡ µte− α− βωte (1.8)
s.t.
e = argmax
e˜
α+ βωte˜− 1
2
e˜tΨe˜− ρ
2
β2σ2 (1.9)
α+ βωte− 1
2
etΨe− ρ
2
β2σ2 ≥ 0, (1.10)
where (1.9) is the agent’s incentive condition and (1.10) her participation constraint.
First, observe that (1.9) can be replaced by e = Ψ−1ωβ. For the subsequent
analysis, let Γ ≡ Ψ−1ω = (ω1/ψ1, ..., ωn/ψn)t be the vector of measure-cost sensi-
tivity ratios. Thus, the agent implements
e∗ = Γβ. (1.11)
In contrast to the first-best scenario, the agent’s effort ei for performing task i
depends on the measure-cost sensitivity ratio ωi/ψi and the incentive parameter β.
In order to maximize her expected profit, the principal sets α such that the
agent’s participation constraint is binding. By solving (1.10) for α and substituting
the resulting expression together with e∗ in the principal’s objective function (1.8),
the maximization problem simplifies to
max
β
Π ≡ µtΓβ − β
2
2
[
ωtΓ+ ρσ2
]
. (1.12)
The first-derivative of Π with respect to β gives the optimal incentive parameter
β∗ =
µtΓ
ωtΓ+ ρσ2
. (1.13)
Besides the precision of the performance measure, 1/σ2, with the agent’s risk tol-
erance, 1/ρ, the optimal incentive parameter is a function of the gross payoff sensi-
tivities µ, the performance measure sensitivities ω, and the measure-cost sensitivity
ratios Γ. Recall that Γ = Ψ−1ω, i.e. Γ comprises the agent’s task-specific abilities
Ψ. Hence, β∗ incorporates Ψ in two ways: (i) by its relation to the gross payoff
sensitivities µ in the numerator; and (ii), by its relation to the performance measure
sensitivities ω in the numerator and denominator. It can therefore be inferred that
agents with different task-specific abilities may obtain diverse incentive contracts,
even if they are in charge of performing an identical set of tasks and evaluated by
the same information system.
Substituting β∗ in (1.12) and using geometric representations give the principal’s
expected second-best profit
Π∗ =
‖µ‖2‖Γ‖2 cos2 θ
2(‖ω‖‖Γ‖ cos ξ + ρσ2) , (1.14)
where θ denotes the angle between the vector of payoff sensitivities µ and the vector
of measure-cost sensitivity ratios Γ. The angle between the vector of performance
measure sensitivities ω and vector Γ is denoted by ξ.
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1.5 Performance Measure Congruity and Effort
Distortion
In this section, I focus more intensively on performance measure congruity and its
effect on effort distortion if the agent performs different tasks with varying degrees
of ease.
Performance measure congruity refers to the degree of alignment between the
agent’s marginal effect on her performance measure and on the expected gross pay-
off [Feltham and Xie, 1994]. Performance measure congruity can thus be character-
ized by the angle ϕ between the vector of payoff sensitivities µ and the vector of
performance measure sensitivities ω, as emphasized by Baker [2002]. In contrast,
effort distortion refers to the relation between an implemented effort vector e and
the vector of the payoff sensitivities µ. If the agent’s effort allocation reflects its
relative contribution to V (e), her effort is non-distorted, see definition 1.2. How-
ever, as shown in section 1.3, effort distortion is not necessarily inefficient. Even the
first-best effort is distorted if the agent has comparative advantages in performing
some tasks relative to others. Nevertheless, a distorted effort allocation is inefficient
if it deviates from the one implemented under first-best. The agent implements
an efficient (first-best) effort allocation if there exists a constant λ > 0 satisfying
efb = λe∗. Recall that efb = Ψ−1µ and e∗ = βΨ−1ω. This leads to the first
observation.
Corollary 1.1 Only a congruent performance measure with µ = λω, λ ∈ R∗, leads
to a first-best effort allocation. If in addition ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n, the second-best
effort vector e∗ is non-distorted.
Observe that the first part of this corollary is independent of the agent’s task-specific
abilities. Consequently, I achieve the same observation as Feltham and Xie [1994],
even though I incorporate task-specific abilities. If the applied performance measure
is incongruent, we can infer that the agent is motivated to implement an inefficient
effort allocation, regardless of her characteristics. However, the extent of this in-
efficiency is determined by Ψ. Finally, identical task-specific abilities additionally
lead to non-distorted effort if the applied performance measure is congruent. The
rationale for this observation is that identical abilities for performing all relevant
tasks imply that the agent’s preference for her effort allocation is only determined
by the relative contribution of her tasks to the performance measure. If this mea-
sure reflects the agent’s relative contribution to firm value, i.e. it is congruent, she
is motivated to implement non-distorted effort.
As explained earlier, the agent’s second-best effort can deviate from that imple-
mented under first-best in two dimensions. First, the agent can choose a suboptimal
effort intensity over all tasks; and second, she may implement an inefficient effort
allocation across tasks. Therefore, an important question is, how the principal can
regulate both dimensions in a second-best environment, provided the agent exhibits
task-specific abilities.
Proposition 1.1 The principal can adjust the agent’s effort intensity by varying the
incentive parameter β. In contrast, if only one performance measure is available,
the effort allocation is exogenously determined by Γ.
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Proof See appendix.
By providing an appropriate incentive parameter β, the principal can moti-
vate the agent to implement any desired effort intensity. The optimal incentive
parameter—as well known—thereby trades-off the provision of incentives and the
agent’s desire for insurance. In contrast to the effort intensity, the effort allocation
cannot be controlled by the principal, as long as the underlying information system
generates only one performance measure. However, I show in section 1.7 that the
principal can adjust the effort allocation when she receives multiple performance
measures.
It can be deduced from previous observations that Γ plays an important role for
the induced effort allocation. For the subsequent analysis, suppose that for at least
two activities ek and ej the respective abilities are not identical. Formally, ψk 6= ψj
for at least one pair (k, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}, k 6= j. Consequently, vector Γ is linearly
independent of vector ω.
Proposition 1.2 If ψk 6= ψj for at least one pair (k, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}, k 6= j, then
ΥD(θ) = cos θ measures effort distortion under second-best.
Proof See appendix.
Note that the measure ΥD(θ) is negatively related to effort distortion. The less
distorted the agent’s effort allocation with respect to µ is, the smaller is θ, and conse-
quently, the higher is ΥD(θ). If θ = 0, the application of performance measure P (e)
motivates non-distorted effort. Observe, however, that an incongruent performance
measure induces non-distorted effort if µ = λβΓ, λ ∈ R∗, or equivalently,
ω = Ψµ (λβ)−1 . (1.15)
In this case, the performance measure sensitivities ω are a transformation of the
agent’s marginal contribution to gross payoff µ and her task-specific abilities Ψ.
However, as pointed out by corollary 1.1, a non-distorted effort allocation can only
be optimal if P (e) is perfectly congruent and the agent experiences identical abilities
for performing all relevant tasks.
Suppose the available performance measure P (e) changes such that the agent
is motivated to implement a less distorted effort allocation. Formally, θ decreases.
This implies, ceteris paribus, a higher expected profit Π∗. Note, however, that there
is a second effect on Π∗ captured by ξ as the angle between ω and Γ. To illustrate
this effect, we can re-formulate the agent’s effort costs by substituting e∗:
C(·) = 1
2
β2‖ω‖‖Γ‖ cos ξ. (1.16)
The properties of the agent’s task-specific abilities affect her effort costs in two
ways. The first effect is a result of the effort cost intensity over all tasks. For
illustrative purposes, assume that the effort costs take the form C(e) = etλΨe/2
with λ > 0. Increasing λ implies that all tasks become more costly to perform,
thereby leading to a higher ‖Γ‖ without affecting cos ξ. The second effect is caused
by the relation between the performance measure sensitivities ω and the agent’s
task-specific abilities Ψ. The relative abilities across tasks thereby affect ‖Γ‖ and
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Figure 1.1: Performance Measure Congruity and Effort Distortion for n = 3
cos ξ. Recall that ‖Γ‖ determines the effort intensity without affecting the allocation.
In contrast, cos ξ measures the agent’s effort costs (in utility terms) for a particular
effort allocation motivated by P (e).
Corollary 1.2 If ψk 6= ψj for at least one pair (k, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}, k 6= j, then
ΥM/C(ξ) = cos ξ characterizes the measure-cost efficiency.
The previous results are illustrated in figure 1.1 for the three-dimensional case
(n = 3). Besides the second-best effort vector e∗, it depicts the vectors of the gross
payoff sensitivities µ, performance measure sensitivities ω, and measure-cost sensi-
tivity ratios Γ. The effort vector e∗ has the same direction as Γ, only their lengths
differ, depending on β. Observe that e∗ is not necessarily on the plane spanned by
µ and ω. The location of e∗ relative to µ characterizes the induced effort distortion
(angle θ), whereas the relation between µ and ω measures the congruity of perfor-
mance measure P (e) (angle ϕ). Finally, the measure-cost efficiency is characterized
by the relation of Γ to ω (angle ξ).
If vector µ and vector ω point in the same direction, then efb = λe∗, λ > 0,
i.e. the incentive contract motivates the agent to implement the first-best effort
allocation, see corollary 1.1. Nevertheless, inducing a first-best effort intensity by
adjusting β can only be optimal if the agent is either risk-neutral or the performance
measure is perfectly precise. Otherwise, the principal imposes to much incentive
risk on the agent which requires the payment of a higher risk premium to ensure her
participation.
Now consider the case where the agent has identical abilities for all tasks, i.e.
ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n. As a consequence, Γ = ω/ψˆ so that vector Γ and
vector ω point in the same direction. This additionally implies that e∗ = ωβ/ψˆ
and ξ = 0. Thus, e∗ and ω are identical with respect to their direction, only their
lengths differ, depending on β and ψˆ. Accordingly, the measure of congruity is now
identical to the measure of distortion. This observation is summarized and proofed
by the subsequent proposition.
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Proposition 1.3 If ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n, then ΥD(ϕ) = ΥC(ϕ) = cosϕ.
Proof See appendix.
If agents do not exhibit different task-specific abilities, performance measure
congruity and effort distortion are captured by the same measure. However, if
we allow the agent to possess different abilities across tasks, it becomes pivotal to
distinguish between both concepts. The application of incongruent performance
measures in incentive contracts leads to inefficient effort allocations, but the extent
of these inefficiencies are further determined by the agent’s relative abilities for
performing the relevant tasks.
Consider again the expected second-best profit Π∗ from section 1.4. Accord-
ing to the previous observations, it depends on three elements: (i) the measure of
distortion ΥD(θ) in the numerator; (ii) the measure-cost efficiency ΥM/C(ξ) in the
denominator; and (iii), the agent’s risk aversion ρ in conjunction with the variance
σ2 of the applied performance measure in the denominator. It is common knowledge
that the trade-off between incentive risk and the agent’s desire for insurance affects
optimal incentive contracts. Moreover, as demonstrated by Feltham and Xie [1994]
and Baker [2002], incentive contracts in multi-task agency relations are adjusted to
the congruity of applied performance measures. However, the previous analysis in-
dicates that the measure-costs efficiency is a third crucial factor whenever the agent
performs some tasks more efficiently than others due to task-specific abilities.
1.6 Ranking Performance Measures
As Feltham and Xie [1994] emphasized, performance measures may differ with re-
spect to their congruity and precision. The previous analysis additionally indicates
that task-specific abilities play a crucial role for the contract efficiency. This sec-
tion therefore focuses on how the attributes of performance measures and agents
eventually determine the relative value of measures in multi-task agencies.
Consider a set P of m ≥ 2 performance measures Pi(e) = ωtie + εi, with
Pi(e) ∈ P ⊆ Rm and εi ∼ N(0, σ2i ).12 To illustrate the relative value of indi-
vidual performance measures, we can compare the expected profits each of them
would induce if applied in the agent’s incentive contract. Then, performance mea-
sure Pk(e) is referred to be strictly superior, if it provides the principal a strictly
higher expected profit than all other available measures Pi(e) ∈ P, i 6= k. Thus, I
first ignore the value of combining several measures and defer the consideration of
this possibility to the next section.
For single-task agency relations, Kim and Suh [1991] have shown that the value
of performance measures can be compared by their respective signal/noise ratio. By
adjusting their definition to a multi-task agency setting, the signal/noise ratio of
performance measures Pi(e) is
Λi =
(∇Pi(e∗))t (∇Pi(e∗))
σ2i
, (1.17)
12Subscript i refers henceforth to performance measure Pi(e) ∈ P.
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where ∇Pi(e∗) is the gradient of performance measure Pi(e) with respect to e. In
single-task agencies, performance measures with higher signal/noise ratios provide
more precise information about the implemented effort and are therefore preferred
to measures with lower ratios. In this multi-task setting, the signal/noise ratio of
performance measures Pi(e) is
Λi =
‖ωi‖2
σ2i
. (1.18)
One can infer from the previous analysis that signal/noise ratios are not necessarily
sufficient to rank performance measures in multi-task agencies, especially, when
agents differ in their task-specific abilities. This deduction is supported by the next
proposition.
Proposition 1.4 Performance measure Pk(e) is strictly superior to any other per-
formance measure Pj(e) ∈ P, j 6= k, if and only if,
‖ωk‖
‖Γk‖
ΥM/C(ξk)
(ΥD(θk))2
+
ρσ2k
‖Γk‖2(ΥD(θk))2 <
‖ωj‖
‖Γj‖
ΥM/C(ξj)
(ΥD(θj))2
+
ρσ2j
‖Γj‖2(ΥD(θj))2 , (1.19)
where ΥD(θi) is the measure of distortion induced by Pi(e), and ΥM/C(ξi) is the
related quantification for the measure-cost efficiency, i = {j, k}.
Proof Follows directly by rearranging Π∗(Pk(e)) > Π∗(Pj(e)) and substituting
ΥM/C(ξi) = cos ξi and ΥD(θi) = cos θi, i = k, j.
The value of a performance measure in comparison to any other measure is
contingent on two ratios: (i) the normalized ratio between the measure-cost efficiency
ΥM/C(·) and the induced effort distortion ΥD(·); and, (ii) the normalized inverse of
the distortion measureΥD(·) with the precision 1/σ2k of the performance measure and
the agent’s risk tolerance 1/ρ. Observe finally that performance measure congruity
does not directly enter into this ranking criteria. It, however, affects indirectly the
measure of effort distortion ΥD(θi) and the measure-cost efficiency characterized by
ΥM/C(ξi).
In fact, the value of performance measures in multi-task agencies cannot nec-
essarily be compared by their respective signal/noise ratios. It is rather pivotal to
take the induced effort distortion and measure-cost efficiency into consideration—
both determined by the performance measure sensitivities ωi relative to the agent’s
task specific abilities Ψ. Therefore, comparing the value of performance measures
requires specific knowledge about the agent’s characteristics, which is not necessary
for ranking performance measures in single-task agencies. In multi-task agencies,
however, the agent’s characteristics eventually determine the principal’s preference
for a specific information system.
Corollary 1.3 Suppose ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n. Then, performance measure Pk(e)
is strictly superior to any other performance measure Pj(e) ∈ P, j 6= k, if and only
if,
1
ΥC(ϕk)
[
1 + ψˆρΛ−1k
] 1
2
<
1
ΥC(ϕj)
[
1 + ψˆρΛ−1j
] 1
2
, (1.20)
where Λi, i = {j, k}, is the signal/noise ratio of performance measure Pi(e), and
ΥC(ϕi) its congruity measure.
1. TASK-SPECIFIC ABILITIES IN MULTI-TASK AGENCIES 19
Proof See appendix.
If the agent’s preference for an effort allocation depends only on the character-
istics of her performance evaluation since her abilities are identical for all tasks,
we can use adjusted signal/noise ratios to rank performance measures in multi-task
agencies. Nevertheless, it is still required to know ψˆ and ρ in order to assess the
relative value of performance measures.
The subsequent proposition offers a sufficient condition ensuring that perfor-
mance measures can be ranked exclusively by their respective signal/noise ratios,
and therefore, independent of the agent’s characteristics.
Proposition 1.5 Suppose there exist constants λj 6= 0 satisfying ωi = λjωj for all
i, j = 1, ...,m, i 6= j. Then, performance measure Pk(e) is strictly superior to any
other performance measure Pj(e) ∈ P, j 6= k, if and only if, Λk > Λj.
Proof See appendix.
Accordingly, the signal/noise ratio is sufficient to rank performance measures in
multi-task agencies, if all measures provide the same information about the agent’s
relative effort allocation. In this case, observe that ΥC(ϕi) = ΥC(ϕj), i, j = 1, ...,m,
i.e. all performance measures share the same measure of congruity.13 As a con-
sequence, every available performance measure—if applied in the agent’s incentive
contract—would imply the same effort distortion and measure-cost efficiency. Then,
their relative value is defined by their precision and scale, which in turn is represented
by their respective signal/noise ratio.
To investigate the effects of task-specific abilities on the ordering of performance
measures, it is insightful to eliminate effects related to their precision. By setting
ρ = 0, condition (1.19) simplifies to
ν
cos2 θk
cos2 θj
>
cos ξk
cos ξj
, ν =
‖ωj‖
‖ωk‖
‖Γk‖
‖Γj‖ . (1.21)
The value of performance measure Pk(e) relative to Pj(e) depends—besides on their
precision and scaling as previously emphasized—on their relative effort distortion
(cos θi) and relative measure-cost efficiency (cos ξi) weighted by the multiplier ν,
i = k, j. In order to make both measures comparable, it is essential to normalize
their scale ‖ωi‖, and exclude their effect on ‖Γi‖, i = k, j. Accordingly, if either the
agent is risk-neutral or the realization of performance measures is not influenced by
random effects, the relative value of performance measures depends on two factors:
(i) the motivated effort allocation and its contribution to gross payoff V (e); and,
(ii) the imposed costs to motivate this effort allocation.
1.7 Multiple Performance Measures
Even though the consideration of single performance measures provides important
insights into incentive mechanisms when agents are placed in charge of several tasks,
13Note that the reversed inference cannot be made, i.e. if ΥC(ϕi) = ΥC(ϕj), it is not necessarily
true that ωi = λjωj , λj 6= 0, i, j = 1, ...,m, i 6= j. In this case, the signal/noise ratio is not
sufficient to rank performance measures in multi-task agencies.
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it is more reasonable to assume that the principal has access to multiple performance
measures, e.g. different accounting numbers. If these additional measures are infor-
mative, they should be used to improve incentive contracts [Holmström, 1979]. This
section focuses on the optimal aggregation of multiple performance measures, when
the agent exhibits different task-specific abilities.
For the subsequent analysis, suppose an information system generates an m-
dimensional vector of performance measures P = (P1(e), ..., Pm(e))t, P ∈ Rm. Let
Ξ = (ωt1, ...,ω
t
m)
t be the m × n matrix of the respective performance measure sen-
sitivities, where the n-dimensional vector ωi summarizes the performance measure
sensitivities of Pi(e). Accordingly, P can be written as
P = Ξe+ ε, (1.22)
where ε = (ε1, ..., εm)t is a normally distributed m-dimensional vector of random
variables with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ. Due to the more general char-
acteristic of the subsequent analysis, we can now relax our initial assumption with
respect to Ψ and may assume that some elements in Ψ beyond the diagonal are
strictly positive or strictly negative, i.e. some activities are complements or sub-
stitutes. In order to ensure that its inverse exists, Ψ is assumed to be a positive
definite matrix.
If the principal applies multiple performance measures in the agent’s incentive
contract, her certainty equivalent modifies to
CE(e) = α+ βtΞe− 1
2
etΨe− ρ
2
βtΣβ, (1.23)
where β = (β1, ..., βm)t is an m-dimensional vector of incentive parameters and
represents the weight for each performance measure in the linear aggregation. Since
the noise terms are normally distributed, the linear aggregation of performance
measures is optimal [Banker and Datar, 1989].
The solution concept for deducing the optimal linear contract dependent on P
is similar to the one applied in section 1.4. First, the agent maximizes her certainty
equivalent by choosing
e∗ = Ψ−1Ξtβ. (1.24)
The agent’s preference for an effort allocation depends on her task-specific abilities
Ψ and the marginal effect of each task on her aggregated performance evaluation
Ξtβ. In contrast to the single performance measure case, the principal can now
influence the agent’s effort allocation by adjusting the weight βi, thereby altering
the agent’s marginal effect on her performance evaluation.
The principal’s problem is to define a contract (α∗,β∗), dependent on P , which
maximizes her expected profit Π = E[V (e)−w(e)]. In order to minimize costs, it is
optimal to set α such that the agent’s participation constraint is binding. Solving
CE(e) = 0 for α and substituting this expression together with e∗ = Ψ−1Ξtβ in
the principal’s objective function yield an unconstrained maximization problem:
max
β
Π ≡ µtΨ−1Ξtβ − 1
2
βtΞΨ−1Ξtβ − ρ
2
βtΣβ. (1.25)
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The first-order condition with respect to β leads to
β∗ =
[
ΞΨ−1Ξt + ρΣ
]−1
ΞΨ−1µ, (1.26)
where
[
ΞΨ−1Ξt + ρΣ
]−1 is the inverse of an m×m matrix. We can infer from β∗
that the objective of aggregating performance measures is to balance three effects:
(i) the effort distortion characterized by ΞΨ−1µ, (ii) the measure-cost efficiency
described by ΞΨ−1Ξt; and (iii), the precision of the aggregated performance eval-
uation with the agent’s risk tolerance, characterized by ρΣ.14 The more risk averse
the agent is, the more important becomes the latter effect for β. Since these three
effects are also determined by the agent’s characteristics Ψ and ρ, we can conclude
that the optimal aggregation of information is tied to individual agents. Roughly
speaking, the principal tailors the aggregation of available performance measures to
the specific characteristics of agents.
As mentioned earlier, the principal can influence the agent’s effort allocation if
she receives more than one performance measure. Note, however, that this is only
feasible if at least two available measures do not contain the same information about
the agent’s relative effort allocation. Formally, for at least two performance measures
Pj(e), Pk(e) ∈ P there exists no constant ϑ 6= 0 satisfying ωj = ϑωk, j 6= k. By
combining these measures appropriately, the principal can—besides mitigating the
uncertainty in the aggregated measure—improve the agent’s effort allocation.
Proposition 1.6 If there exist no constants ϑl 6= 0 satisfying ωk = ϑlωl, k 6= l,
k, l ∈ {1, ...,m}, for at least h performance measures with n ≤ h ≤ m, the principal
can aggregate these measures such that the agent implements e∗ = λefb, 0 < λ ≤ 1.
However, this is only optimal, if and only if,
ρΣ = λˆ ΞΨ−1Ξt, λˆ =
1− λ
λ
. (1.27)
Proof See appendix.
The first condition in proposition 1.6 emphasizes that the principal needs ac-
cess to an information system generating at least the same quantity of performance
measures as number of tasks the agent has to perform.15 Moreover, their sensitivity
vectors are required to be linearly independent, i.e. performance measures differ in
their information content with respect to the implemented effort allocation. If these
two requirements are satisfied, the principal can combine these measures appropri-
ately in order to motivate the agent to implement the first-best effort allocation. As
the second condition in proposition 1.6 highlights, the aggregation of performance
measures with the purpose of motivating the first-best effort allocation is only op-
timal if the covariance matrix Σ is a transformation of the measure-cost efficiency
14For a detailed analysis and discussion how performance measures are balanced in an aggregate,
refer to Datar et al. [2001]. However, since they do not consider different task-specific abilities, their
observations are slightly different in the sense that in their optimal aggregation the measure-cost
efficiency does not play a role and therefore, effort distortion is only affected by the performance
measure congruity.
15Note that this condition is sufficient, i.e. the principal can also induce a first-best effort
allocation with less performance measures if e.g. one measure is perfectly congruent.
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ΞΨ−1Ξt. In this case, aggregating performance measures to exclusively motivate
the first-best effort allocation contemporaneously maximizes the precision of the ag-
gregate, and consequently, minimizes the agent’s risk premium. However, the most
important observation is that (1.27) is also tied to the agent’s characteristics Ψ and
ρ. If the principal can employ a ‘suitable’ agent for a given information system, the
optimal incentive contract may eventually motivate the first-best effort allocation.
Even though it might be optimal from the principal’s perspective to provide the
agent with incentives motivating the first-best effort allocation, it is not necessarily
optimal that they contemporaneously induce a first-best effort intensity, as the next
corollary to proposition 1.6 emphasizes.
Corollary 1.4 Suppose there exist no constants ϑl 6= 0 satisfying ωk = ϑlωl, k 6= l,
k, l ∈ {1, ...,m}, for h performance measures with n ≤ h ≤ m. Then, it is optimal
to induce efb, if and only if, either ρ = 0 or Σ = [0]ij, i, j = 1, ...,m.
Proof See appendix.
Consequently, the optimal linear incentive contract motivates the agent to im-
plement a first-best effort allocation and intensity if two fundamental criteria are
satisfied. First, the principal has access to at least the same quantity of appropriate
performance measures as quantity of relevant tasks. These measures are required
to provide different information about the implemented effort allocation. Second,
either all performance measures are perfectly precise (i.e. noiseless) or the agent
is risk-neutral. For single-task agencies, it is well known that the second criteria
is sufficient to achieve first-best if the agent is not financially constrained. Multi-
task agencies, however, impose additional requirements on the information system
with respect to the characteristics and quantity of generated performance measures.
In particular, the principal needs access to an information system which can be ad-
justed such that it reflects the agent’s multidimensional contribution to gross payoff.
Then, the principal can motivate the agent to conduct an efficient effort allocation
by providing her congruent incentives.
1.8 Adverse Selection
The preceding analyses indicate that the properties of the agent’s task-specific abil-
ities play a crucial role for the design of incentive contracts and the value of em-
ploying particular agents. This offers the principal sufficient latitude to enhance
her expected profit by applying adverse selection mechanisms aimed at choosing the
‘most appropriate’ agent for a given information system and set of tasks. The objec-
tive of this section is a brief illustration of adverse selection in multi-task agencies,
when agents differ with respect to their task-specific abilities. The focus is thereby
on the characteristics of the most beneficial type from the principal’s perspective,
rather than on the mechanism design itself.16
Suppose there exists a non-empty set of agents A. Each agent i ∈ A is char-
acterized by her individual task-specific abilities Ψi and risk tolerance 1/ρi. For
16For adverse selection models refer e.g. to Salanié [1997] and Bolton and Dewatripont [2005],
and the references therein. For adverse selection in a multi-task agency setting where agents’
talents also affect their effort costs, see Moen and Rosen [2001].
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simplicity, each agent knows her own type prior to signing the contract. The re-
spective types are exogenous and do not change over time. The principal, however,
can neither observe the agents’ types nor does she receive any signals indicating
the respective types, but she knows the distribution of available types in the econ-
omy. Accordingly, she can adjust the incentive contract such that only a desired
type accepts, whereas less preferred types refuse. Precisely speaking, the principal
sets the contract parameters α and β such that the participation constraint for a
superior type ti(Ψi, ρi), i ∈ A, is binding, and violated for all less valuable types
j ∈ A, j 6= i. Suppose the principal wants to employ a type i and the correspond-
ing incentive contract would also ensure the participation of another type k, with
i, k ∈ A. Then, two cases are possible. First, k’s participation constraint is also
binding, thereby implying k’s employment as equally valuable as i’s from the prin-
cipal’s perspective. Second, k’s participation constraint is not binding so that she
could extract an economic rent. If this is the case, we can infer that the employ-
ment of k is strictly superior and the principal is better off by tailoring the incentive
contract to her characteristics.
Recall that the optimal linear incentive contract derived in section 1.7 implies
that the participation constraint for a given type is binding. Thus, from an analytical
perspective, it is sufficient to compare the expected profits induced by each available
type in order to identify the ‘most appropriate’ one. A type tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ) is therefore
superior from the principal’s perspective if her employment guarantees the highest
of all feasible expected profits. Formally,
tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ)→ Π(Ψˆ, ρˆ) = max {Π(Ψi, ρi)}i∈A . (1.28)
Consequently, the principal tailors the incentive contract to her characteristics and
provides the agent with (α(Ψˆ, ρˆ),β(Ψˆ, ρˆ)). Using the results from section 1.7, the
problem can be formulated as
tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ)→ Π(Ψˆ, ρˆ) = max
{
1
2
µtΨ−1i Ξ
t
[
ΞΨ−1i Ξ
t + ρiΣ
]−1
ΞΨ−1i µ
}
i∈A
. (1.29)
Identifying the superior type is not trivial since this condition depends on specific
matrix products and the inverse of an m×m matrix. Nevertheless, the next propo-
sition summarizes some inferences about the superior type satisfying (1.29).
Proposition 1.7 Suppose there exists a non-empty set of agents A, each of them
characterized by ti(Ψi, ρi), i ∈ A. Then, the superior type tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ) balances the
following effects in the most efficient way:
(i): The measure-cost efficiency effect characterized by ΞΨ−1i Ξt,
(ii): The distortion effect characterized by µtΨ−1i Ξt and its transpose,
(iii):The risk effect characterized by ρiΣ.
In principle, the value of particular agents depends—besides on their task-specific
abilities and risk-aversion—on the subsequent job characteristics: (i) the number
and properties of performance measures generated by an information system; and
(ii), the relative contribution of all tasks to gross payoff. To exemplify the latter job
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characteristic, recall that µtΨ−1i Ξt emphasizes the effort distortion as a result of the
information congruity relative to the agent’s task-specific abilities Ψi. Consider for
instance two organizations k and l with identical information systems. They have
different preferences for agents if there exists no constant λ 6= 0 satisfying µk = λµl.
Otherwise, k’s gross payoff function is (possibly) differently scaled than l’s without
affecting the induced effort distortion. In this case, the distortion effect is identical
for both organizations, which leads to identical preferences for specific types.17
The relation between these emphasized effects provides two main implications for
the selection of agents. First, organizations, or subunits, with different information
systems may prefer different types, even if their gross payoff functions are identical.
This observation follows directly from the distortion effect, measure-cost efficiency
effect and risk effect. Second, organizations, or subunits, with different gross payoff
functions may choose different types, even if they have access to identical infor-
mation systems. This is implied by the distortion effect. Generally speaking, the
individual value of available agents can only be assessed with respect to the corre-
sponding job characteristics: (i) the relevant tasks and their contribution to firm’s
outcome; and (ii), the precision and congruity of the available information system.
For illustrative purposes, consider for instance a manager and a worker sharing for
simplicity the same risk tolerance. Due to prior learning experiences, the manager is
assumed to exhibit relative higher abilities in performing administrative tasks than
in conducting manufacturing related tasks. For the worker, however, the reversed
relation is assumed. Now, who is superior from a firm’s perspective? As previously
emphasized, this cannot be assessed without considering the particular job charac-
teristics. The manager is superior for jobs consisting primarily of administrative
tasks, whereas it is efficient to employ the worker for manufacturing goods. As a
result, both individuals are allocated to different jobs and obtain various incentive
contracts tailored to their respective abilities and performance measurement. Now
suppose it is desirable from the principal’s perspective to employ two managers A
and B characterized by the same risk tolerance. Assume that manager A exhibits
a higher relative ability in performing administrative tasks than manager B, but
the latter one can supervise her subordinates more effectively. The previous results
indicate that the principal tailors the incentive contracts to their respective abilities.
As a consequence, both managers receive different incentive contracts, even though
they are in charge of performing identical tasks.
Proposition 1.8 Let T ⊆ A be the set of superior types. Then, T ⊆ A can contain
various types with tk(Ψk, ρk) 6= tl(Ψl, ρl), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A, k 6= l. Nevertheless, it is
possible that (α∗(Ψk, ρk),β∗(Ψk, ρk)) = (α∗(Ψl, ρl),β∗(Ψl, ρl)), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A.
Proof See appendix.
This result highlights that the principal does not necessarily strictly prefer iden-
tical types of agents. That is, a type k can be equally valuable for the principal
as type l, even though tk(Ψk, ρk) 6= tl(Ψl, ρl), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A, k 6= l. Indifference
17Note that the same inference about two information systems characterized by Ξk = λΞl,
λ 6= 0, cannot be made. This is due to their respective scale and its effect on the precision of the
information system relative to the information content.
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between different types of agents requires that some of them have a comparative
disadvantage in one or two of the three dimensions emphasized by proposition 1.7,
which is perfectly countervailed by a comparative advantage in the remaining di-
mension(s). To exemplify the second result emphasized by proposition 1.8, suppose
the principal wants to employ several agents for jobs with identical characteristics.
Then, the eventually employed agents are not necessarily identical, even though
their jobs are similar. In any case, however, it is optimal to tailor their respective
incentive contract to their individual characteristics. In general, one can expect to
observe different contracts for various types of agents. Nonetheless, it is also possible
that different agents receive identical incentive contracts.
1.9 Conclusion
Applying incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts motivates agents
to implement an inefficient effort allocation across relevant tasks. This essay in-
corporates task-specific abilities in a multi-task agency framework and investigates
their effects on the provision of incentives. As demonstrated, task-specific abilities
determine the efficiency of the agent’s effort allocation and play an important role
for the contractual design.
When the principal applies incongruent and noisy performance measures in in-
centive contracts, the agent’s effort choice deviates from first-best with respect to
two dimensions. First, as well known, the optimal incentive contract induces a sub-
optimal effort intensity due to the agent’s desire for insurance. Second, the agent
chooses an inefficient effort allocation if the performance measure does not reflect her
contribution to gross payoff. The extent of the latter inefficiency, however, depends
on the agent’s task-specific abilities relative to the performance measure congruity.
As a result, incentive contracts are tailored to the agent’s abilities and, particularly,
depend on three factors: (i) the inefficiency of effort distortion as a result of apply-
ing incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts, relative to the agent’s
task-specific abilities (distortion effect), (ii) the agent’s effort costs associated with
the motivated effort allocation (measure-cost efficiency); and (iii), the precision of
the information system with the agent’s risk-aversion (risk effect).
This essay further proposes a ranking criteria for performance measures in multi-
task agencies. One important observation is that the signal/noise ratio, commonly
used to assess performance measures in single-task agencies, is not a sufficient rank-
ing criteria in multi-task agencies. The relative value of performance measures
depends—besides on their precision—on their congruity relative to the agent’s task-
specific abilities, thereby implying that their ranking is tied to the agent’s char-
acteristics. The same is true for the optimal aggregation of multiple performance
measures. As further illustrated, the principal can motivate the agent to implement
a first-best effort allocation if she has access to a sufficient quantity of appropriate
performance measures. However, this is only optimal if the efficient aggregation max-
imizes the precision of the information system while motivating the (agent-specific)
first-best effort allocation.
The characteristics of agents, particularly their task-specific human capital, do
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not only affect their performance evaluation and incentive contracts, they also de-
termine the benefit of their employment from the principal’s perspective. It is
consequently in the principal’s interest to apply adverse selection mechanisms to
guarantee the employment of the most valuable agent. As shown, the best available
type of agent balances three effects most efficiently: (i) the distortion effect, (ii) the
measure-cost efficiency effect; and (iii), the risk effect. Due to the characteristics of
these effects, the value of individual agents is linked to the respective set of tasks
the agent is in charge of, and attributes of the information system. Different agents,
however, may be equally valuable, but may, nonetheless, receive different incentive
contracts. Generally speaking, task-specific abilities and the properties of informa-
tion systems can explain why different agents are allocated to various jobs; or why
they receive different incentive contracts, even if their jobs are identical.
This essay is part of a larger research agenda. Previous multi-task literature
focused primarily on performance measure congruity and its effect on incentive con-
tracts. As this essay illustrates, we can shed more light on the nature of incentive
contracts in multi-task agency relations, when we keep in mind that agents may dif-
fer in their skills and abilities to perform particular tasks. I believe it is substantial
to further explore the effects of task-specific human capital on incentive contracts
and the optimal selection of agents. In particular, if task-specific abilities change
over time due to work experience, and the principal cannot precisely observe this
mutation, she will update her beliefs about the individual abilities in accordance
to the agent’s prior performances. Such framework could contribute to our under-
standing of the dynamics of incentive contracts. However, I leave these fascinating
issues for future research.
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1.10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.1.
Recall that e∗ = Γβ. Consider first a change in β. Without loss of generality, choose
two arbitrary activities ej and ek, j, k ∈ {1, ..., n}, j 6= k. A variation of β influences
the effort intensity without the effort allocation, if λ = ek/ej is independent of
β. Substituting ei = Γiβ, i = j, k, gives λ = Γk/Γj. Accordingly, the relative
effort allocation cannot be adjusted by β. In contrast, β affects the effort intensity
if there exists no constant λ 6= 0, 1 satisfying e(β′) = λe(β′′) for two arbitrary
incentive parameters β′ 6= β′′. Consequently, Γβ′ = λΓβ′′, which is equivalent to
λI = (β′/β′′) I, where I is an n× n identity matrix. Hence, the effort intensity can
be adjusted by β.
Next, consider again two arbitrary activities ej and ek, j, k ∈ {1, ..., n}, j 6= k, the
agent implements for task j and k given ωi and ψi, i = j, k. Additionally, consider
two activities e¯j and e¯k the agent implements for task j and k given ω¯i and ψ¯i,
i = j, k. Then, the relative effort allocation changes if ej/ek 6= e¯j/e¯k, which is
equivalent to
ωjψk
ωkψj
6= ω¯jψ¯k
ω¯kψ¯j
. (1.30)
Observe that the relative effort allocation changes if ψi 6= ψ¯i and/or ωi 6= ω¯i, i = j, k,
except for the case where (1.30) is an equality even though ψi 6= ψ¯i and/or ωi 6= ω¯i,
i = j, k. Thus, the effort allocation depends on Γ = Ψ−1ω.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.2.
Effort distortion refers to the relation of e∗ to µ and can be therefore measured by
the vector product µte∗. Since e∗ = Γβ,
µte = β
n∑
i=1
µiΓi = β‖µ‖‖Γ‖ cos θ. (1.31)
First note that ‖µ‖ does not affect the relative importance of tasks for V (e). Fur-
thermore, β‖Γ‖ determines the lengths of vector e∗, but not its direction in the
n-dimensional space. The length is arbitrary in the sense that it can be adjusted
by β. Consequently, ΥD(θ) = cos θ ∈ [0, 1] measures the induced effort distortion
under second-best.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.
To measure effort distortion, we can use the vector product µte∗. If ψi = ψˆ > 0,
i = 1, ..., n, then e∗ = βω/ψˆ. This leads to
µte =
β
ψˆ
n∑
i=1
µiωi =
β
ψˆ
‖µ‖‖ω‖ cosϕ. (1.32)
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Again, ‖µ‖ does not affect the relative importance of tasks for V (e), and β‖ω‖
determines the lengths of vector e∗ but not its direction in the n-dimensional space.
Thus, Υ¯D(ϕ) = cosϕ ∈ [0, 1] measures distortion under second-best if ψi = ψˆ > 0,
i = 1, ..., n. Consequently, Υ¯D(ϕ) = ΥC(ϕ).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1.3.
If ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n, then Γi = ωi/ψˆ and ‖Γi‖ = ‖ωi‖/ψˆ, i = {j, k}.
Consequently, ΥM/C(ξ = 0) = 1 and Υ¯D(ϕi) = ΥC(ϕi), see proposition 1.3. By
substituting Λi = ‖ωi‖2/σ2i , i = {j, k}, the ranking criteria of proposition 1.4 can
be reformulated to the one stated in the corollary.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.5.
Observe first that the expected profit on the basis of Pi(e) can be written as
Π∗ =
(µtΓi)
2
2(ωtiΓi + ρσ
2
i )
. (1.33)
Recall that Γi = Ψ−1ωi. Consequently, performance measure Pk(e) is strictly supe-
rior to any other performance measure Pj(e) ∈ P, ∀j 6= k, if and only if,(
µtΨ−1ωk
)2
2(ωtkΨ
−1ωk + ρσ2k)
>
(
µtΨ−1ωj
)2
2(ωtjΨ
−1ωj + ρσ2j )
. (1.34)
If ωk = λωj, we can re-scale Pj(e) such that it is characterized by the same sensi-
tivity in e as Pk(e). Accordingly,
P¯j(e) = ω
t
je+
εj
λ
, (1.35)
where var
[
P¯j(e)
]
= σ2jλ
−2. Let ω ≡ ωi, i = j, k. This leads to(
µtΨ−1ω
)2
2(ωtΨ−1ω + ρσ2k)
>
(
µtΨ−1ω
)2
2(ωtΨ−1ω + ρσ2jλ−2)
, (1.36)
which can be re-arranged to
1
σ2k
>
λ2
σ2j
. (1.37)
Recall that after re-scaling, ωk = ωj. Thus, (1.37) can be written as
‖ωk‖2
σ2k
>
λ2‖ωj‖2
σ2j
, (1.38)
which is identical to Λk > Λj.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1.6.
The agent implements the first-best effort allocation, if e∗ = λefb. Note, however,
that 0 < λ ≤ 1 since it cannot be optimal to induce a higher effort intensity under
second-best than under first-best. Therefore, β needs to solve Ψ−1Ξtβ = λΨ−1µ,
which is equivalent to Ξtβ = λµ. If rankΞt ≥ n, there exists at least one solution of
this equation system. In particular, h columns in Ξt, n ≤ h ≤ m, must be linearly
independent. Consequently, rankΞt ≥ n, if there exist no constants ϑl 6= 0 satisfying
ωk = ϑlωl, k, l ∈ {1, ...,m}, k 6= l, for h performance measures with n ≤ h ≤ m.
Inducing a first-best effort allocation is only optimal if e(β∗) = λefb. This partic-
ulary requires that Ξtβ∗ = λµ, or equivalently, β∗ = λ
[
Ξt
]−1
µ. Substituting β∗
gives [
ΞΨ−1Ξt + ρΣ
]−1
ΞΨ−1µ = λ
[
Ξt
]−1
µ (1.39)
ΞΨ−1 = λ
[
ΞΨ−1Ξt + ρΣ
] [
Ξt
]−1 (1.40)
ΞΨ−1 = λΞΨ−1Ξt
[
Ξt
]−1
+ λρΣ
[
Ξt
]−1 (1.41)
(1− λ) ΞΨ−1 = λρΣ [Ξt]−1 , (1.42)
which is equivalent to
ρΣ =
1− λ
λ
ΞΨ−1Ξt. (1.43)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.8.
Suppose a type tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ) satisfies (1.29). Assume further that there exists another
type ti(Ψi, ρi) satisfying Π(Ψˆ, ρˆ) = Π(Ψi, ρi). This implies
µtΨˆ
−1
Ξt
[
ΞΨˆ
−1
Ξt + ρˆΣ
]−1
ΞΨˆ
−1
µ = µtΨ−1i Ξ
t
[
ΞΨ−1i Ξ
t + ρiΣ
]−1
ΞΨ−1i µ.
(1.44)
We know that tˆ(Ψˆ, ρˆ) is exogenous but we can treat agent i’s characteristics ti(Ψi, ρi)
as endogenous in order to show that there can be several types satisfying (1.44).
Accordingly, we have an equation with n+1 independent variables. Thus, depending
on the parameter values, there can be several types satisfying (1.44).
Finally observe that different types generally lead to different incentive contracts.
However, to proof that (α∗(Ψk, ρk),β∗(Ψk, ρk)) 6= (α∗(Ψl, ρl),β∗(Ψl, ρl)) is not al-
ways true, even though tk(Ψk, ρk) 6= tl(Ψl, ρl), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A, k 6= l, I subsequently
provide a counter example. Suppose the principal receives one performance measure
P (e). Assume that two types tk(Ψk, ρk) 6= tl(Ψl, ρl), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A, k 6= l, satisfy
(1.29), and they do not exhibit cost substitutes or complements, thereby implying
that Ψl and Ψk are diagonal matrices. The optimal incentive parameters β∗k and β∗l
for agent k and agent l, respectively, are
β∗k =
n∑
i=1
µiωi
ψki
n∑
i=1
ωiωi
ψki
+ ρkσ
2
β∗l =
n∑
i=1
µiωi
ψli
n∑
i=1
ωiωi
ψli
+ ρlσ
2
,
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where ψji denotes agent j’s task-specific ability with respect to task i, j = k, l.
Observe that β∗k = β∗l , if e.g. n = 2, µ1 = µ2, ω1 = ω2 and both agents are
further characterized by ρk = ρl and ψk1 = ψl2 and ψk2 = ψl1, k 6= l. Since
β∗k = β
∗
l and ρk = ρl, the risk premium is identical for both agents. Although each
agent implements a different effort allocation with e∗k = (ω1β∗k/ψk1, ω2β∗k/ψk2)t and
e∗l = (ω1β
∗
l /ψl1, ω2β
∗
l /ψl2)
t, observe that C(e∗k) = C(e∗l ) since e∗k1 = e∗l2 and e∗k2 = e∗l1.
As a result, α∗(Ψk, ρk) = α∗(Ψl, ρl). If this is possible for a single performance
measure and two-dimensional effort, it can be also the case for multiple measures and
n > 2. Hence, even though two types tk(Ψk, ρk) 6= tl(Ψl, ρl) satisfy condition (1.29),
it can be true that (α∗(Ψk, ρk),β∗(Ψk, ρk)) = (α∗(Ψl, ρl),β∗(Ψl, ρl)), k, l ∈ T ⊆ A.
Q.E.D.
Essay 2
Costly Performance Measurement
in Multi-Task Agencies
2.1 Introduction
Many employees are charged with performing multiple tasks which may differently
contribute to firms’ objectives. Employees can therefore not only decide on their
effort intensity, but also on how to allocate their effort across all relevant tasks. If
effort is non-contractible, firms face a two-dimensional incentive problem: they need
not only to induce a sufficient effort intensity, but also to motivate an efficient effort
allocation across tasks. The latter objective could be achieved if firms are able to
identify each employee’s individual contribution and apply this information in incen-
tive contracts. However, company structures are often too complex for accrediting
the respective contribution to each employee. As a consequence, firms are compelled
to employ other potential incentive mechanisms.
One alternative is the application of objective performance measures in incentive
contracts, as extensively analyzed in agency literature.1 However, the application of
performance measures in incentive contracts can motivate employees to focus on ac-
tivities which suitably enhance their performance evaluation, but have possibly little
or even negative effects on firm value. The behavioral literature provides illustrative
examples of such dysfunctional behavior. For instance, Prendergast [1999] reported
that AT&T rewarded their software engineers for the quantity of lines they wrote
for their programs. It was soon discovered that the programs consisted of more lines
than necessary.
Even if all relevant activities contribute to firm value, the relative effort alloca-
tion across those tasks can be inefficient. This occurs, when firms apply performance
measures to provide their employees’ with incentives, which do not perfectly reflect
their individual contribution to firm value. The provision of incentives based on such
incongruent performance measures leads therefore to a suboptimal effort allocation
across tasks [Feltham and Xie, 1994]. For example, faculties at universities are pri-
marily responsible for two tasks: teaching and conducting research. Since teaching is
harder to quantify than the output from research, promotion decisions are generally
1For a review of agency literature refer e.g. to Prendergast [1999], Lambert [2001], Gibbons
[2005], and Christensen and Feltham [2005].
31
2. COSTLY PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 32
made on the basis of research accomplishments. This in turn motivates particularly
younger faculties to concentrate on research at the expense of teaching.2 Neverthe-
less, schools can modify their incentive schemes in order to improve the quality of
teaching. Brickley and Zimmerman [2001] considered the incentive scheme adapted
by the William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, University
of Rochester. After adjusting the performance evaluation and the reward system
during the early 90’s, teaching quality improved significantly, but at the same time,
research output declined.
If organizations do not have access to performance evaluations that are suitable
to induce an efficient effort allocation, they need to apply alternative mechanisms
that act to mitigate effort distortion. Recent multi-task agency literature analyzes
and discusses some alternatives to improve agents’ effort allocations. For instance,
Feltham and Xie [1994], Banker and Thevaranjan [2000], and Datar et al. [2001]
analyze, how multiple performance measures can be aggregated to mitigate effort
distortion besides alleviating incentive risk.3 As demonstrated in chapter 1, the prin-
cipal can even motivate the agent to implement non-distorted effort if she has access
to a sufficient quantity of appropriate performance measures. A second stream of
the multi-task agency literature focuses on the optimal design of jobs as a device
to restrict effort distortion by allowing independent tasks to be split among multi-
ple agents, see e.g. Holmström and Milgrom [1991], Schöttner [2005], Corts [2005],
and Hughes et al. [2005]. Finally, Holmström [1999] and Baker et al. [2002] empha-
size that transferring asset ownership to the agent can mitigate her effort distortion
because asset ownership internalizes the consequences of her effort allocation. Nev-
ertheless, such an approach compromises the objective of efficient risk-sharing if the
agent is risk-averse and the principal is risk-neutral.
The ability to improve employees’ performance evaluations in order to mitigate
their effort distortion can be crucial for the efficiency of firms. To understand the
provision of incentives in multi-task agency relations, it is essential to investigate
whether and how organizations respond to the lack of perfectly congruent perfor-
mance measures, and consequently, to the imposed inefficiencies due to effort dis-
tortion. Surprisingly, previous multi-task literature remains virtually silent about
costly performance measurement with the objective of improving the agent’s effort
allocation. This essay thus focuses on costly performance measurement in order to
glean new insights into the improvement of information systems aimed at mitigating
effort distortion.
Specifically, I analyze a multi-task agency framework with risk-neutral parties,
where the agent faces a liability limit constraint. Similar to Baker [2002], I adopt
geometric representations for performance measure congruity, which eventually form
the foundation for the considered measurement technology. The main emphasis lies
in understanding the principal’s preference for either investing centrally in assets
which provides a viable means of measuring the agent’s performance, or delegating
the information acquisition to a supervisor. However, employing a supervisor induces
2See Kerr [1975] for a discussion of this and further examples. Additional illustrative examples
are summarized by Gibbons [1998] and Baker [2000].
3For an empirical investigation on how performance measures are combined, refer to Gibbs et al.
[2004].
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a second moral hazard problem since the principal cannot contract over her effort
to acquire information.
The analysis in this essay indicates that recruiting a supervisor for measuring the
agent’s performance can only be beneficial if she provides a sufficient relative mea-
surement efficiency, which countervails the additionally imposed agency costs. More
precisely, the principal’s decision on whether to delegate the information acquisition
to the supervisor is contingent on three factors: (i) the precision of the supervisor’s
evaluation system, (ii) the supervisor’s comparative cost advantage in obtaining the
required information; and (iii), the congruence of the costless available information
system about the agent’s effort. If the supervisor’s performance evaluation is suf-
ficiently precise, an adequately incongruent costless information system generally
favors delegation. The rationale for this observation is that a less congruent costless
information system imposes lower requirements on the supervisor’s relative mea-
surement efficiency, which is more likely to be satisfied by a potential supervisor. In
contrast, a more congruent information system would impose higher requirements
on the supervisor’s comparative cost advantage, which is less likely to be achieved
by a potential supervisor. In this case, a centralized investment is presumably to be
observable. If the supervisor’s performance evaluation is sufficiently imprecise, the
contrary implications apply.
This essay is closely related to the multi-task agency literature analyzing the
efficiency of induced effort allocations, especially to Holmström and Milgrom [1991],
Feltham and Xie [1994], Datar et al. [2001], and Baker [2002]. However, it deviates in
two main directions. First, it utilizes a framework with a risk-neutral and financially
constrained agent, i.e. payments from the agent to the principal are not feasible.
This allows to abstract from risk considerations in order to focus exclusively on the
induced effort allocation. Second, the analyzed incentive contract is one of the bonus
type similar to the ones applied by Park [1995], Kim [1997], Pitchford [1998] and
Demougin and Fluet [2001] for single-task agency relations.
This essay contributes to the previous multi-task agency literature in two impor-
tant ways. First, it extends their work by investigating a costly mechanism aimed
at improving the agent’s performance evaluation and hence, the efficiency of her
motivated effort allocation. Second, this essay provides preliminary insights into the
relationship between the properties of available information systems and the optimal
design of organizations aimed at efficiently improving these information systems.
The essay proceeds as follows. I introduce the basic model in section 2.2 and
provide the first-best solution in section 2.3. In section 2.4, I derive and discuss
the second-best contract and elaborate on a ranking criteria for information systems
in multi-task agencies with risk-neutral parties. Subsequently, I analyze in section
2.5 the principal’s investment decision for generating additional measures about the
agent’s performance. Section 2.6 focuses on the contractual arrangement, when the
principal employs a supervisor who is charged with the acquisition of the required
performance measures. Both considered alternatives for improving the underlying
information system are compared in section 2.7. Section 2.8 summarizes the main
results and concludes.
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2.2 The Model
Consider a single-period agency relationship between a principal and an agent. Both
parties are risk-neutral and the agent faces a liability limit constraint, i.e. payment
from the agent to the principal are not feasible. The agent is assigned to perform
n > 2 tasks which cannot be split among different agents. Therefore, she needs
to implement a vector of effort e = (e1, ..., en)t, e ∈ E ⊆ Rn+, where ei is the
agent’s effort allocated to task i.4 Effort is non-verifiable and all activities ei ∈ E
are measured in the same unit. The agent’s disutility of effort C(e) is quadratic and
separable in the different activities:
C(e) =
n∑
i=1
1
2
e2i =
1
2
ete. (2.1)
By implementing effort e, the agent can affect the firm value V , which can be either
high or low. Formally, let V ∈ {0, 1}, whereas the probability for realizing the high
firm value conditional on e is
Prob{V = 1|e} = min{µte, 1}. (2.2)
Vector µ = (µ1, ..., µn)t, µ ∈ Rn+, represents the sensitivity of the expected firm
value in the agent’s effort. Accordingly, the agent can not only influence the expected
firm value by her effort intensity, but also by her relative effort allocation across
relevant tasks. To ensure an interior solution for the first-best effort vector efb, I
assume that µ is characterized such that Prob{V = 1|efb} = µtefb < 1.5
The realized firm value is non-contractible, and therefore, cannot be used to
provide the agent with explicit incentives. Nevertheless, the principal receives a
binary and verifiable signal S¯ ∈ {0, 1}, where S¯ = 1 is the favorable signal in
the sense of Milgrom [1981]. The probability of realizing the favorable signal is
conditional on the agent’s effort and takes the form
Prob{S¯ = 1|e} = min{ω¯te, 1}, (2.3)
where ω¯ = (ω¯1, ..., ω¯n)t, ω¯ ∈ Rn+, represents the sensitivity of the expected signal
in the agent’s effort. This binary statistic potentially represents several costless
performance measures which are summarized in the most efficient way. Henceforth,
I refer to S¯ as the costless information system. To ensure interior solutions, I shall
assume that ω¯ is characterized such that Prob{S¯ = 1|e∗} = ω¯te∗ < 1 for the
second-best effort vector e∗.6
Since the realized value of S¯ is verifiable, the principal can exploit this informa-
tion in a bonus contract to provide the agent with incentives to implement effort.
Particulary, the agent obtains a bonus βA in addition to a fixed transfer αA if the
favorable signal S¯ = 1 is realized. Accordingly, the agent’s binary wage wA takes
the form
wA =
{
αA + βA, if S¯ = 1,
αA, if S¯ = 0. (2.4)
4All vectors are column vectors where ‘t’ denotes the transpose.
5By using the subsequently derived first-best solution, one can show that this requires µtµ < 1.
6One can show by using the subsequently derived second-best solution that this requires
µtω¯/2 < 1.
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As a result of the agent’s liability limit, all transfers have to be non-negative for
any realization of S¯. If the agent accepts this bonus contract on the basis of S¯, it
provides her with the expected utility
UA(e) = αA + βAω¯te− 1
2
ete. (2.5)
For parsimony, the agent’s reservation utility is normalized to zero.
2.3 The First-Best Contract
Before investigating the second-best contract, it is useful to derive the first-best
solution of this problem as a benchmark for the subsequent analysis. Suppose the
principal can directly contract over e. Then, she appoints the effort vector efb which
maximizes the difference between the expected firm value E[V |e] and wage payment
wA = C(e). Formally, the first-best effort vector efb solves
max
e
Π(e) ≡ µte− 1
2
ete. (2.6)
The first-order condition leads to efb = µ. The principal assigns each activity ei in
accordance to its marginal effect µi on the expected firm value. To exemplify the
relative effort allocation across tasks, consider the relation between two arbitrary
activities efbi and e
fb
j , i 6= j:
efbi
efbj
=
µi
µj
i, j = 1, ..., n , i 6= j. (2.7)
Suppose µi > µj. In this case, it is optimal to assign more effort on task i relative
to task j since the former task contributes more to the expected firm value than the
latter.7 This implies that an implemented effort allocation is efficient if it reflects
the relative marginal contribution of each task to the expected firm value. The
conducted effort allocation is thus deemed to be non-distorted. In contrast, if an
implemented effort allocation deviates from the one assigned under first-best, it is
distorted. Formally, implemented effort is distorted if there exists no constant λ > 0
satisfying e = λefb.
Finally, substituting efb in the principal’s objective function leads to
Πfb =
1
2
µtµ. (2.8)
The principal’s expected first-best profit is therefore only characterized by the vector
product µtµ, where µ represents the sensitivity of the expected firm value in the
agent’s effort.
7Note that this observation applies because marginal effort costs are assumed to be identical
across relevant tasks. If they differ, the task-specific marginal effort costs relative to the respective
marginal contribution to firm value determine the first-best effort allocation, see chapter 1.
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2.4 The Second-Best Contract
If the principal cannot directly contract over e, she faces an incentive problem. Since
the firm value V is non-contractible, she is compelled to use the information system
S¯ to provide the agent with incentives. However, the application of S¯ in an incentive
contract can motivate the agent to implement an inefficient effort allocation across
tasks if E[S¯] does not perfectly reflect her contribution to the expected firm value
E[V ]. In this case, the information system S¯ is deemed to be incongruent with the
expected firm value, and its application in the agent’s incentive contract imposes
incongruent incentives.
In a second-best environment, the principal’s problem is to find a bonus contract
(αA∗, βA∗) aimed at maximizing her expected profit Π ≡ E[V −wA|e] while ensuring
the agent’s participation. Formally, the optimal bonus contract solves
max
αA,βA,e
Π ≡ µte− αA − βAω¯te (2.9)
s.t.
αA + βAω¯te− 1
2
ete ≥ 0 (2.10)
e = argmax
e˜
αA + βAω¯te˜− 1
2
e˜te˜ (2.11)
αA + βA ≥ 0 (2.12)
αA ≥ 0. (2.13)
Condition (2.10) is the agent’s participation constraint and ensures that it is in her
interest to enter into this relationship. Moreover, (2.11) is the agent’s incentive
condition. Finally, (2.12) and (2.13) guarantee that the optimal bonus contract is
compatible with the agent’s liability limit.
We can directly infer from the agent’s incentive constraint that she implements
e∗ = βAω¯. (2.14)
The second-best effort vector consists of two components: the scalar βA and the
vector µ. The bonus βA determines the overall effort intensity, whereas the relative
effort allocation across tasks is characterized by ω¯. To exemplify the effort allocation
under second-best, consider again the relation between two arbitrary activities e∗i
and e∗j , i 6= j:
e∗i
e∗j
=
ω¯i
ω¯j
i, j = 1, ..., n , i 6= j. (2.15)
The agent places relatively more emphasis on tasks with a higher contribution to
her performance evaluation in order to maximize the likelihood of obtaining the
contracted bonus. From the principal’s perspective, however, the motivated effort
allocation is inefficient if it deviates from that implemented under first-best. Recall
that the agent’s effort allocation is distorted if there exists no constant λ > 0 sat-
isfying e∗ = λefb. Substituting e∗ and efb leads to ω¯β = λµ. Apparently, effort
distortion is rooted in the misalignment of the agent’s performance evaluation with
2. COSTLY PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 37
respect to firm value. To put it differently, effort distortion occurs if the agent’s per-
formance evaluation is incongruent, i.e. does not perfectly capture her contribution
to firm value. In contrast, if the principal has access to a congruent information
system, the agent can be motivated to implement the non-distorted (first-best) ef-
fort allocation. Formally, the costless information system is congruent if there exists
a constant ξ > 0 satisfying µ = ξω¯. Otherwise, the agent’s performance evalua-
tion is incongruent and—when applied in an incentive contract—motivates her to
implement an inefficient effort allocation across relevant tasks.
To exemplify the preceding observations, suppose the agent can implement two
activities e1 and e2, where e2 does not contribute to firm value (µ2 = 0). Nonethe-
less, e2 is suitable to positively influence her performance evaluation (ω¯2 > 0).8
Accordingly, it would be desirable from the principal’s perspective to exclude e2
from the performance measurement. However, since the performance evaluation is
non-separable in the different activities, the principal is compelled to accept the
implementation of e2. This suggests two inefficiencies: First, the principal eventu-
ally rewards non-valuable activities (e2), and second, she needs to compensate the
agent for the implementation of these activities in order to ensure her participation.
However, even if e2 contributes little to firm value relative to e1 (µ1 > µ2) but the
expected signal is relatively more sensitive in e2 than in e1 (ω¯1 < ω¯2), the induced
effort allocation is distorted as the agent inefficiently places more emphasis on tasks
2 than on task 1.
Proposition 2.1 The optimal bonus contract is characterized by αA∗ = 0 and
βA∗ =
µtω¯
2ω¯tω¯
. (2.16)
The principal’s expected second-best profit is
Π∗ =
(µtω¯)
2
4ω¯tω¯
. (2.17)
Proof First observe that the principal needs to set βA > 0 in order to ensure that
the agent implements ei > 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, ..., n}. As a consequence, (2.12)
is satisfied as long as (2.13) holds and therefore omits. Recall that e∗ = βAω¯. Thus,
the Lagrangian becomes
L(αA, βA) = µtω¯βA − αA − (βA)2ω¯tω¯ + λ
[
αA +
1
2
(βA)2ω¯tω¯
]
+ ξαA. (2.18)
The corresponding first-order conditions are
− 1 + λ+ ξ = 0, (2.19)
µtω¯ + βAω¯tω¯ (λ− 2) = 0, (2.20)
8Feltham and Xie [1994] analyze a similar example in a setting, where the agent is risk-averse.
They refer to this particular phenomenon as window dressing.
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and the complementary slackness conditions,
λ
[
αA +
1
2
(βA)2ω¯tω¯
]
= 0, (2.21)
ξαA = 0. (2.22)
There are two cases to consider: (i) λ > 0, and (ii) λ = 0. First, suppose λ > 0. In
this case, αA + (βA)2ω¯tω¯/2 = 0 due to (2.21). Since it is required that αA ≥ 0, this
would imply that αA∗ = 0, βA∗ = 0, and consequently, e∗ = (0, ..., 0)t. Therefore,
λ > 0 cannot be a solution of this problem. Thus, λ = 0. Then, the second
complementary slackness condition additionally implies that ξ = 1. Consequently,
αA∗ = 0 due to (2.22). Solving (2.20) for βA with λ = 0 leads to
βA∗ =
µtω¯
2ω¯tω¯
. (2.23)
Finally, the principal’s expected profit can be obtained by substituting αA∗ and βA∗
in the principal’s objective function.
Q.E.D.
Observe that the optimal bonus βA∗—and as a consequence the principal ex-
pected profit Π∗—depends on the relation between vector µ and vector ω¯. We
can infer from preceding observations that the agent implements an inefficient effort
allocation if µ and ω¯ are linearly independent.9 Baker [2002] demonstrated that
performance measure congruity can be characterized by the angle between these
two vectors. To provide a measure of the induced effort distortion and the corre-
sponding efficiency loss, I subsequently adapt Baker’s geometric interpretation to
the underlying setting with a risk-neutral and financially constrained agent. This
eventually provides the analytical foundation for the subsequently analyzed costly
improvement of the agent’s performance evaluation aimed at motivating a more
efficient effort allocation.
Lemma 2.1 The angle ϕ¯ ∈ [0, pi/2] between vector µ and vector ω¯ measures the
induced effort distortion and associated efficiency loss if the bonus contract is depen-
dent on S¯.10
Proof See appendix.
This lemma indicates that the angle ϕ¯ between the vector of the expected firm
value sensitivities µ and the vector of the expected signal sensitivities ω¯ measures
not only the congruity of a performance measure as emphasized by Baker [2002],
but also the induced effort distortion and the corresponding efficiency loss.11 The
9Formally, vector µ and vector ω¯ are linearly independent if there exists no constant λ > 0
satisfying µ = λω¯.
10Throughout this essay, angles are represented in radian measures.
11The scaling of E[S¯|e] characterized by ‖ω¯‖ does not affect the efficiency of the bonus contract
since the agent is risk-neutral. With risk-averse agents, however, the scaling is crucial since it
affects the precision of performance measures and hence, the agent’s required risk-premium, see
e.g. Baker et al. [2002], Gibbons [2005], or chapter 1 for further discussions.
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relation of these two vectors in the n-dimensional space is sufficient to characterize
the inefficiency provoked by the application of an incongruent performance evalu-
ation in the agent’s incentive contract. Observe that the measure ϕ¯ is negatively
related to effort distortion and the corresponding efficiency loss. A smaller angle ϕ¯
characterizes a more congruent information system, and therefore, induces less ef-
fort distortion. The provision of more congruent incentives is also desirable from the
principal’s perspective because it leads to a higher expected profit, as emphasized
by lemma 2.1. To observe this, one can use the relations for vector products and
re-write the principal’s expected profit as
Π(ϕ¯) =
1
4
‖µ‖2 cos2 ϕ¯, (2.24)
where ‖µ‖ is the length of vector µ. Observe that the principal’s expected profit is
decreasing in ϕ¯. The rationale for this observation is that a less congruent perfor-
mance evaluation (higher ϕ¯) motivates the agent to implement a less efficient effort
allocation. This entails two inefficiencies: (i) the expected firm value is less than
it would have been under the implementation of less distorted effort; and (ii), the
principal has to compensate the agent even for inefficiently chosen effort allocations
in order to ensure her participation. Both effects deteriorate the efficiency of the
bonus contract, and consequently, diminish the principal’s expected profit.
Previous research dealing with single-task agency relations proposed several crite-
ria to rank information systems with respect to their contract efficiency.12 However,
these ranking criteria are in general not applicable when the agent’s effort is multi-
dimensional. If the agent is risk-averse, I have shown in chapter 1 that the relative
value of information systems is determined by their respective congruency relative to
their precision. In this framework, however, the agent is risk-neutral and uncertainty
in her performance evaluation does not effect the contract efficiency. Accordingly,
an information system is weakly superior to any other information system from the
principal’s perspective if it motivates a weakly more efficient effort allocation, and
consequently, results in a weakly higher expected profit.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose there exists a non-empty set of information systems I
with S¯i ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ I. Then, information system k generating S¯k, k ∈ I, is weakly
superior to any other information system if and only if,
ϕ¯k ≤ ϕ¯l, ∀ l ∈ I, l 6= k, (2.25)
where ϕ¯i denotes the congruity measure for information system i ∈ I.
The emphasized measure ϕ¯ for the congruity of an information system and the in-
duced effort distortion additionally allows us to rank information systems in multi-
task agencies if all involved parties are risk-neutral. The superior information
system—when applied in an incentive contract—induces the least effort distortion,
and therefore, minimizes the efficiency loss for the principal.
12For ranking of information systems in single-task agency relations with risk-averse agents,
see e.g. Kim and Suh [1991]; and for a setting with a risk-neutral agent facing a liability limit
constraint, see Demougin and Fluet [2001].
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Next, consider the congruity of S¯ and its effect on the agent’s expected utility.
Substituting e∗ with the optimal bonus contract (αA∗, βA∗) in (2.5) gives
UA(ϕ¯) =
1
8
‖µ‖2 cos2 ϕ¯. (2.26)
Obviously, the congruity measure ϕ¯ additionally influences the agent’s expected
utility. The rationale for this observation is that the optimal bonus contract reflects
the congruity of S¯ in order to adjust the provision of incentives appropriately.
Proposition 2.3 The agent extracts a rent for all ϕ¯ ∈ [0, pi/2). The rent is maxi-
mized for a congruent expected signal with ϕ¯ = 0, and decreasing in ϕ¯.
Proof The first derivative of UA(ϕ¯) with respect to ϕ¯ gives
∂UA(ϕ¯)
∂ϕ¯
= −1
4
‖µ‖2 sin ϕ¯ cos ϕ¯. (2.27)
Since 2 sin ϕ¯ cos ϕ¯ = sin(2ϕ¯), this is equivalent to
∂UA(ϕ¯)
∂ϕ¯
= −1
8
‖µ‖2 sin(2ϕ¯), (2.28)
which is strictly negative for all ϕ¯ ∈ (0, pi/2) due to the definition of the sine.
Furthermore, UA(ϕ¯) is maximized for ϕ¯ = 0, which implies UA(0) = ‖µ‖2/8. In
contrast, UA(pi/2) = 0.
Q.E.D.
Since the agent’s liability limit is always binding (see proof of proposition 2.1),
the principal must leave her a rent. More interestingly, however, is the observation
that the agent extracts a higher rent, the more congruent the underlying information
system is. This can be observed because providing the agent with more congruent
incentives (lower ϕ¯) leads to the implementation of less distorted effort. Then, it is
beneficial from the principal’s perspective to enhance the bonus aimed at motivating
a higher effort intensity. To see this, one can re-write the optimal bonus as
βA∗(ϕ¯) =
‖µ‖
2‖ω¯‖ cos ϕ¯. (2.29)
First observe that βA∗(ϕ¯) is increasing in the performance measure congruity, i.e.
ϕ¯ decreases. As a result of the agent’s liability limit, enhancing βA∗(ϕ¯) contem-
poraneously leads to a higher rent extraction. However, if ϕ¯ = pi/2, the principal
sets βA∗(pi/2) = 0, thereby implying that the agent does not extract a rent. This
observation is due to the fact that the application of S¯ with ϕ¯ = pi/2 in a bonus
contract would motivate the agent to implement an effort allocation which does not
contribute to firm value. To see this, note that Prob{V = 1|e∗} = βA‖µ‖‖ω¯‖ cos ϕ¯.
Consequently, Prob{V = 1|e∗} = 0 if ϕ¯ = pi/2.
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2.5 Costly Performance Measurement
As the observations in preceding sections indicate, the contract efficiency in multi-
task agencies is directly determined by the congruity of an available information
system if all parties are risk-neutral. Accordingly, the principal is better off if she
has access to an information system that better reflects the agent’s contribution to
firm value, and can therefore be utilized to generate a more efficient effort allocation.
Feltham and Xie [1994] and Datar et al. [2001] have shown that the principal can
mitigate effort distortion by combing multiple performance measures appropriately.
Since they restricted their analysis to the aggregation of costless available perfor-
mance measures, it is intuitive to expand on their initial theoretical foundation to
focus on the next logical step of investigating investment decisions with the objec-
tive of improving the congruity of an information system. Suppose the principal
centrally invests in assets which are suitable to generate additional measures about
the agent’s performance. The principal can therefore improve the congruity of the
information system by incorporating the additionally acquired measures appropri-
ately. The more measures generated, the more congruent will be the eventually
established information system as a representation of all available performance mea-
sures. The principal’s investment into the improvement of the information system
is henceforth referred to as centralization.
To exemplify the underlying idea of costly performance measurement, consider a
worker who is employed for producing goods. Suppose these goods achieve a higher
price on the market, the better their quality is. The previous analysis indicates
that the worker’s incentive contract should incorporate certain quality measures
to ensure the achievement of a desired quality level. In contrast to the produced
quantity, however, verifying the quality is costly. If the firm wants to maintain a
certain quality standard, it is necessary to invest in a quality verification mechanism,
e.g. by acquiring a machine suitable to verify whether the quality of produced
items is within a specified tolerance level. Both performance measures—produced
quantity and achievement of a desired quality—can be appropriately combined and
used to provide the worker with incentives. Particularly, the firm can commit to pay
only a bonus if the produced quantity of items satisfying a desired quality exceeds
a predefined number. This incentive scheme eventually ensures that the worker
implements a more efficient effort allocation. Roughly speaking, the worker is now
motivated to place more emphasis on the achievement of a certain quality standard
besides producing a sufficient quantity.
Consider the principal’s investment into the improvement of the agent’s per-
formance evaluation aimed at providing her with more congruent incentives. Let
m ∈ R+ be the measurement intensity, where a higher intensity generates a more
congruent information system. The principal commits to a certain intensity m by
investing in the measurement system prior to negotiating with the agent about her
incentive contract.
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Figure 2.1: The Measurement Technology
Assumption 2.1 The implementation of m ∈ R+ generates a new verifiable and
binary statistic S(m) ∈ {0, 1} characterized by
(i): Prob{S = 1|m, ϕ¯, e} = min{ω(ϕ(m, ϕ¯))te, 1},
(ii): ϕ(m, ϕ¯) < ϕ¯ ∀m > 0.
The first condition emphasizes that the implemented measurement intensity m
generates a new information system which is represented by the binary statistic
S(m) ∈ {0, 1}. The corresponding expected signal is further characterized by the
sensitivity vector ω(ϕ(m, ϕ¯)). Its relation to the sensitivity vector µ of the expected
firm value is thereby determined by the angle ϕ(·), which measures the congruity of
S(m). The angle ϕ(m, ϕ¯) as the congruity measure is a function of the implemented
measurement intensity m and the congruity measure ϕ¯ of the costless available
information system S¯. The final condition ensures that implementing a strictly
positive intensity m leads eventually to a more congruent information system.13
The underlying measurement technology is illustrated in figure 2.1. The more
intense the costly information acquisition m is, the smaller becomes the angle be-
tween the vector of the expected firm value sensitivities µ and the new vector of
the expected signal sensitivities ω(·). Note that ω(·) is not necessarily on the plane
spanned by µ and ω¯. It is only required that ω(·) is characterized by a smaller angle
to µ than vector ω¯, i.e ϕ(m, ϕ¯) < ϕ¯. Observe further that geometrically the new
vector ω(·) is the sum of vector ω¯ and vector θ, where θ represents all information
additionally acquired through costly performance measurement.
Recall that the optimal bonus βA∗ is normalized by ‖ω¯‖ in order to exclude
potential effects by different lengths of ω¯. The same will be true if the length
of ω(·) varies with m. For parsimony purposes and without loss of generality, I
normalize the length of every new generated vector ω(·) to ‖ω(·)‖ = ‖ω¯‖.14
13Technically, the last condition requires that new generated performance measures are not
sufficient statistics of other available measures.
14This assumption additionally ensures interior solutions, see section 2.2.
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Assumption 2.2 The generated information system with ϕ(m, ϕ¯) as its congruity
measure is characterized by
(i): ϕm < 0 and ϕmm > 0 ∀m ≥ 0,
(ii): ϕϕ¯ > 0 and ϕmϕ¯ < 0 ∀m ≥ 0,
(iii): ϕ (0, ϕ¯) = ϕ¯ and ϕ (m, 0) = 0,
(iv): ϕ¯ ∈ [0, pi/4],
where ϕi denotes the first, and ϕii the second derivative of ϕ(·) with respect to i,
i = m, ϕ¯.15
Condition (i) implies that a higher measurement intensity m enhances the congruity
of the generated information system (smaller ϕ(·)), whereas the marginal effect of
reducing ϕ(·) is decreasing in m. Condition (ii) states that the new generated in-
formation system S(m) is less congruent for a given measurement intensity m, the
less congruent the costless information system S¯ is. Moreover, the marginal effect of
reducing ϕ(·) by implementing an arbitrary intensity m is higher, the less congruent
the costless information system is, i.e. the higher ϕ¯ is. Condition (iii) emphasizes
that without costly performance measurement, only the costless information system
is available. Additionally, a perfectly congruent information system cannot be im-
proved. To understand the last condition, observe from (2.24) that the expected
gross benefit contingent on an arbitrary measurement intensity m becomes
V̂ (m) =
1
4
‖µ‖2 cos2 ϕ (m, ϕ¯) . (2.30)
It can be verified that V̂ (m) is strictly concave increasing in m for ϕ(·) ∈ (0, pi/4),
whereas the shape of V̂ (m) is ambiguous for ϕ(·) ∈ [pi/4, pi/2) and depends on the
particular behavior of ϕ(·) in m. Consequently, condition (iv) guarantees that the
first-order approach is sufficient for identifying the optimal measurement intensity.
Assumption 2.3 The implementation of m ∈ R+ imposes costs C(m) character-
ized by
(i): C ′(m) > 0, C ′′(m) > 0, and C ′′′(m) ≥ 0,
(ii): C(0) = C ′(0) = 0,
(iii): limm→∞C ′(m) =∞.
The first condition emphasizes that the investment costs for improving the agent’s
performance evaluation are strictly convex increasing in the conducted measurement
intensity. The assumption about the third derivative is for technical reasons only.
Condition (ii) states that the principal bears no additional costs when she does not
improve the information system. The final condition ensures an interior solution
since the generation of a perfectly congruent information system is prohibitively
costly.16
15For parsimony purposes, I suppress the arguments for the respective derivative, unless it is
necessary for specific comparisons.
16This condition implicitly requires that the quantity of relevant tasks is strictly greater than
the number of available performance measures that provide different information about the agent’s
effort allocation. For a formal analysis refer to chapter 1.
2. COSTLY PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 44
As explained earlier, the principal commits to a particular measurement intensity
m by investing C(m) prior to negotiating with the agent about her bonus contracts.
As a consequence, the agent’s bonus contract is now on the basis of S(m) and
therefore, depends on ϕ(m, ϕ¯), but everything else remains identical. Hence, we can
directly turn to the principal’s problem for identifying the optimal measurement
intensity m∗. The adjustment of (2.24) with respect to the introduced measurement
technology implies that the optimal intensity m∗ solves
max
m
ΠC(m, ϕ¯) =
1
4
‖µ‖2 cos2 ϕ (m, ϕ¯)− C(m). (2.31)
Since 2 sinϕ(·) cosϕ(·) = sin (2ϕ(·)), the first-order condition gives
1
4
‖µ‖2 sin (2ϕ (m∗, ϕ¯)) (−ϕm) = C ′(m∗). (2.32)
The principal enhances the measurement intensity m until the expected marginal
gross benefit is equal to marginal costs. Since the expected gross benefit is concave,
and investment costs are convex increasing in m, the first-order approach is also
sufficient.17 Observe that the optimal measurement intensity m∗ depends implicitly
on the congruity measure ϕ¯ of the costless information system S¯. The effect of ϕ¯ on
the optimal measurement intensity m∗ and the principal’s expected profit ΠC(·) is
clarified by the subsequent proposition.
Proposition 2.4 The optimal measurement intensity m∗(ϕ¯) is increasing in ϕ¯.
Overall, the principal’s expected profit ΠC(m∗(ϕ¯), ϕ¯) decreases in ϕ¯.
Proof See appendix.
The less congruent the costless available information system S¯ is (higher ϕ¯), the
more distorted would be the motivated effort allocation if the principal uses S¯ to
provide the agent with incentives. Since this diminishes the principal’s expected
profit, it is optimal from her perspective to invest more in the improvement of
the information system aimed at mitigating effort distortion. However, improving
the information system imposes strictly convex increasing costs. Consequently, the
additional inefficiency due to an increases of ϕ¯ cannot be compensated by enhancing
m∗(·). As a result, ΠC(·) decreases in ϕ¯.
By committing to the optimal measurement intensity m∗(·), the principal en-
sures that the agent’s performance evaluation is eventually characterized by a de-
sired congruity measure ϕ(m∗(·), ϕ¯). This in turn motivates the agent to choose a
17To prove this analytically, observe that the second-order condition gives
∂2ΠC(·)
∂m2
=
1
4
‖µ‖2 [2 cos(2ϕ(·))ϕm(−ϕm) + sin (2ϕ (·)) (−ϕmm)]− C ′′(m), (2.33)
which is equivalent to
∂2ΠC(·)
∂m2
= −1
4
‖µ‖2 [2 cos(2ϕ(·))(ϕm)2 + sin (2ϕ (·))ϕmm]− C ′′(m). (2.34)
Since cos(2ϕ(·)) > 0 and sin (2ϕ (·)) > 0 for all ϕ(·) ∈ (0, pi/4), the second derivative is strictly
negative. Hence, the first-order approach is sufficient.
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more efficient effort allocation in comparison to the application of S¯. The preceding
analysis indicates that the agent’s bonus contract reflects the congruity of her per-
formance evaluation. To illustrate the effect of improving the incentive congruity on
the agent’s expected utility, observe that UA(·) changes to
UA(m∗(ϕ¯), ϕ¯) =
1
8
‖µ‖2 cos2 ϕ(m∗(ϕ¯), ϕ¯). (2.35)
Recall that 2 sin(·) cos(·) = sin(2(·)). Consequently, the first derivative of UA(·) with
respect to m is
∂UA(·)
∂m
=
1
8
‖µ‖2 sin(2ϕ(·))(−ϕm), (2.36)
which is strictly positive for all ϕ(·) ∈ (0, pi/2) since ϕm(·) < 0. Accordingly, im-
proving the information system contemporaneously implies a higher rent extraction
by the agent. This in turn constitutes indirect costs for mitigating effort distortion
if the agent faces a liability limit constraint.
2.6 Delegation
Instead of centrally investing in the improvement of the agent’s performance eval-
uation, the principal can alternatively delegate the information acquisition to a
supervisor. This can be favored by the principal if the supervisor is able to measure
the agent’s performance more efficiently than a centralized regime. However, em-
ploying a supervisor with the objective of improving the information system imposes
a second moral hazard problem. Thus, the principal needs to provide the supervi-
sor with appropriate incentives in order to ensure the implementation of a desired
measurement intensity.
Suppose the principal recruits a risk-neutral supervisor who also faces a liability
limit constraint. For parsimony, her reservation utility is normalized to zero. The
supervisor can conduct a performance measurement with the intensity mS ∈ R+ sat-
isfying assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. A strictly positive measurement intensity therefore
generates additional measures about the agent’s performance, which can be used
to enhance the congruence of her performance evaluation. The supervisor’s per-
formance measurement is therefore objective rather than subjective.18 Recall the
quantity/quality example from section 2.5. Instead of purchasing a machine veri-
fying the achievement of a quality standard, the supervisor may verify and docu-
ment the quality characteristics of produced items. Both information—the produced
quantity and achieved quality—can be appropriately combined to provide the agent
with more congruent incentives. Finally, the manipulation of generated performance
measures is assumed to be prohibitively costly for the supervisor.
For the sake of comparability, the supervisor’s disutility of conducting an arbi-
trary measurement intensity mS is CS(mS) = ηC(mS), where C(mS) is identical to
the principal’s investment costs for all mS = m. Potential differences in the mea-
surement efficiency are characterized by η ∈ R+. The ratio 1/η thereby measures the
18Subjective evaluations imply additional problems since implicit promises to reward favorable
behavior needs to be self-enforcing in repeated games [Baker et al., 1994a], or induce favoritism by
the evaluator [Prendergast and Topel, 1996].
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supervisor’s comparative advantage in generating the same performance measures
relative to the principal’s central investment.
The principal observes the realization of the binary statistic S(mS) ∈ {0, 1} but
cannot directly contract over mS. Suppose the unfavorable signal S(mS) = 0 is
realized. This can occur because either the agent indeed failed to meet her perfor-
mance objective, or the supervisor did not generate the required information such
that there exists no evidence about the implementation of the desired effort alloca-
tion. Consequently, the principal needs to provide the supervisor with incentives to
motivate a desired measurement intensity mS > 0. The principal, however, receives
several biased information about the conducted measurement intensity, which are
summarized by the binary statistic M ∈ {0, 1}.19
Assumption 2.4 Let Pr[M = 1|mS] = ρ(mS) ∈ [0, 1), where the probability ρ(mS)
to realize the favorable signal M = 1 satisfies
(i): ρ(0) = 0,
(ii): ρ(mS) is twice-continuously differentiable with ρ′(mS) > 0 and
ρ′′(mS) ≤ 0 ∀mS ≥ 0,
(iii): limmS→∞ ρ(mS) = 1 and limmS→0 ρ′(mS) =∞.
Condition (i) emphasizes that without improving the information system, the binary
statistic M can never be favorable. The second and third conditions are standard
and guarantee an interior and unique solution for the optimal measurement intensity.
In order to induce a desired measurement intensity, the principal provides the
supervisor with a bonus contract wS on the basis of the verifiable statistic M . In
particular, let
wS =
{
αS + βS, if M = 1,
αS, if M = 0, (2.37)
where αS denotes the fixed transfer and βS the bonus payment. The supervisor can
increase the probability ρ(mS) to realize the favorable signal M = 1, and conse-
quently, the likelihood to obtain the contracted bonus βS, when she enhances her
measurement intensity mS. Since the supervisor is risk-neutral, the bonus contract
provides her with the expected utility
US(mS) = αS + ρ(mS)βS − ηC(mS). (2.38)
Before deriving the optimal bonus contract for the supervisor, it is essential to briefly
consider the timing of this problem. First, the principal offers the supervisor a bonus
contract wS. If she accepts the contract and participates, it provides her with incen-
tives to implement a desired measurement intensity mS∗. Afterwards, the principal
provides the agent with a bonus contract on the basis of her anticipated performance
evaluation represented by the binary statistic S(mS∗). Then, the agent implements
effort and the supervisor subsequently generates the additional performance mea-
sure(s). Afterwards, the agent’s and supervisor’s performance evaluations S(mS∗)
19See Demougin and Fluet [2001] for a formal derivation that verifiable information about one-
dimensional effort can be summarized by a binary statistic if parties are risk-neutral.
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and M are realized and become public knowledge. Finally, all contracted payments
take place.
The agent’s bonus contract depends now on the supervisor’s induced measure-
ment intensity mS∗, but remains qualitatively the same as in section 2.5. Therefore,
we can directly turn to the derivation of the supervisor’s contract, which is aimed
at maximizing the principal’s expected profit while guaranteeing the supervisor’s
participation. Formally, the supervisor’s optimal bonus contract solves
max
αS ,βS ,mS
ΠD ≡ 1
4
‖µ‖2 cos2 ϕ (mS, ϕ¯)− αS − ρ(mS)βS (2.39)
s.t.
αS + ρ(mS)βS − ηC(mS) ≥ 0 (2.40)
mS = argmax
m˜S
αS + ρ(m˜S)βS − ηC(m˜S) (2.41)
αS + βS ≥ 0 (2.42)
αS ≥ 0. (2.43)
Condition (2.40) is the supervisor’s participation constraint and guarantees that it is
in her interest to enter into this relationship. Additionally, (2.41) is the supervisor’s
incentive constraint. Finally, conditions (2.42) and (2.43) ensure that the bonus
contract is compatible with the supervisor’s liability limit.
Proposition 2.5 The supervisor’s optimal bonus contract is characterized by the
fixed transfer αS∗ = 0 and the expected bonus
B(mS∗, η) =
ηC ′(mS∗)ρ(mS∗)
ρ′(mS∗)
. (2.44)
The optimal measurement intensity mS∗ thereby solves
1
4
‖µ‖2 sin (2ϕ (mS∗, ϕ¯)) (−ϕm) = ∂B(mS∗, η)
∂mS
. (2.45)
Then, the principal receives
ΠD(mS∗, ϕ¯, η) =
1
4
‖µ‖2 cos2 ϕ (mS∗, ϕ¯)−B(mS∗, η). (2.46)
Proof See appendix.
Consider first the supervisor’s expected bonus B(mS∗, η) which comprises the
optimal alignment to induce mS∗. Observe that the expected bonus is characterized
by the likelihood ratio ρ′(mS)/ρ(mS) which, according to Holmström [1979], mea-
sures the principal’s propensity to expect that the supervisor has not implemented
the anticipated measurement intensity mS∗ when the favorable signal M = 1 is
realized. The likelihood ratio therefore measures the precision of the supervisor’s
performance evaluation. Finally observe that B(mS∗, η) consists of the supervisor’s
relative measurement efficiency parameterized by η. The less efficient the super-
visor’s information acquisition is, characterized by a higher η, the higher must be
the expected bonus payment B(·) in order to motivate the implementation of an
arbitrary measurement intensity.
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Proposition 2.6 The supervisor extracts a rent for mS∗ > 0, which is increasing
in mS∗.
Proof The supervisor obtains a rent if R(mS∗, η) ≡ B(mS∗, η) − ηC(mS∗) > 0.
Suppose first that mS = 0. Since ρ(0) = 0, this implies that B(0, η) = 0, and
consequently, R(0, η) = 0. In order to demonstrate that R(mS∗, η) > 0 for mS∗ > 0,
we can use the first derivative of R(·) with respect to mS, which leads after re-
arranging to
∂R(·)
∂mS
=
ρ(mS)ηC ′′(mS)
ρ′(mS)
+
ρ(mS)ηC ′(mS)(−ρ′′(mS))
[ρ′(mS)]2
. (2.47)
Observe that ∂R(·)/∂mS > 0 for all mS > 0. Since R(0, η) = 0 and ∂R(·)/∂mS > 0,
it follows that R(·) > 0 for all mS∗ > 0.
Q.E.D.
Since her liability limit constraint (2.43) is binding, the supervisor extracts a
rent. This is because the principal cannot impose negative transfers to expropriate
the supervisor’s rent. However, despite the supervisor’s rent extraction, it cannot
be inferred that delegation is always less beneficial from the principal’s perspective
than a centralized investment. In particular, this depends on the supervisor’s cost
parameter η, which characterizes her comparative advantage in acquiring the desired
measures about the agent’s performance. If this relative advantage is sufficiently high
(low η), the expected bonus for inducing an arbitrary measurement intensity can be
eventually less than the principal’s required investment. In contrast, employing a
supervisor with only a slight comparative advantage can impose higher costs for an
arbitrary measurement intensity due to her rent extraction.
Next, consider the optimality condition for mS∗ emphasized by proposition 2.5.
The optimal measurement intensity mS∗ implicitly depends on two parameters: (i)
the congruity measure ϕ¯ of the costless information system S¯; and (ii), the supervi-
sor’s relative measurement efficiency η. Since both parameters determine the optimal
measurement intensity mS∗, they implicitly affect the congruity of the agent’s per-
formance evaluation, and consequently, the efficiency of her effort allocation across
tasks.
Proposition 2.7 The optimal measurement intensity mS∗(ϕ¯, η) is increasing in ϕ¯
and decreasing in η. Overall, the principal’s expected profit ΠD(mS∗(ϕ¯, η), ϕ¯, η) is
decreasing in ϕ¯ and in η.
Proof See appendix.
The first part of this result is obvious because a less congruent costless infor-
mation system induces more distortion in the agent’s effort allocation. In order to
restrict this inefficiency, it is optimal to provide the supervisor with more powerful
incentives aimed at motivating the implementation of a higher measurement inten-
sity mS∗. Note that this directly leads to a higher rent extraction by the supervisor
and by the agent. However, improving the congruity of the information system im-
poses convex increasing costs B(·). Thus, the additional inefficiency of an increasing
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ϕ¯ cannot be perfectly compensated by inducing a higher intensity mS∗(·). As a
consequence, ΠD(·) decreases in ϕ¯. Moreover, it is more costly for the principal to
motivate an arbitrary measurement intensity if the supervisor provides a less rela-
tive measurement efficiency (higher η). In this case, it is optimal to induce a lower
measurement intensity, contemporaneously implying that the principal receives a
lower expected profit.
2.7 When is Delegation Profitable?
According to previous observations, one crucial factor for the principal’s preference
in term of centralizing or delegating the information acquisition is the supervisor’s
relative measurement efficiency η. If η is sufficiently low, one can expect that the
principal favors delegation, and vice versa. However, it is not obvious how the
congruity of the costless information system ϕ¯ affects the profitability of delegation
relative to a centralized investment. The purpose of this section is therefore to
investigate, how the relationship between the congruity of the costless information
system ϕ¯ and the supervisor’s relative measurement efficiency η affect the optimal
organizational design.
Before turning to the principal’s preference for a particular organizational design
aimed at efficiently improving the information system, it is first necessary to compare
the optimal measurement intensities for both considered alternatives. Intuitively,
one could expect that the supervisor establishes a more congruent information sys-
tem if delegation is more profitable than centralization. Note, however, this is not
in general true. It particularly depends on the shape of the supervisor’s expected
bonus B(·) characterized by the inverted likelihood ratio ρ(mS)/ρ′(mS). To iden-
tify whether or not mS∗(·) > m∗(·), suppose the supervisor would implement the
same measurement intensity as the principal does in the optimum, i.e. mS = m∗(·).
Then, the supervisor’s optimal measurement intensitymS∗(·) is higher than the prin-
cipal’s optimal intensity m∗(·) if her expected bonus is less increasing in the point
mS = m∗(·) than the principal’s investment costs. Formally, mS∗(·) > m∗(·) if
∂B(m∗(·), η)
∂mS
< C ′(m∗(·)). (2.48)
I demonstrate in the appendix that this is equivalent to
ρ(m∗)
ρ′(m∗)
[
C ′′(m∗)
C ′(m∗)
− ρ
′′(m∗)
ρ′(m∗)
]
<
1− η
η
, (2.49)
where m∗ ≡ m∗(·). If the inverted likelihood ratio ρ(·)/ρ′(·) is sufficiently low in m∗
and the supervisor provides an adequate relative measurement efficiency (low η), it
is optimal from the principal’s perspective to motivate a higher measurement inten-
sity under delegation than it would be optimal for a centralized investment. In this
case, delegation leads to the provision of more congruent incentives than centraliza-
tion, thereby motivating the agent to implement less distorted effort. In general,
the principal’s decision on whether to centralize or to delegate the information ac-
quisition depends, besides the precision of the supervisor’s performance evaluation
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Figure 2.2: The Optimal Organizational Design
ρ(mS)/ρ′(mS), on the congruity of the costless information system ϕ¯, and on the
supervisor’s relative measurement efficiency η.
Proposition 2.8 There exists a cut off cost parameter η∗ ∈ (0, 1) implying that the
principal is indifferent between centralization and delegation. Moreover, η∗ is strictly
increasing (decreasing) in ϕ¯ if mS∗(·) > (≤)m∗(·).
Proof See appendix.
Delegating the information acquisition to the supervisor is only favored by the
principal if the supervisor provides a sufficient comparative advantage in measuring
the agent’s performance, which countervails her rent extraction. More interestingly,
however, is the observation that the supervisor’s minimum required measurement
efficiency is lower (higher η∗), the less congruent the costless information system is
(higher ϕ¯). This applies when the supervisor’s performance evaluation is sufficiently
precise such that delegation leads to a higher measurement intensity than centraliza-
tion. If in contrast the supervisor’s performance evaluation is sufficiently imprecise
such that mS∗(·) ≤ m∗(·), the reversed observation obtains.
The preceding observations are illustrated in figure 2.2, where the supervisor’s
relative measurement efficiency η is depicted on the horizontal axis, and the princi-
pal expected profits for centralization and delegation are represented on the vertical
axis. Since ΠC(·) is independent of η, its curve is parallel to the horizontal axis,
whereas ΠD(·) is decreasing in η, see proposition 2.7. The intersection of both curves
characterizes the cut off η∗, where the principal is indifferent between centralization
and delegation. For every η < η∗, the principal delegates the information acquisi-
tion to the supervisor, and centralizes, otherwise. Now suppose that the costless
information system becomes more incongruent, i.e. ϕ¯ increases to ϕ¯′. As a result,
it is optimal to conduct a higher measurement intensity under centralization and
delegation in order to mitigate the agent’s effort distortion, see proposition 2.4 and
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2.7. However, enhancing the measurement intensity imposes convex increasing costs,
thereby implying that ΠC(·) and ΠD(·) decrease. Observe that the decline of ΠD(·)
in ϕ¯ particularly depends on the value of η, and on whether or not mS∗(·) > m∗(·).
Suppose for a moment thatmS∗(·) > m∗(·). If η ≤ η∗, the marginal costs for enhanc-
ing the measurement intensity are lower for delegation than for centralization. As a
consequence, ΠD(·) is less decreasing in ϕ¯ than ΠC(·) for η ≤ η∗. Graphically, this
implies that η∗ increases to η∗∗. Generally speaking, the supervisor’s minimum re-
quired relative measurement efficiency for delegation to be superior, is lower, the less
congruent the costless information system is. In contrast, a more congruent informa-
tion system imposes higher requirements on the supervisor’s relative measurement
efficiency for delegation to be favored by the principal. However, if mS∗(·) ≤ m∗(·),
the reverse is true such that η∗ decreases to η∗∗∗.
To illustrate the relevance of the preceding observations for the design of or-
ganizations, consider a firm with two departments A and B, where the costless
information system about employees’ effort allocation is assumed to be more con-
gruent in department A than in B. For example, department A can be the sales
department and B the human resources department. For simplicity, assume that
there is only one costless performance measure in each department available: (i)
the achieved sales in the sales department; and (ii), the office-hours in the human
resources department. The achieved sales can thereby be inferred to be a more
congruent performance measure than the office-hours in the human resources de-
partment. Suppose the supervisor’s performance evaluation is sufficiently precise in
both departments, thereby implying mS∗(·) > m∗(·). The reversed argumentation
applies for mS∗(·) ≤ m∗(·). According to previous results, it is optimal to conduct
a higher measurement intensity in department B than in department A aimed at
improving the respective information system and hence, mitigating effort distortion.
Furthermore, the minimum required measurement efficiency a potential supervisor
has to provide, is higher for department A than for department B. This even-
tually leads to the conclusion that delegation for department B (human resources
department) is more likely than for department A (sales department) since potential
supervisors presumably meet the requirements with respect to their measurement
efficiency for department B, rather than for department A.
The previous analysis reveals that job characteristics, particulary the congruity
of costless performance measures, determine how costly performance measurement
will be organized. Particularly, if the supervisor’s performance evaluation is ade-
quately precise, the previous analysis provides two crucial implications to explain
why we can observe different practises for costly performance measurement even
within the same organization. First, a sufficiently incongruent costless information
system generally leads to delegation as the superior alternative. The rationale for
this observation is that delegation—to be preferred by the principal—requires only a
low relative measurement efficiency which is more likely to be provided by a poten-
tial supervisor. Second, the more congruent the costless information system is, the
more likely is a centralized investment in the information acquisition. This can be
observed because delegation—in order to be the more profitable alternative—would
impose high requirements on the supervisor’s relative measurement efficiency, which
is less likely to be achieved by a potential supervisor. The reverse inference applies
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if the supervisor’s performance evaluation is sufficiently imprecise.
2.8 Conclusion
In economic relationships that are subject to moral hazard, objective performance
measurement is frequently utilized to provide agents with incentives. However, ap-
plying performance measures in incentive contracts may motivate agents to imple-
ment inefficient effort allocations across relevant tasks. This occurs if an available
performance evaluation does not perfectly reflect the agent’s contribution to firm
value. Then, it is desirable from the perspective of firms to use mechanisms which
are suitable to mitigate this inefficiency. This essay investigates the costly acquisition
of additional performance measures as one mechanism to alleviate effort distortion.
The main emphasis is on the principal’s preference for either centrally investing in
assets that can be utilized to measure the agent’s performance, or delegating the
acquisition of additional measures to a supervisor.
This essay demonstrates that the less congruent the costless information sys-
tem is, the greater is the investment in its improvement aimed at restricting effort
distortion. This applies for both considered alternatives, i.e. for the centralized in-
vestment and for the delegation of the performance measurement to the supervisor.
However, enhancing the congruity of the agent’s performance evaluation does not
only improve her effort allocation, but also provides her with a higher rent due to
her liability limit.
The analysis indicates that employing a financially constrained supervisor for
measuring the agent’s performance can only be beneficial if she provides a sufficient
relative measurement efficiency, which countervails her rent extraction. This essay
illustrates that the profitability of delegation depends on three factors: (i) the pre-
cision of the supervisor’s evaluation system, (ii) the supervisor’s comparative cost
advantage in obtaining the required information; and (iii), the congruence of the
costless available information system about the agent’s effort. Particularly, if the
supervisor’s performance evaluation is sufficiently precise, this investigation leads to
the subsequent two implications. First, the principal generally prefers to delegate
the information acquisition to the supervisor if the costless information system is
sufficiently incongruent. This is because a less congruent costless information sys-
tem imposes lower requirements on the supervisor’s relative measurement efficiency,
which is more likely to be satisfied by a potential supervisor. Second, the prin-
cipal favors in general a centralized investment if the costless information system
is sufficiently congruent. This can be observed because delegation—in order to be
the superior strategy—imposes a high requirement on the supervisor’s relative mea-
surement efficiency, which is less likely to be achievable by a potential supervisor.
The reverse can be observed if the supervisor’s performance evaluation is sufficiently
imprecise.
This essay contributes to previous multi-task agency literature by shedding light
on two potential alternatives for the costly generation of additional measures about
the agent’s effort aimed at improving the efficiency of her effort allocation. However,
our understanding of how organizations respond to induced effort distortion is far
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from complete. There are several issues which are promising to consider in more
detail. First, there exists empirical evidence that non-linear compensation schemes
provoke individuals not only to distort their effort among different tasks, but also
to distort their effort over time.20 Accordingly, besides motivating an efficient ef-
fort intensity and allocation across tasks, the additional objective of performance
measurement is to motivate an efficient effort allocation over time. Furthermore,
this essay focussed on the improvement of an information system in a setting with
risk-neutral parties. The next logical step is to elaborate on the information acqui-
sition in a setting with a risk-averse agent. In this case, the purpose of acquiring
additional performance measures is not only restricted to improve her effort alloca-
tion, but also to reduce incentive risk. By incorporating a risk-averse agent in the
underlying framework, prospective research may focus on this additional trade-off.
However, I leave these important issues to future research.
20See e.g. Asch [1990] and Oyer [1998].
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2.9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1.
As emphasized, effort distortion refers to the relation of e∗ to µ. Hence, it can
be characterized by the vector product µte∗ = βAµtω¯. Applying the relation for
vector products gives µte∗ = βA‖µ‖‖ω¯‖ cos ϕ¯, where ‖ · ‖ denotes the length of the
respective vector, and ϕ¯ the angle between vector µ and vector ω¯. As demonstrated
in chapter 1, ‖µ‖, ‖ω¯‖ and βA determine the effort intensity but do not influence
the relative effort allocation. In contrast, ϕ¯ measures effort distortion.
To illustrate that ϕ¯ measures also the efficiency loss imposed by the application of
S¯ in the agent’s incentive contract, suppose first that ω¯ = ξ−1µ, ξ > 0, such that
E[S¯|e] = ξ−1µte, i.e. the expected signal is congruent with the expected firm value.
Then, the principal’s expected profit on the basis of a congruent information system
becomes Πˆ = µtµ/4. Accordingly, ∆Π ≡ Πˆ − Π∗ is the expected loss if S¯ is not
perfectly congruent. Consequently,
∆Π =
1
4
[
µtµ− (µ
tω¯)
2
ω¯tω¯
]
, (2.50)
which is equivalent to
∆Π =
(
∑
i µ
2
i )(
∑
i ω¯
2
i )− (
∑
i µiω¯i)
2
4
∑
i ω¯
2
i
. (2.51)
According to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, ∆Π ≥ 0. Applying the relations√∑
i µ
2
i = ‖µ‖ and
∑
i µiω¯i = ‖µ‖‖ω¯‖ cos ϕ¯ gives
∆Π =
1
4
‖µ‖2(1− cos2 ϕ¯) ≥ 0, (2.52)
which can be re-arranged to cos ϕ¯ ≤ 1. Consequently, ϕ¯ measures ∆Π. Finally,
ϕ¯ ∈ [0, pi/2] since µi, ω¯i ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.
To identify the effect of ϕ¯ on m∗, define
F ≡ 1
4
‖µ‖2 sin (2ϕ (m∗, ϕ¯)) (−ϕm)− C ′(m∗) = 0. (2.53)
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem gives dm∗/dϕ¯ = −(∂F/∂ϕ¯)/(∂F/∂m).
Since the second-order condition form∗ is satisfied, it follows ∂F/∂m < 0. Moreover,
∂F
∂ϕ¯
=
1
4
‖µ‖2 [2 cos(2ϕ(·))(−ϕm)ϕϕ¯ + sin(2ϕ(·))(−ϕmϕ¯)] , (2.54)
which is strictly positive for all ϕ(·) ∈ (0, pi/4). Consequently, dm∗/dϕ¯ > 0. To
identify the effect of ϕ¯ on ΠC(·), one can apply the Envelope Theorem, which gives
dΠC(m∗(ϕ¯), ϕ¯)
dϕ¯
= −1
4
‖µ‖2 sin (2ϕ(·))ϕϕ¯. (2.55)
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Observe that dΠC(·)/dϕ¯ < 0 for all ϕ(·) ∈ (0, pi/4).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.
First observe that (2.41) is equivalent to
βS(mS, η) =
ηC ′(mS)
ρ′(mS)
, (2.56)
with βS(·) as the required bonus to induce an arbitrary mS. Consequently, the
expected bonus B(mS, η) = βS(mS, η)ρ(mS) becomes
B(mS, η) =
ηC ′(mS)ρ(mS)
ρ′(mS)
. (2.57)
Note that βS(·) needs to be strictly positive in order to inducemS > 0. Consequently,
(2.42) is satisfied as long as (2.43) holds and therefore omits. The Lagrangian
therefore becomes
L(αS,mS) = 1
4
‖µ‖2 cos2 ϕ (mS, ϕ¯)− αS −B(mS, η)
+λ
[
αS +B(mS, η)− ηC(mS)]+ ξαS. (2.58)
The first-order conditions with respect to αS and mS are
− 1 + λ+ ξ = 0, (2.59)
1
4
‖µ‖2 sin (2ϕ (mS, ϕ¯)) (−ϕm)− ∂B(·)
∂mS
+ λ
[
∂B(·)
∂mS
− ηC ′(mS)
]
= 0, (2.60)
and the complementary slackness conditions,
λ
[
αS +B(·)− ηC(mS)] = 0, (2.61)
ξα = 0. (2.62)
To find a solution of this problem, suppose for a moment that λ > 0. Note that in
this case, αS + B(·) − ηC(mS) = 0 due to (2.61). Since it is required that αS ≥ 0,
this would imply that B(·) ≤ ηC(mS). In this case, the supervisor maximizes her
expected utility by choosing mS = 0. Hence, λ > 0 cannot be a solution of this
problem. Consequently, λ = 0, i.e. the supervisor’s participation constraint is not
binding. We can further infer from (2.59) that ξ = 1. Thus, in accordance to (2.62),
the principal sets αS∗ = 0. Since λ = 0, we can observe from (2.60) that mS∗ solves
1
4
‖µ‖2 sin (2ϕ (mS∗, ϕ¯)) (−ϕm) = ∂B(mS∗, η)
∂mS
. (2.63)
Next, it is necessary to proof that the first-order approach is also sufficient. Recall
from assumption 2.2 that the gross payoff is concave increasing inmS. Consequently,
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it is sufficient to show that B(·) is convex increasing in mS. The first derivative of
B(·) with respect to mS gives
∂B(·)
∂mS
= ηC ′(·) + ρ(m
S)ηC ′′(mS)
ρ′(mS)
+
ρ(mS)ηC ′(mS)(−ρ′′(mS))
[ρ′(mS)]2
, (2.64)
which is strictly positive for all mS > 0, i.e. B(·) is increasing in mS. The second
derivative leads to
∂2B(·)
∂(mS)2
= ηC ′′(·) + [ρ
′(·)ηC ′′(·) + ρ(·)ηC ′′′(·)] ρ′(·)− ρ(·)ηC ′′(·)ρ′′(·)
[ρ′(·)]2
+
[(ρ′(·)ηC ′(·) + ρ(·)ηC ′′(·)) (−ρ′′(·))] [ρ′(·)]2
[ρ′(·)]4
−2ρ(·)ηC
′(·)(−ρ′′(·))ρ′(·)ρ′′(·)
[ρ′(·)]4 , (2.65)
which can be re-arranged to
∂2B(·)
∂(mS)2
= 2ηC ′′(·) + ρ(·)ηC
′′′(·)
ρ′(·) +
ρ(·)ηC ′′(·)(−ρ′′(·))
[ρ′(·)]2
+
[ρ′(·)ηC ′(·) + ρ(·)ηC ′′(·)] [−ρ′′(·)]
[ρ′(·)]2 +
2ρ(·)ηC ′(·)(−ρ′′(·))2
[ρ′(·)]3 .(2.66)
Observe that ∂2B(·)/∂(mS)2 > 0. Accordingly, B(·) is convex increasing inmS. This
implies that the first-order approach to identify the optimal measurement intensity
is also sufficient. Finally, substituting αS∗ = 0 and mS∗ in the principal’s objective
function gives ΠD(mS∗, ϕ¯, η).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.7.
For identifying dmS∗/dϕ¯, define
F ≡ 1
4
‖µ‖2 sin (2ϕ (m∗, ϕ¯)) (−ϕm)− ∂B(·)
∂mS
= 0. (2.67)
The Implicit Function Theorem gives dmS∗/dϕ¯ = −(∂F/∂ϕ¯)/(∂F/∂mS). First, one
get
∂F
∂ϕ¯
=
1
4
‖µ‖2 [2 cos(2ϕ(·))(−ϕm)ϕϕ¯ + sin(2ϕ(·))(−ϕmϕ¯)] , (2.68)
which is strictly positive for all mS > 0 and ϕ¯ ∈ [0, pi/2). Since the second-order
condition for mS∗ is satisfied, we have ∂F/∂mS < 0. Consequently, dmS∗/dϕ¯ > 0.
The effect of η on mS∗ can be shown by applying dmS∗/dη = −(∂F/∂η)/(∂F/∂mS).
Recall that ∂F/∂mS < 0. Furthermore, the first derivative of F with respect to η
yields
∂F
∂η
= −C ′(mS)− ρ(m
S)C ′′(mS)
ρ′(mS)
− ρ(m
S)C ′(mS)(−ρ′′(mS))
[ρ′(mS)]2
, (2.69)
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which is strictly negative for all mS > 0. Consequently, dmS∗/dη < 0. To illustrate
the effect of η on ΠD(·), one can apply the Envelope Theorem, which gives
dΠD(·)
dη
= −∂B(·)
∂η
= −C
′(mS)ρ(mS)
ρ′(mS)
. (2.70)
Thus, dΠD(·)/dη < 0 for all mS∗ > 0.
Q.E.D.
Comparison of Measurement Intensities.
First, recall that
∂B(·)
∂mS
= ηC ′(·) + ρ(m
S)ηC ′′(mS)
ρ′(mS)
+
ρ(mS)ηC ′(mS)(−ρ′′(mS))
[ρ′(mS)]2
. (2.71)
Consequently, C ′(m∗(·)) > ∂B(m∗(·), η)/∂mS is equivalent to
1− η
η
C ′(m∗(·)) > ρ(m
∗(·))C ′′(m∗(·))
ρ′(m∗(·)) +
ρ(m∗(·))C ′(m∗(·)) [−ρ′′(m∗(·))]
[ρ′(m∗(·))]2 . (2.72)
This can be transformed to
1− η
η
>
C ′′(m∗(·))
C ′(m∗(·))
ρ(m∗(·))
ρ′(m∗(·)) +
ρ(m∗(·)) [−ρ′′(m∗(·))]
[ρ′(m∗(·))]2 , (2.73)
and hence,
1− η
η
>
ρ(m∗(·))
ρ′(m∗(·))
[
C ′′(m∗(·))
C ′(m∗(·)) −
ρ′′(m∗(·))
ρ′(m∗(·))
]
. (2.74)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.8.
Observe that η∗ implies F ≡ ΠD(mS∗(ϕ¯, η∗), ϕ¯, η)−ΠC(m∗(ϕ¯), ϕ¯) = 0. Suppose first
that η ≥ 1. Due to rent extraction, inducing an arbitrary measurement intensity
is more costly under delegation than under centralization. Accordingly, we have
B(m) > ηC(m) ≥ C(m) for allm > 0 and η ≥ 1. In contrast, if η = 0, the supervisor
can be induced to implement mS →∞ with B(mS, 0) = 0. In this case, delegation
is strictly superior. Moreover, recall from proposition 2.7 that dΠD(·)/dη < 0 for all
mS∗ > 0. Consequently, there exists a cut off η∗ ∈ (0, 1) implying that the principal
is indifferent between centralization and delegation.
To identify the effect of ϕ¯ on η∗, one can apply the Implicit Function Theorem,
which gives dη∗/dϕ¯ = −(∂F/∂ϕ¯)/(∂F/∂η). In order to derive ∂F/∂ϕ¯, it useful to
apply the Envelope Theorem for ΠC(·) and ΠD(·) separately. Thus,
∂ΠD(·)
∂ϕ¯
= −1
4
‖µ‖2 sin (2ϕ (mS∗(·), ϕ¯))ϕϕ¯(mS∗), (2.75)
and
∂ΠC(·)
∂ϕ¯
= −1
4
‖µ‖2 sin (2ϕ (m∗(·), ϕ¯))ϕϕ¯(m∗). (2.76)
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Since
∂F
∂ϕ¯
=
∂ΠD(·)
∂ϕ¯
− ∂Π
C(·)
∂ϕ¯
, (2.77)
we have
∂F
∂ϕ¯
=
‖µ‖2
4
[
sin (2ϕ (m∗(·), ·)) ϕϕ¯|m∗(·)
− sin (2ϕ (mS∗(·), ·)) ϕϕ¯|mS∗(·)] . (2.78)
Observe that ∂F/∂ϕ¯ > 0 if
sin (2ϕ (m∗(·), ϕ¯))
sin (2ϕ (mS∗(·), ϕ¯)) >
ϕϕ¯(m
S∗(·))
ϕϕ¯(m∗(·)) . (2.79)
Recall first that ϕ(mS∗(·), ϕ¯) < ϕ(m∗(·), ϕ¯) if mS∗(·) > m∗(·). Consequently,
sin(2ϕ(mS∗(·), ϕ¯)) < sin(2ϕ(m∗(·), ϕ¯)), (2.80)
for ϕ(·) ∈ [0, pi/2]. Moreover, ϕϕ¯|m∗(·) > ϕϕ¯|mS∗(·). This eventually implies that
(2.79) is satisfied for mS∗(·) > m∗(·). Therefore, ∂F/∂ϕ¯ > 0 if mS∗(·) > m∗(·). In
contrast, ∂F/∂ϕ¯ ≤ 0 if mS∗(·) ≤ m∗(·). Finally observe that ΠC(·) is independent
of η. Thus, the Envelope Theorem gives
∂F
∂η
=
∂ΠD(·)
∂η
= −∂B(·)
∂η
= −ρ(·)C
′(·)
ρ′(·) , (2.81)
which is strictly negative for all mS∗(·) > 0. Thus, dη∗/dϕ¯ > 0 if mS∗(·) > m∗(·);
and dη∗/dϕ¯ ≤ 0, otherwise.
Q.E.D.
Essay 3
Vertical Collusion, Incongruent
Preferences in Inter-Firm Trade,
and the Theory of the Firm
3.1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Coase [1937], a stream of economic literature has emerged
to focus on explanations of why firms exist and utilize non-market in place of mar-
ket transactions. The question is still valid today: What are the conditions driving
firms to assimilate outside transactions even though integrated transactions im-
pose further inefficiencies due to moral hazard or hidden characteristics of agents?1
As Williamson [1979] argued, the main rationale for firms’ decision on whether to
utilize integrated or non-integrated transactions is rooted in the associated costs.
According to Williamson [1979] it is beneficial to integrate transactions so long as
an organization can achieve the same objective to lower costs than by using pure
market transactions. Empirical evidence supports this argumentation by demon-
strating that the characteristics of transaction costs are crucial for organizational
design (see e.g. Joskow [1988]).
In addition to agency costs arising from moral hazard or the hidden character-
istics of agents, Tirole [1986] illustrated a further source of internal inefficiencies
that stems from agents’ incentives for side-contracting–what is commonly referred
to as collusion.2 Even though Tirole [1986], among others, restricted his analysis
1See Eisenhardt [1989] for an early survey of agency literature with distinctions being made
between these two streams. For surveys with the emphasis on moral hazard see e.g. Prendergast
[1999], Lambert [2001], Gibbons [2005], and Christensen and Feltham [2005]; and for adverse
selection refer e.g. to Salanié [1997] and Bolton and Dewatripont [2005] and the references therein.
2Particularly, collusion among agents within the same hierarchical level may serve one of the
subsequent intentions: (i) to hide the efficiency characteristic of agents [Laffont and Meleu, 1997,
Laffont and Martimort, 2000]; (ii) to share risk [Itoh, 1993]; and, (iii) to misreport production
costs [Laffont and Martimort, 1997]. In contrast, vertical side-contracting usually occurs among a
supervisor and an agent whereby the supervisor may observe specific information such as random
productivity shocks [Tirole, 1986, Kofman and Lawarree, 1993, Villadsen, 1995], the true costs of an
implemented project [Strausz, 1997], the agent’s type [Faure-Grimaud et al., 2003], or the agent’s
effort implementation [Kessler, 2000]. Under such circumstances, the agent may have incentives
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to the integrated case and determined conditions ensuring collusion-proofness, it is
intuitive to expand on this preliminary foundation to concentrate on the next logical
question of whether potential collusion leads to the application of market instead
of integrated transactions. From this angle, collusive behavior within organizations
constitutes inefficiencies and imposes costs for integrated transactions, which in turn
would imply that the exploitation of the market may be a device for avoiding these
expenditures.
Utilizing the market for bypassing internal inefficiencies—such as collusion—
may have its own drawback. Spot market transactions between firms in competitive
markets appear to be beneficial as long as exchanged goods are not required to be
tailored to the needs of particular demanding firms. Things are different, however,
when demanding firms require unique adjustments of exchanged goods necessary
for their own processing. In this case, the value of spot market transactions is lim-
ited because supplying firms are motivated to adjust their products with the aim of
maximizing the market price they can achieve, rather than satisfying the require-
ments of a single potential trading partner. Generally speaking, supplying firms’
preferences with respect to configure their products are not necessarily congruent
with the requisites of specific demanding firms. By utilizing inter-firm trade for ac-
quiring goods, demanding firms are potentially compelled to purchase less suitable
products than desired. Nevertheless, engaging in bilateral long-term relationships
with one supplying firm may ensure the exchange of sufficiently tailored goods. This
particularly requires relation-specific investments from the supplying firm aimed at
customizing its goods. However, making relation-specific investments in order to
satisfy one demanding firm’s prerequisites is only beneficial if holdup is not antici-
pated. As shown by Baker et al. [2002], Halonen [2002] and Itoh and Morita [2005],
vertical integration can be a remedy for holdup problems.3
The purpose of this essay is to illustrate the trade-off between internal and exter-
nal inefficiencies by means of collusion among agents within firms and incongruent
preferences between firms. It investigates the consequences associated with (i) firms’
decisions on whether to integrate transactions or to utilize the market, and (ii) the
properties of contractual arrangements. The analysis in this essay suggests that
the effect of potential collusion is twofold. First, it may force firms to adopt mar-
ket transactions even though integrated transactions would have been more efficient
otherwise. Second, the contingency of collusion may also be beneficial under specific
circumstances if it facilitates the achievement, or enhances the profitability, of supe-
rior relational contracts within and between firms. As further shown, incongruent
preferences between firms for the properties of exchanged goods affect the efficiency
of long-term market relations intended to motivate relation-specific investments.
The investigation in this essay indicates that more congruent preferences with re-
spect to the properties of exchanged goods, are disadvantageous from demanding
firms’ perspectives because they impose higher costs to motivate the supplier to
make relation-specific investments. On the other hand, diverging requirements for
for side-contracting in order to motivate the supervisor to withhold or misrepresent her private
information.
3The Fisher Body-General Motors case reported in Klein et al. [1978] is a widely used example
for illustrating holdup. For a summary of extreme examples of holdup see Shavell [2005].
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goods between demanding and supplying firms (incongruent preferences) do not af-
fect the value of spot market transactions from the demanding firms’ perspectives.
This is observable because the exchange of goods with less suitable properties leads
to a lower transfer price, thereby leaving the profitability of spot market transaction
unaffected.
This essay contributes to contemporary literature in the theory of the firm in two
ways. First, it defines how potential collusion within organizations can be a rationale
for market transactions even though an internal production process appears to be
more efficient. Second, it illuminates how incongruent preferences between firms for
the characteristics of exchanged goods determine the contractual arrangements for
their bilateral relationship.
This essay is related to following strands of literature. First, the framework in
this essay builds on the model established by Baker et al. [2002], who also deal with
optimal transactions within and between firms. They analyze how asset owner-
ship facilitate the achievement of superior relational contracts, which in turn affects
the properties of intra-firm and inter-firm transactions. The subsequently proposed
framework therefore also comprises implicit (or relational) contracts within firms as
analyzed e.g. by Bull [1987], Pearce and Stacchetti [1998], and Levin [2003]; and
between firms as considered by Telser [1980] and Klein and Leffler [1981]. Second,
this essay is related to the literature analyzing vertical side-contracting, as e.g. Ti-
role [1986], Kofman and Lawarree [1993] and Villadsen [1995]. Third, this essay also
deals with relation-specific investments as analyzed by Edlin and Reichelstein [1996],
Baker et al. [2001, 2002], Halonen [2002], and Itoh and Morita [2005]. Nevertheless,
this essay differs from prior studies in two main aspects. First, it elaborates on
collusion as a supplementary contribution to the theory of the firm. The objective is
to illustrate how potential side-contracting within firms can be a rational for market
transaction aimed at bypassing this internal inefficiency. Second, this essay exem-
plifies how different preferences affect the characteristics of inter-firm transactions.
This essay proceeds as follows. I introduce the basic model in section 3.2 and
derive the first-best solution as a benchmark in section 3.3. The optimal contractual
arrangements for the different types of transactions are derived in section 3.4, and
compared in section 3.5 with the emphasis on how collusion within, and incongru-
ent preferences between firms affect the properties of transactions. Furthermore, I
illustrate in section 3.6 the value of verifiable but imperfect signals for the efficiency
of transactions. Section 3.7 summarizes the main results and concludes.
3.2 The Model
Consider a risk-neutral market participant (firm) referred henceforth as the down-
stream party. In every period, she needs a preliminary product in order to sustain
her production, e.g. engines or windshields for manufacturing cars. The downstream
party owns an asset which can be utilized to produce this good. However, she lacks
either the ability or the time to produce the good by herself.
The good is differently valued by the downstream party and other market par-
ticipants, possibly due to diverse usage intentions. In particular, the downstream’s
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(internal) good value Ii and the market’s (external) value Ei can be either high
(i = H) or low (i = L), where ∆I ≡ IH − IL and ∆E ≡ EH −EL are the respective
spreads between the high and low value. Independent of the realized good value, the
downstream party always prefers an internal use to maintain her production instead
of selling it on the market. This requires that the low internal value exceeds the high
external value, or formally, IH > IL > EH > EL ≥ 0, where for parsimony, EL = 0.
The realized internal and external good value are observable by all involved entities
but non-verifiable by third parties. This occurs for instance when the attainment
of a certain quality standard is predominant in the valuation of a good. Quality
is observable and involved parties are able to assess whether or not a previously
defined quality standard is achieved. Nonetheless, it is sometimes either impossible
to verify the achieved quality, or the associated costs are prohibitively high.
The downstream party can choose among two alternatives to obtain the required
good: (i) she can purchase the good from another risk-neutral market participant
(firm) referred henceforth as the upstream party (market transaction); or (ii), she
can utilize an integrated production (employment). The upstream party owns a
similar asset as the downstream party such that their production technologies are
identical.
If the downstream party utilizes an integrated production, she requires the service
of a worker as the productive entity. The worker is risk-neutral and financially
constrained (limited liability). For parsimony, her reservation utility is zero.4
In every period, depending on the chosen transaction, either the worker (W ) or
the upstream party (U) implements non-verifiable effort ei = (ei1, ..., ein)t, i = W,U ,
ei ∈ Rn+.5 Effort imposes strictly convex increasing costs C(ei) = etiei/2, i = W,U ,
which, for simplification purposes, are assumed to be identical for the worker and
upstream party.6 By choosing the respective effort intensity and allocation, the
worker or upstream party determine the probability of whether the internal and
external good value will be high or low. More precisely, let
Prob{Ii = IH |ei} = min{µtei, 1},
Prob{Ei = EH |ei} = min{ωtei, 1}
be the probabilities that the high internal and external, and
Prob{Ii = IL|ei} = 1−min{µtei, 1},
Prob{Ei = EL|ei} = 1−min{ωtei, 1}
be the probabilities that the low internal and external good value will be realized.
These probabilities are further conditional independent, where µ = (µ1, ..., µn)t
and ω = (ω1, ..., ωn)t, µ,ω ∈ Rn+, characterize the marginal effect of ei on the
4It is well known that financially constrained agents extract economic rents if their reservation
utility is sufficiently low, see e.g. Demougin and Fluet [2001] and Demougin and Helm [2005].
Thus, assuming a small but strictly positive reservation utility does not change the subsequent
results.
5All vectors are column vectors, where ‘t’ denotes the transpose.
6The upstream’s costs for implementing an arbitrary eU can be either her own disutility of
effort, or her costs for motivating a worker as productive party.
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probabilities to realize the respective high good value. For parsimony, it is assumed
that ‖µ‖ = ‖ω‖ = 1, i.e. the lengths of µ and ω are normalized to one.
Next, consider an integrated production. Since the realized good value is non-
verifiable, the downstream party cannot use this information to provide the worker
with an explicit incentive contract. The downstream party, however, may recruit a
supervisor who is charged with confirming the manifested good value (supervision).
Due to her supposedly neutral position, the supervisor’s confirmation eventually
potentiates that the final internal good value is ‘quasi-verifiable’ from the courts’
perspective such that it can be applied in explicit incentive contracts. The supervisor
is risk-neutral and her best alternative provides her with the utility U¯S.
However, employing a supervisor for acquiring ‘quasi-verifiable’ information may
have one drawback. Suppose the downstream party provides the worker with a bonus
contract contingent on the realized internal good value affirmed by the supervisor. If
the low value is realized, the worker might prefer to bribe the supervisor so that she
reports a high good value. In this case, the downstream party is forced to pay the
contracted bonus. If the final good is one of high value, the downstream party could
be better off by bribing the supervisor into confirming a low good value in order to
avoid the bonus payment. Consequently, empowering the supervisor to eventually
confirm the realized good value may lead to side-contracting between the supervisor
and either the worker or the downstream party, and contradicts the objective of
supervision.
As pointed out earlier, one further alternative for the downstream party is to
purchase the good from the upstream party. Utilizing a market relation with the
upstream party, however, may imply one disadvantage: the upstream part is not
necessarily intended to adapt her production with the aim of maximizing the down-
stream’s internal good value. In fact, she wants to maximize the transfer price she
may obtain in exchange for the good. The preferences between the downstream
party and upstream party are therefore not necessarily aligned and deemed to be
incongruent. This may motivate the upstream party to implement an inefficient
effort allocation from the downstream’s perspective. Suppose for a moment that
there exists a constant λ > 0 satisfying µ = λω. In this case, maximizing the
expected internal good value requires the same effort allocation as maximizing the
expected external good value. This implies perfectly aligned preferences between the
downstream and upstream party in terms of a particular effort allocation. If there
exists no constant λ > 0 satisfying µ = λω, maximizing the internal and external
good value are competing objectives in the sense that they require the implemen-
tation of a different effort allocation. Yet, the upstream’s incentives depart from
the preferences of the downstream party if she also wants to enhance the expected
external good value rather than focussing exclusively on maximizing the expected
internal value. The relation between vector µ and vector ω in the n-dimensional
space is characterized by the angle ϕ, which I refer henceforth as the dimension of
incongruent preferences induced by the production technology.
The downstream party cannot only choose between an integrated and market
transaction, she can also decide on the type of contract she applies. This can be
either an explicit contract about verifiable information (spot contract), or a rela-
tional contract about observable, but non-verifiable information such as the realized
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Transaction Contract
Spot Contract Relational Contract
Integration Employment Spot Employment (SE) Relational Employment (RE)
Supervision Supervision (S)
Market Spot Market (SM) Relational Market (RM)
Table 3.1: Combinations of Transactions and Contracts
internal good value Ii.7 The subsequently considered combinations of transactions
and contracts are summarized in table 3.1.
Relational (or implicit) contracts refer to contracts, for which some elements are
not enforceable by third parties [MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989], or are prohibitively
costly to specify ex ante [Baker et al., 2002]. As demonstrated by extant literature,
relational contracts contingent on non-verifiable information can be self-enforcing,
and therefore, credible in repeated games.8 To incorporate relational contracts into
the subsequent framework, I assume that all parties live forever such that they can
interact for an infinite number of periods. Infinitely living parties, however, can be
achieved by assuming overlapping generations of individuals who in turn live only
a certain number of periods [Thomas and Worrall, 1988]. Suppose for a moment
that all parties interact only for a finite number of periods and share the same
belief about which period is the last. In the last period, no party stays on implicit
agreements due to the lack of prospective punishments. Going one period back, we
can observe the same situation: since there is no prospective punishment, honoring
implicit agreements cannot be a dominant strategy. We can continue this procedure
until we reach the first period. Accordingly, interacting for a finite time horizon
implies that relational contracts are not feasible.9
Finally, all parties share the same interest rate r and play a trigger strategy:
once they detect a violation of implicit obligations, they will never rely on implicit
agreements with the violator again. Particulary, I follow Thomas and Worrall’s
[1988] argumentation that firms obtain a bad reputation on the labor market, once
they breached contracts. Accordingly, the violation of implicit obligations becomes
common knowledge on the labor market such that no other worker trusts the down-
stream party and refuses to enter into a relationship founded on implicit agreements.
However, if no participant has incentives to deviate ex post from her previously stip-
ulated obligations, relational contracts are self-enforcing and eliminate opportunistic
behavior.
7See e.g. Hayes and Schaefer [2000] for empirical evidence that privately observed information
are frequently components of incentive contracts.
8Refer e.g. to Telser [1980], Radner [1985], Bull [1987], Thomas and Worrall [1988], or MacLeod
and Malcomson [1989] for comprehensive analyzes and discussions of relational contracts.
9Alternatively, some authors assume uncertainty about the duration of the interaction. This
uncertainty can thereby also ensure that relational obligations are honored, see e.g. Telser [1980]
and Schöttner [2005].
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3.3 The First-Best Outcome
Before turning to the different organizational forms, let us briefly consider the first-
best solution as a benchmark. Recall that the worker’s and upstream’s costs for
implementing an arbitrary effort vector are identical. Therefore, the first-best so-
lution is independent of whether the worker or the upstream party is in charge of
producing the good. Since an internal use of the good is always optimal from the
downstream’s perspective, the first-best effort vector efb maximizes the difference
between the expected internal good value and the corresponding production costs.
Formally, efb solves
max
e
Π ≡ IL +∆Iµte− 1
2
ete. (3.1)
Assume for a moment that Prob{Ii = IH |efb} < 1, i.e. efb characterizes an interior
solution. Then, the downstream party assigns efb = ∆Iµ. Observe that efb consists
of two components: the scalar ∆I and the vector µ. The spread of the internal good
value ∆I thereby determines the first-best effort intensity, whereas the relative effort
allocation across tasks is characterized by µ. To see this, consider two arbitrary
first-best activities efbi and e
fb
j , i 6= j. The relative effort allocation is thereby
characterized by
efbi
efbj
=
µi
µj
, i, j = 1, ..., n, i 6= j. (3.2)
The relative effort allocation obviously shifts towards a higher focus on activity i,
the higher its marginal effect µi on the probability to realize the high internal good
value is, and vice versa. Roughly speaking, the first-best effort allocation reflects
the relative importance of tasks with respect to producing the high internal good
value. If, however, there exists no constant λ > 0 for any implemented effort vector
e satisfying efb = λe, the effort allocation deviates from first-best and is deemed to
be distorted.
The first-best effort vector efb was previously assumed to characterize an interior
solution. Note, however, that the implementation of efb = ∆Iµ leads to
Prob{Ii = IH |efb} = min{∆I, 1} (3.3)
As a consequence, we obtain a corner solution for ∆I ≥ 1. To ensure interior
solutions, I assume henceforth that ∆I,∆E < 1.10
Provided that ∆I < 1 and the productive party implements efb, the down-
stream’s receives
Πfb = IL +
1
2
(∆I)2, (3.4)
which is convex increasing in the spread of the internal good value ∆I, and inde-
pendent from the external good value Ei.
10Alternatively, one can let ∆I,∆E > 1 by assuming that µtµ and ωtω are sufficiently small.
In this case, the lengths of µ and ω appear in the subsequent solutions. Since this does not provide
additional insights, I decided for the first alternative for parsimony purposes.
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3.4 Organizational Forms
In subsequent sections, I elaborate on the different types of transactions and con-
tractual arrangements as summarized in table 3.1. The main focus is on the char-
acteristics and efficiency of the contractual arrangements within and between firms.
3.4.1 Spot Employment
Consider first the case where the downstream party recruits a worker as the pro-
ductive party. Since verifiable information about the realized good value are not
available, the downstream party cannot provide the worker with an enforceable in-
centive contract. However, the downstream party can promise to pay a bonus if
the high internal good value is realized. Once this occurs, the downstream party
can take the good without paying the promised bonus since she owns the asset and
possesses the related property rights [Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore,
1990]. Anticipating this behavior, the worker is better off by implementing her least
costly effort vector eW = (0, ..., 0)t. Consequently, the downstream party obtains
ΠD|SE = IL under spot employment.
3.4.2 Relational Employment
In contrast to spot employment, suppose the downstream party interacts with the
worker for an infinite number of periods such that a relational contract might be
self-enforcing. In order to provide appropriate incentives, the downstream party can
promise the worker to pay a bonus β in addition to a fixed transfer α in the event
that the high internal good value is realized. The worker’s binary wage payment
wW takes thereby the form
wW =
{
α+ β, if Ii = IH
α, if Ii = IL,
(3.5)
where the worker’s liability limit requires that all transfers have to be non-negative.
As a result of the implicit nature of this bonus contract, the downstream’s
promise to pay β needs to be reliable in order to be effective. A relational con-
tract based on Ii can be credible, and therefore self-enforcing, if the downstream
party stands to lose more by violating this agreement than by fulfilling her (non-
enforceable) obligations. To derive a sufficient condition which guarantees the com-
pletion of the downstream’s implicit obligations, suppose the worker initially trusts
the downstream party that she will pay the promised bonus β if Ii = IH . In this case,
she is motivated to implement effort such that the probability for realizing the high
internal good value is strictly positive. Consider now the case where a high internal
good value is indeed realized. The downstream party only pays the promised bonus
if she values a sustained relationship with the worker based on implicit obligations
more than the short-term gain she obtains by reneging on β. The downstream party
is therefore not tempted to renege on β if
− β + Π
D|RE
r
≥ Π˜
RE
r
, (3.6)
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where
Π˜RE ≡ max{ΠD|SE,ΠD|S,ΠD|SM ,ΠD|RM}
is the downstream’s expected profit she could obtain under her best alternative. Af-
ter reneging occurred, no worker wants to enter into a relationship with the down-
stream party based on implicit contracts. Accordingly, the downstream party can
henceforth either choose spot employment (SE) or may employ the supervisor (S)
in order to receive contractible information. Alternatively, she can also utilize a
market relation with the upstream party based on explicit (SM) or implicit (RM)
contracts.
The left side of (3.6) represents the downstream’s expected payoff when she
acts honestly, i.e. paying the promised bonus β but obtaining ΠD|RE in the future.
In order to be deterred from reneging, this needs to be greater than the present
value of her best fall-back position Π˜RE. If this condition is satisfied, the worker
anticipates that the downstream party delivers on her promise to pay β when Ii = IH ,
and therefore, is motivated to implement effort. In contrast, if (3.6) is violated,
the worker anticipates the downstream’s reneging temptation and chooses her least
costly effort vector eW = (0, ..., 0)t. In this case, the downstream party receives
ΠD|RE = IL.
The optimal implicit bonus contract maximizes the difference between the ex-
pected internal good value and the worker’s expected wage payment. However, the
objective of the optimal relational employment contract is not only restricted to
provide the worker with appropriate incentives, it is also required to be compatible
with the previously derived self-enforcement condition. Consequently, the optimal
bonus contract solves
max
α,β,eW
ΠD|RE ≡ IL +∆IµteW − α− βµteW (3.7)
s.t.
α+ βµteW − 1
2
etWeW ≥ 0 (3.8)
eW ∈ argmax
e˜W
α+ βµte˜W − 1
2
e˜tW e˜W (3.9)
α+ β ≥ 0 (3.10)
α ≥ 0 (3.11)
IL +∆Iµ
teW − α− βµteW − Π˜RE ≥ βr. (3.12)
Condition (3.8) is the worker’s participation constraint and guarantees that it is
in her interest to enter into this relationship. Furthermore, (3.9) is the worker’s
incentive constraint. Conditions (3.10) and (3.11) ensure that the bonus contract is
compatible with the worker’s liability limit. Finally, (3.12) is the self-enforcement
condition and ensures that the relational bonus contract does not motivate the
downstream party to renege ex post on β.
The worker’s incentive constraint implies that she implements eW = βµ in order
to maximize her expected utility. The subsequent proposition further emphasizes
the optimal relational bonus contract for all values of r.
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Proposition 3.1 Under relational employment, the optimal bonus contract is char-
acterized by α∗ = 0 and
β∗(r) =

∆I
2
, if r ≤ rRE
1
2
(∆I − r) + φ, if rRE < r ≤ r̂RE
0, if r̂RE < r.
(3.13)
The downstream party receives
ΠD|RE(r) =

IL +
1
4
(∆I)2, if r ≤ rRE
r
2
[∆I − r + 2φ] + Π˜RE, if rRE < r ≤ r̂RE
IL, if r̂RE < r,
(3.14)
where
rRE ≡ ∆I
2
− 2
∆I
[
Π˜RE − IL
]
r̂RE ≡ ∆I − 2
[
Π˜RE − IL
] 1
2
φ ≡
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − Π˜RE
] 1
2
.
Proof See appendix.
If r ≤ rRE, the downstream party sufficiently values a sustained relationship with
the worker such that her promise to pay the optimal bonus β∗ = ∆/2 is credible.
Anticipating that the downstream party adheres on her implicit obligations, the
worker is motivated to implement e∗W = β∗µ. Note, however, that the downstream’s
expected profit for r ≤ rRM is less than her expected first-best profit, see section
3.3. To identify the reason, observe that the optimal bonus contract provides the
worker with the expected utility
EUW |RE =
1
8
(∆I)2. (3.15)
Apparently, EUW |RE > 0, i.e. the worker extracts a rent which is convex increasing
in the spread of the internal good value ∆I. This is deducible from the fact that it
is optimal from the downstream’s perspective to provide more powerful incentives
through a higher bonus β∗ if ∆I increases. However, since negative payments are
not compatible with the worker’s liability limit, the downstream party must leave
her a rent.
For rRE < r ≤ r̂RE, however, the downstream party cannot credibly promise
to pay β∗ = ∆I/2. To motivate the worker nevertheless to implement effort, she
needs to adjust the bonus aimed at satisfying the self-enforcement condition (3.12).
Observe that β∗(r) is decreasing in r. A higher interest rate r implies a less se-
vere ‘punishment’ for the downstream party for violating the implicit contract. To
eliminate her ex post reneging temptation, the downstream party needs to adjust
3. COLLUSION AND INCONGRUENT PREFERENCES 69
the bonus β∗(r) appropriately. However, the more β∗(r) deviates from the efficient
bonus β∗ = ∆I/2, the lower is the downstream expected profit. If r > r̂RE, the
downstream party cannot find a strictly positive bonus which eliminates her reneg-
ing temptation. As a result, β∗ = 0, and the downstream party obtains the spot
employment profit.
3.4.3 Supervision
As shown, the downstream party cannot motivate the worker to implement effort
if a relational contract contingent on Ii is not self-enforcing. Alternatively, the
downstream party can employ a supervisor who is in charge of affirming the realized
good value. This eventually ensures that the good value becomes ‘quasi-verifiable’
and can be applied in an enforceable incentive contract.
The supervisor is unproductive but can confirm the realized good value without
costs. Verifying the worker’s conducted effort, however, is prohibitively costly. If
the supervisor is indifferent between a truthful and non-truthful confirmation, it is
assumed that she reveals her observation truthfully. In exchange for her service, the
downstream party offers the supervisor the payment wS.
As a benchmark, let us first consider the collusion-free case.11 After observing
the realized good value, the supervisor reveals her observation truthfully such that
the downstream party is forced to pay β∗ if Ii = IH . Accordingly, employing a
supervisor is a commitment device for the downstream party to pay a promised
bonus if the high internal good value is realized.
The downstream party wants to maximize the difference between the expected
internal good value and the expected compensations for the worker and supervisor.
Their optimal contracts thereby solve
max
α,β,eW ,wS
ΠD|S ≡ IL +∆IµteW − α− βµteW − wS (3.16)
s.t.
wS ≥ U¯S (3.17)
(3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.11),
where (3.17) is the supervisor’s participation constraint. Observe that this max-
imization problem is basically identical to the one considered in section 3.4.2 for
relational employment, except that now wS appears in the downstream’s objective
function, and the self-enforcement condition for relational employment does not ap-
ply. Additionally, it is required that wS ≥ U¯S in order to ensure the supervisor’s
participation. To minimize her costs, the downstream party sets wS such that the
supervisor’s participation constraint becomes binding, i.e. wS = U¯S. Since wS does
not influence the worker’s incentive contract, we obtain the same optimal bonus
contract for the worker as under relational employment for r ≤ rRE. Accordingly,
11Throughout this essay it is important to distinguish between the collusion-free case and a
collusion-proof contract. In the collusion-free case, side-contracting is excluded by assumption,
whereas a collusion-proof contract refers to a contract ensuring that no party can improve her
payoff by side-contracting [Tirole, 1986].
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α∗ = 0 and β∗ = ∆I/2. This also leads to the implication that the worker re-
ceives the same expected utility. Given the optimal contracts for the worker and
supervisor, the downstream party receives under collusion-free supervision
ΠD|S = IL +
1
4
(∆I)2 − U¯S. (3.18)
Notice that employing a supervisor is only beneficial if her contribution to the down-
stream’s expected profit exceeds her compensation wS = U¯S. Formally, her employ-
ment is profitable in comparison to spot employment if
wS = U¯S <
1
4
(∆I)2. (3.19)
Otherwise, the downstream party is at least better off by choosing spot employment.
Since one purpose of this essay is to illustrate the consequences of collusion with the
supervisor on the optimal transactions, I shall assume for the subsequent analysis
that (3.19) holds.
Next, consider the case where collusion among the supervisor and either the
worker or downstream party is potentially a dominant strategy. The realized internal
good value eventually determines who might be better off by bribing the supervisor
for spuriously claiming that the other value is realized. Particularly, if the low
value is realized, the worker may have incentives to bribe the supervisor with the
purpose of obtaining her bonus. In contrast, the downstream party may prefer to
bribe the supervisor into confirming a low realized good value if the high value is
realized. In this case, the downstream’s objective is to avoid the payment of β∗. If
the supervisor accepts the respective bribe, she does not deviate from the stipulated
behavior and confirms the requested good value.12 From the perspective of the
external observers such as the courts, the worker and the downstream party are the
immediate parties involved in the dispute over the value of the realized good whereas
the supervisor is the supposedly neutral entity in this conflict. Due to individuals’
tendency for personal gain, the court naturally assumes that the worker will always
report a high value whereas the downstream party will always report the opposite.
Therefore, the statement from the supervisor as a supposed ‘neutral’ party will have
a greater weightage in swaying the court’s decision. Collusion will thus work in favor
of the colluding parties because the deceived party will have to convince the court
of sufficient grounds in overturning her original judgment. To do so, however, the
deceived party will not only have to prove the good’s value, which itself is either
exceedingly difficult or prohibitively expensive, but she will also have to demonstrate
the existence of collusion, which is virtually impossible.
All involved parties can perfectly infer that collusion occurred once the confirmed
good value deviates from the observed one. The occurrence of collusion is thereby
considered as a breach of the implicit promise not to engage in side-contracting. Due
12It is not unusual in the collusion literature to assume that collusion is per se enforceable,
see Tirole [1992] for a discussion, and for exemplary models of enforceable side-contracting see
e.g. Tirole [1986], Kofman and Lawarree [1993], Villadsen [1995], Faure-Grimaud et al. [2001] and
Faure-Grimaud et al. [2003]. There exists also experimental evidence that promises are honored
among agents, see Dawes and Thaler [1988] for a survey. Nevertheless, some authors explicitly
focus on enforcement mechanisms of side-contracting as e.g. Tirole [1992] and Martimort [1999].
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to the trigger-strategy of all involved parties, the violators—the one who eventually
bribed the supervisor successfully and the supervisor herself—are never trusted to
honor implicit agreements again. Suppose the worker is the one who engaged in
side-contracting with the supervisor. The downstream party dismisses both of them
and, if she still prefers supervision, employs a different worker and supervisor from
the labor market. However, things are different when the downstream party colludes
with the supervisor. In this case, no worker in the labor market relies on implicit
agreements with the downstream party again. Consequently, her alternatives shrink
to spot employment as internal transaction, and either spot or relational transactions
with the upstream party.
Next, let us derive collusion-proofness conditions preventing side-contracting
among the supervisor and either the worker or the downstream party. Let T i be the
bribe the worker (i = W ) or the downstream party (i = D) offers the supervisor in
exchange for affirming the requested good value. For the subsequent analysis, as-
sume the worker and the downstream party possess the entire bargaining power such
that the supervisor can only accept or reject their respective offer.13 The supervisor
refuses T i if
T i +
U¯S
r
≤ w
S
r
, (3.20)
i.e. the transfer T i does not compensate the supervisor for her prospective loss after
she is dismissed and obtains U¯S henceforth.
Suppose now that the low internal good value is realized such that it potentially
provides the worker incentives to collude with the supervisor. The maximum bribe
T¯W she is willing to pay implies indifference between colluding and non-colluding.
Formally, T¯W satisfies
− T¯W + β = EU
W
r
. (3.21)
The maximum bribe T¯W is equal to her short-term gain β and her discounted loss
of expected utility after collusion is detected by the downstream party and she is
dismissed. Observe that T¯W ≤ 0 if r ≤ EUW/β. In this case, the worker sufficiently
values a sustained employment such that she has no incentives to engage in side-
contracting.
Now consider the downstream’s temptation to collude with the supervisor. Sup-
pose the worker had no incentives to collude with the supervisor in the first place and
trusted the downstream party that she does not engage in side-contracting either.
Nevertheless, it might be beneficial for the downstream party to pay the supervisor
a bribe TD aimed at avoiding the payment of β∗ if the high internal good value is
realized. The maximum bribe T¯D the downstream party is willing to pay implies
that she is indifferent between colluding and non-colluding. Formally, T¯D satisfies
− T¯D + Π˜
S
r
= −β + Π
D|S
r
, (3.22)
13For collusion models where the supervisor holds the entire bargaining power, refer to Faure-
Grimaud et al. [2001] and Faure-Grimaud et al. [2003]. In contrast, Kofman and Lawarree [1996]
apply the Nash bargaining solution to model different allocations of bargaining power.
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where Π˜S denotes the downstream’s expected profit she would receive under her best
alternative. If T¯D > 0, the worker anticipates collusion between the downstream
party and the supervisor. Hence, she is better off by refusing to implement effort
such that Prob[Ii = IH |eW = 0] = 0.
Proposition 3.2 The worker’s optimal contract (α∗, β∗) is collusion-proof if r ≤ rS,
where
rS ≡ min{rW , rD}, rW ≡ ∆I
4
, rD ≡ ∆I
2
− 2
∆I
[
Π˜S + U¯S − IL
]
.
If rS < r ≤ r̂ S, the collusion-proof contract is characterized by α∗ = 0 and
β∗(r) =
 2r, if r
W < rD
η + φ, if rW ≥ rD. (3.23)
Then, the downstream party receives
ΠD|S(r) =
 IL + 2r(∆I − 2r)− U¯
S, if rW < rD
η + φ+ Π˜S, if rW ≥ rD, (3.24)
where
r̂ S ≡ 1
2
[
∆I
3
−
[
1
32
(∆I)2 +
2
3
κ
] 1
2
]
η ≡ 1
2
(∆I − r)
κ ≡ IL − U¯S − Π˜S φ ≡
[
η2 + κ
] 1
2 .
If r > r̂ S, the downstream party sets β∗ = 0 and receives ΠD|S = IL. Finally, the
supervisor’s contract is characterized by wS = U¯S for any value of r.
Proof See appendix.
If r ≤ rS, all parties sufficiently value a sustained relationship such that no one is
tempted to collude. In this case, the downstream party provides the worker with the
same bonus contract as for collusion-free supervision, and therefore, the downstream
party receives the same expected profit.
If in contrast rS < r ≤ r̂ S, the downstream party adjusts the worker’s bonus
aimed at preventing collusion. To discuss the two separated cases emphasized by the
previous proposition, note that rD refers to the downstream’s temptation to collude,
and rW to the worker’s, respectively. If in the first place rW < rD, i.e. the worker
but not the downstream party is better off by side-contracting for rW < r ≤ rD,
the downstream party needs to enhance β∗(r) in order to prevent the worker from
side-contracting. This in turn improves her rent and makes side-contracting with
the supervisor less beneficial. In contrast, the downstream party needs to reduce
β∗(r) in order to achieve collusion-proofness if rD ≤ rW . This is necessary in order
to prevent the downstream party herself from side-contracting. However, deviating
from the efficient bonus β∗ = ∆I/2 in both directions inevitably leads to a lower
expected profit the downstream party receives under supervision.
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Note further that contemporaneously detaining the worker and downstream party
to collude with the supervisor requires the adjustment of the bonus in opposite
directions. As a consequence, the downstream party cannot find a bonus contract
for r > r̂ S which is collusion-proof. Yet, she can only avoid collusion by appointing
β∗ = 0, which will not only remove incentives to collude, but also to implement effort.
In this case, the downstream party sets wS = 0 since employing the supervisor
in the first place is not beneficial from the downstream’s perspective. Then, the
downstream party obtains the same profit as under spot employment.
3.4.4 Spot Market
Instead of utilizing an integrated production, the downstream party can alterna-
tively purchase the good from the upstream party. The subsequently considered
transaction has the properties of a spot relationship in the sense that every pe-
riod the downstream and upstream party negotiate about a transfer price ΥSM in
exchange for the good.
Consider first the consensual price agreed upon by the downstream and upstream
party. To achieve this price, I apply the Nash-Bargaining solution with equal bar-
gaining power. This suggests that gains from a coalition are shared equally among
parties. In particular, the downstream party pays the upstream party the external
good value Ei plus half of the downstream’s surplus Ii − Ei for its internal use.
Consequently, ΥSM = [Ii + Ei]/2, and the expected transfer price takes the form
E[ΥSM |eU ] = 1
2
[
IL +∆Iµ
teU +∆Eω
teU
]
. (3.25)
The higher the spread of the internal (∆I) and external (∆E) good value, the higher
is the expected transfer price. There are two reasons for this observation. Firstly, a
higher spread of the internal value makes the purchase of the good more beneficial
for the downstream party, which is reflected by a higher expected transfer price.
Secondly, a higher spread of the external value improves the upstream’s bargaining
position and hence, the price she expects to receive.
The upstream party chooses her effort vector eU such that her expected profit
for spot market transactions ΠU |SM ≡ E[ΥSM |eU ]− C(eU) is maximized. Thus,
max
eU
ΠU |SM ≡ 1
2
[
IL +∆Iµ
teU +∆Eω
teU
]− 1
2
etUeU , (3.26)
which directly implies that the upstream party implements
e∗U =
1
2
[∆Iµ+∆Eω] . (3.27)
Apparently, the upstream party implements the first-best effort vector efb = ∆Iµ
if µ∆I = ω∆E. In this case, the upstream’s effort allocation and effort intensity
imply the same expected internal and external good value. If in contrast there exists
no constant λ 6= 0 satisfying µ = λω, the upstream party implements a suboptimal
effort allocation; and if ∆I 6= ∆E, a suboptimal effort intensity.
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If the upstream party anticipates a spot market transaction with the downstream
party, she implements e∗U and receives
ΠU |SM =
1
2
IL +
1
8
[
(∆I)2 + (∆E)2 + 2∆I∆E cosϕ
]
. (3.28)
Recall that ϕ is the angle between vector µ and vector ω and characterizes, how
congruent the upstream’s production technology is. It further measures, how effi-
cient the upstream’s motivated effort allocation from the downstream’s perspective
is. If ϕ = 0, the upstream party is motivated to implement the non-distorted (first-
best) effort allocation, which is most preferred by the downstream party. Generally
speaking, ϕ = 0 implies perfectly congruent preferences between both market par-
ticipants. In contrast, the upstream party is motivated to implement an inefficient
effort allocation from the downstream’s perspective if ϕ > 0. This in turn provides
her a lower expected profit because her production technology is less efficient in
terms of contemporaneously maximizing the expected internal and external good
value, and consequently, the expected transfer price.
If she decides for a spot market transaction, the downstream’s expected profit
is the difference between the expected internal good value and the transaction price
she expects to pay in exchange for the good. Formally, ΠD|SM ≡ E[Ii − ΥSM |e∗U ],
which is equivalent to
ΠD|SM ≡ 1
2
IL +
1
4
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] . (3.29)
Finally observe that the downstream’s expected profit is independent of the con-
gruity measure ϕ. Nevertheless, there are two countervailing effects of ϕ on ΠD|SM .
To see this, recall that E[Ii|e∗U ] = IL +∆Iµte∗U , and consequently,
E[Ii|e∗U ] = IL +
1
2
(∆I)2 +
1
2
∆I∆E cosϕ. (3.30)
Likewise, the upstream’s effort choice e∗U leads to the expected transfer price
E[ΥSM |e∗U ] =
1
4
[
(∆I)2 + (∆E)2
]
+
1
2
[IL +∆I∆E cosϕ] . (3.31)
Now suppose that ϕ increases, i.e. the upstream party is motivated to implement a
more distorted effort allocation from the downstream’s perspective. The marginal
effect on the expected internal good value and expected transfer price therefore is
∂ E[Ii|e∗U ]
∂ϕ
=
∂ E[ΥSM |e∗U ]
∂ϕ
= −1
2
∆I∆E sinϕ. (3.32)
Accordingly, an increase in ϕ leads firstly to a lower expected internal good value,
but secondly, also to a lower expected transfer price. As we can infer from (3.30) and
(3.31), both effects cancel each other such that ΠD|SM does not change in ϕ. Roughly
speaking, a lower expected transfer price perfectly compensates the downstream
party for a lower expected good value.
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3.4.5 Relational Market
As illustrated in the previous section, using a spot market transaction based on a ne-
gotiated transfer price may motivate the upstream party to implement an inefficient
effort allocation from the perspective of the downstream party. As an alternative
to negotiate every period about a transfer price, the downstream party can promise
the upstream party to pay a certain amount exclusively contingent on the realized
internal good value aimed at motivating the upstream party to implement the non-
distorted (first-best) effort allocation. This bilateral relationship therefore requires
relation-specific investments from the upstream party in the sense that she needs to
focus exclusively on maximizing the expected internal good value, which leads to a
deterioration of the expected market price she could obtain.
In particular, let PL be a floor payment both parties consent to in an enforceable
contract for exchanging the good, regardless of its final value. In addition, the
downstream party promises to pay a higher price PH if Ii = IH . Thus, this type
of transaction consists of an explicit component PL and a non-enforceable premium
∆P ≡ PH − PL. Notice that PL is not necessarily strictly positive, but can also
be negative in the sense of penalizing the upstream party for low internal good
values. Provided that this relational contract is credible, it ensures the alignment of
the downstream’s and upstream’s preferences for the properties of exchanged goods,
and therefore, leads to the implementation of the first-best effort allocation.
The payments PL and PH need to guarantee that it is in the upstream’s interest
to enter into a sustained relationship with the downstream party based on a rela-
tional contract. This is the case, if the upstream party is at least weakly better
off than under her best alternative. However, her best alternative is determined by
the downstream’s best fall-back position. If the downstream’s next alternative to
relational market is to utilize spot market transactions, the upstream’s reservation
utility is ΠU |SM as derived in the previous section. In contrast, if an integrated trans-
action is the downstream’s best alternative, the upstream’s reservation utility is the
one she receives for selling the good on the market at the price ΥM = Ei. In this
case, the upstream party maximizes her expected profit ΠU |M ≡ E[ΥM |eU ]−C(eU),
which is equivalent to
max
eU
ΠU |M ≡ ∆EωteU − 1
2
etUeU . (3.33)
If the upstream’s objective is to sell the good on the market for ΥM , she implements
e∗U = ∆Eω and receives
ΠU |M =
1
2
(∆E)2. (3.34)
Suppose that the downstream party wants to engage in a sustained bilateral rela-
tionship with the upstream party and offers her the payments PL and PH . If the
upstream party accepts, her intention to focus exclusively on maximizing the ex-
pected internal good value characterizes relation-specific investments and may lead
to holdup: once the high internal good value is realized, the downstream party may
prefer to renege on the promised premium ∆P . Nevertheless, the downstream party
stays on her implicit obligation to pay ∆P if she values a sustained bilateral rela-
tionship more than she is tempted to renege. Suppose the high internal good value
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is realized. Then, the downstream party stays on her promise and pays ∆P if
−∆P + Π
D|RM
r
≥ Π˜
RM
r
, (3.35)
where Π˜RM denotes the downstream’s expected profit she receives under her best
fall-back position. Note that ΠD|RM can take one of two values conditional on the
downstream’s best alternative Π˜RM . The downstream party adheres to her promise
if paying the premium and maintaining the relationship provides her with a higher
present expected profit than her best fall-back position.
As previously emphasized, the payments PL and PH need to provide the upstream
party with appropriate incentives while ensuring her participation. Additionally, the
proposed relational contract must be self-enforcing in the sense that the downstream
party has no incentives to deviate from the stipulated behavior to pay the promised
premium ∆P if Ii = IH . Accordingly, the optimal payments solve
max
PL,PH ,eU
ΠD|RM ≡ IL +∆IµteU − PL −∆PµteU (3.36)
s.t.
PL +∆Pµ
teU − 1
2
etUeU ≥ Π¯U (3.37)
eU ∈ argmax
e˜U
PL +∆Pµ
te˜U − 1
2
e˜tU e˜U (3.38)
IL +∆Iµ
teU − PL −∆PµteU − Π˜RM ≥ ∆Pr, (3.39)
where
Π¯U =

1
2
IL +
1
8
[∆Iµ+∆Eω]2 , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM
1
2
(∆E)2, if Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM ,
(3.40)
is the upstream’s reservation utility conditional on the downstream’s best fall-back.
Condition (3.37) is the upstream’s participation constraint ensuring that the pro-
posed relational contract makes her at least weakly better off than her best alterna-
tive. Moreover, (3.38) is her incentive condition. Finally, condition (3.39) ensures
that the relational contract is self-enforcing.
The upstream’s incentive constraint (3.38) indicates that she chooses e∗U = ∆Pµ
in order to maximize her expected profit. Apparently, this bilateral market relation
is suitable to motivate the upstream party to implement non-distorted effort. As
previously exposed, the upstream’s reservation utility can take one of two values
conditional on the downstream’s best fall-back position. For the sake of lucidity, I
subsequently consider both cases separately.
Proposition 3.3 If Π˜RM = ΠD|SM , the optimal premium ∆P ∗ under relational
market is characterized by
∆P ∗(r) =

∆I, if r ≤ rRM
∆I − r + φ, if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM
0, if r̂RM < r.
(3.41)
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Then, the downstream party receives
ΠD|RM(r) =

1
2
[
IL + (∆I)
2
]− 1
8
[∆Iµ+∆Eω]2 , if r ≤ rRM
r [∆I − r + φ] + ΠD|SM , if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM
ΠD|SM , if r̂RM < r,
(3.42)
where
rRM ≡ 1
8∆I
[∆Iµ−∆Eω]2 r̂RM ≡ ∆I − η 12
φ ≡ [(∆I − r)2 − η] 12 η ≡ 1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 − IL + 2ΠD|SM .
Proof See appendix.
If r ≤ rRM , the downstream party honors her non-enforceable obligation to
pay ∆P ∗ = ∆I. In this case, the upstream party anticipates that holdup is not
an issue and is motivated to make relation-specific investments. If in contrast
rRM < r ≤ r̂RM , the downstream party needs reduce the premium ∆P ∗(r) in
order to ensure that the relational contract remains credible, thereby implying a
lower expected profit.14 If r > r̂RM , the downstream party cannot find a strictly
positive and credible premium to provide the upstream party with incentives. Ac-
cordingly, ∆P ∗ = 0. Since this would imply that the upstream party implements
e∗U = (0, ..., 0)
t, the downstream party is better off by appointing P ∗L = 0 and
to engage in spot market transactions with the upstream party. Consequently,
ΠD|RM = ΠD|SM for r > r̂RM .
To gain further insights, we can re-write ΠD|RM for r ≤ rRM as15
ΠD|RM =
1
2
[
IL + (∆I)
2
]− 1
8
[
(∆I)2 + (∆E)2 + 2∆I∆E cosϕ
]
. (3.43)
Apparently, ΠD|RM depends on the congruity measure ϕ if the downstream’s best
fall-back is to utilize spot market transactions (Π˜RM = ΠD|SM). The rationale for
this observation is as follows: The downstream party has to provide the upstream
party at least the same expected profit as she would receive if both engage in mutual
spot market transactions. As a consequence, the floor payment PL reflects the
upstream’s best alternative ΠU |SM , which in turn depends on ϕ, see section 3.4.4.
Consequently, it also appears in ΠD|RM if ΠD|SM = Π˜RM . Furthermore, we have seen
that a more congruent production technology (smaller ϕ) enhances the upstream’s
expected profit for spot market transactions. This in turn makes it more costly
for the downstream party to ensure her participation, thereby implying a smaller
expected profit ΠD|RM . The same observations apply for ΠD|RM if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM .
Finally, re-consider the cut off interest rate rRM , which is equivalent to
rRM =
1
8∆I
[
(∆I)2 + (∆E)2 − 2∆I∆E cosϕ] . (3.44)
14Note that changing ∆P requires also an adjustment of PL to ensure the upstream’s participa-
tion.
15To see this, recall that µtω = ‖µ‖‖ω‖ cosϕ and ‖µ‖ = ‖ω‖ = 1.
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Observe that rRM is increasing in ϕ. This can be observed because a higher ϕ—
implied by a less congruent production technology—deteriorates the upstream’s ex-
pected profit. This further implies that the downstream party can abate the floor
payment PL. As a consequence, the downstream party receives a higher expected
profit such that her prospective ‘punishment’ for violating the implicit contract be-
comes more severe. This is in turn reflected by a higher rRM . It can be verified that
the same observation applies for r̂RM .
Proposition 3.4 If Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM , the optimal premium ∆P ∗ under relational
market is characterized by
∆P ∗(r) =

∆I, if r ≤ rRM
∆I − r + φ, if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM
0, if r̂RM < r.
(3.45)
Then, the downstream party receives
ΠD|RM(r) =

IL +
1
2
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] , if r ≤ rRM
r [∆I − r + φ]− (∆E)2 + Π˜RM , if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM
ΠD|SM , if r̂RM < r,
(3.46)
where
rRM ≡ 1
2∆I
[
2IL + (∆I)
2 − (∆E)2 − 2Π˜RM
]
r̂RM ≡ ∆I − η 12
φ ≡ [(∆I − r)2 − η] 12 η ≡ [(∆E)2 + 2Π˜RM − 2IL] .
Proof See appendix.
The downstream party sufficiently values a bilateral relationship with the up-
stream party based on implicit agreements if r ≤ rRM . As a consequence, the
promise to pay the efficient premium ∆P ∗ = ∆I is trustworthy and the upstream
party implements e∗ = µ∆I. For rRM < r ≤ r̂RM , however, the relational contract
can be only self-enforcing if the downstream party adjusts ∆P ∗(r), and therefore
PL, appropriately. If r > r̂RM , the downstream party cannot credibly promise to
pay a strictly positive premium. Thus, she sets ∆P ∗ = 0 and engages in spot market
transactions with the upstream party. Accordingly, the downstream party receives
ΠD|RM = ΠD|SM for r > r̂RM .
3.5 The Optimal Organizational Form
After elaborating on the different combinations of transactions and contractual ar-
rangements as summarize in table 3.1, we are better equipped to identify the efficient
organizational form from the perspective of the downstream party. The objective
of this section is to illustrate how the eventuality of collusion within firms and in-
congruent preferences between firms influence the characteristics of implemented
3. COLLUSION AND INCONGRUENT PREFERENCES 79
transactions. For illustrative purposes, I demonstrate the potential effects for spot
contracts and relational contracts separately. Finally, the observations are illustrated
and conclusively discussed.
3.5.1 The Optimal Spot Contract
Suppose first that relational contracts are not feasible. This may occur if the interest
rate is too high such that implicit contracts are not credible, or the involved parties
can only commit to transactions lasting for a finite period of time. Accordingly, the
downstream party can only select one of three spot contracts: spot employment,
supervision, or spot market. The optimal spot contract eventually determines the
downstream’s best fall-back position for relational contracts and hence, their self-
enforcement conditions.
The downstream’s decision in terms of an integrated production or market trans-
action is conditional on three parameter values: (i) the spread of the internal good
value ∆I, (ii) the spread of the external good value ∆E; and (iii), the supervisor’s
reservation utility U¯S. The congruity measure ϕ, however, affects the upstream’s,
but not the downstream’s expected profit in a spot environment, see section 3.4.4.
To identify the effect of collusive behavior on the downstream’s optimal strategy, let
us first consider the collusion-free case.
Proposition 3.5 Consider the collusion-free case and suppose that only spot con-
tracts are feasible. Then, the downstream party receives
ΠD =
{
ΠD|SM , if 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ
ΠD|S, if Θ < (∆E)2, (3.47)
where
Θ ≡ 2 [2U¯S − IL] . (3.48)
Proof See appendix.
Apparently from above, there exists a threshold level of ∆E implying that the
downstream party is indifferent between an integrated production and a market
transaction. The downstream party prefers a mutual spot transaction with the
upstream party if (∆E)2 ≤ Θ, and supervision, otherwise. In another sense, a
market transaction is superior to an integrated production if the market valuation
towards the difference between the low and high external good value is sufficiently
low. This directly implies a lower bargaining position for the upstream party and
hence, a lower transfer price. However, if (∆E)2 > Θ, acquiring the good via a
market transaction is more costly than an integrated production. In this case, it is
more beneficial for the downstream party to recruit a supervisor aimed at providing
the worker with explicit incentives.
Without side-contracting, supervision is found to be superior for sufficiently high
spreads in the external good value. However, if we were to allow collusive behavior, it
would always occur in a spot environment due to the lack of prospective punishments.
Recall that the downstream party obtains only the spot employment profit under
supervision if collusion is anticipated either by the worker or by the downstream
party. As a result, the downstream’s one-shot alternatives shrink to spot employment
and spot market transactions.
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Proposition 3.6 Consider the collusion case and suppose that only spot contracts
are feasible. Then, the downstream party receives
ΠD =
{
ΠD|SM , if 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ
ΠD|SE, if Θ < (∆E)2, (3.49)
where
Θ ≡ (∆I)2 − 2IL. (3.50)
Proof See appendix.
Spot market transactions apparently remain optimal for sufficiently low spreads
in the external good value ∆E. However, the downstream party now prefers spot
market transactions for Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ instead of employing a supervisor for an
integrated production.16 In this case, supervision cannot be profitable as a result of
potential collusion between the supervisor and either the worker or the downstream
party herself. To put it differently, the threat of collusive behavior forces the down-
stream party to use market instead of integrated transactions, which would have
been more efficient otherwise. Utilizing the market for acquiring the good is the
downstream’s most efficient strategy to bypass collusion and the associated costs for
Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ. However, things are different for Θ < (∆E)2. Here, the down-
stream party prefers spot employment to bypass collusion. There are two reasons
for this observation. First, supervision does not provide a higher expected profit
due to vertical side-contracting. Second, the spread of the external good value and
consequently, the transfer price as a result of the upstream’s bargaining position, is
too high such that the acquisition of the good via the market is less beneficial than
an integrated spot production.
3.5.2 The Optimal Relational Contract
Now suppose that all parties interact infinitely such that relational contracts contin-
gent on observable, but non-verifiable information can be credible. If the involved
parties are better off by honoring a sustained relationship rather than by violating
their implicit obligations, no party has incentives to deviate from the stipulated
behavior and relational contracts are self-enforcing. In this case, the optimal trans-
action additionally depends on the interest rate r, which can be interpreted as the
patience of all involved entities.
Suppose for a moment that the interest rate r is sufficiently low such that all
considered implicit contracts with the efficient incentives schemes are self-enforcing.
Formally, this requires r ≤ min{rRM , rRE}. Then, the downstream party prefers re-
lational market if ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE, and relational employment, otherwise. I demon-
strate in the appendix that ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE requires
(∆E)2 ≤ Φ, if ΠD|SM = Π˜RM (3.51)
(∆E)2 ≤ Φ, if ΠD|SM 6= Π˜RM , (3.52)
where
Φ ≡
[(
κ2 + (∆I)2 − 4IL
) 1
2 − κ
]2
Φ ≡ 1
2
(∆I)2 κ ≡ ∆I cosϕ.
16Note that Θ < Θ since U¯S < (∆I)2/4.
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A sustained bilateral market transaction with the upstream party (relational market)
is more profitable if the spread in the external good value ∆E is sufficiently low.
The rationale is that a lower ∆E diminishes the upstream’s bargaining position for
spot transactions, and therefore, mitigates the downstream’s costs for ensuring her
participation. Observe, however, that we have two different threshold levels Φ and
Φ. Recall that the downstream’s expected profit for relational market is conditional
on whether or not a spot market transaction with the upstream party is her best
alternative. This leads to two different cut offs, where Φ is relevant if spot market
transactions are the downstream’s best fall-back, and Φ otherwise.
For ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RE, the downstream party needs to adjust incen-
tives for both relational contracts in order to ensure their self-enforcement. The
downstream party thereby prefers relational market if ΠD|RM(r) ≥ ΠD|RE(r), and
relational employment, otherwise. For the subsequent analysis, let (∆E)2 = Ψ(r)
be the squared spread of the external good value implying ΠD|RM(r) = ΠD|RE(r)
for Π˜RM = ΠD|SM , and (∆E)2 = Ψ(r) for Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM , respectively.17 Then,
ΠD|RM(r) ≥ ΠD|RE(r) requires
(∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM (3.53)
(∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), if Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM . (3.54)
To identify the effect of collusion on the optimal relational contract and its self-
enforcement condition, assume for a moment that side-contracting cannot occur. In
this case, we know from proposition 3.5 that supervision is the superior spot contract
for (∆E)2 > Θ, and spot market transactions with the upstream party, otherwise.
Proposition 3.7 Consider the collusion-free case. The downstream party imple-
ments relational market and receives ΠD|RM(r) in the intervals{
0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Φ,Θ} and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ, if r ≤ rRM ;
0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Ψ(r),Θ} and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM ,
where
rRM =

1
8∆I
[∆Iµ−∆Eω]2 , if 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Φ,Θ}
∆I
4
+
1
2∆I
[
2U¯S − (∆E)2] , if Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ, (3.55)
and,
r̂RM =

∆I −
[
1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 +
1
2
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2]] 12 ,
if 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Ψ(r),Θ}
∆I −
[
(∆E)2 +
1
2
(∆I)2 − 2U¯S
] 1
2
, if Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r).
(3.56)
17Due to the structure of ΠD|RM (r) and ΠD|RE(r) for ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RE, one cannot
achieve a tractable closed form solution. Nevertheless, using the implicit characterizations does
not derogate the subsequent results.
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In contrast, the downstream party implements relational employment and receives
ΠD|RE(r) in the intervals{
Φ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and Φ < (∆E)2, if r ≤ rRE;
Ψ(r) < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and Ψ(r) < (∆E)2, if rRE < r ≤ r̂RE,
where
rRE =

1
2∆I
[
(∆E)2 + 2IL
]
, if Φ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ
2U¯S
∆I
, if Φ < (∆E)2,
(3.57)
and,
r̂RE =

∆I + IL +
1
2
[
(∆E)2 − (∆I)2] , if Ψ(r) < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ
∆I − 1
2
(∆I)2 + 2U¯S, if Ψ(r) < (∆E)2.
(3.58)
If in contrast r > r̂RM or r > r̂RE in the relevant intervals, the downstream party
receives ΠD = max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|S}.
Proof See appendix.
The cut off interest rates r̂RM and r̂RE determine whether or not the respective
relational contract is credible. Suppose for a moment that both relational contracts
are self-enforcing. Generally, relational market is superior for low values of∆E. Nev-
ertheless, relational employment can be temporarily preferred by the downstream
party in the interval Ψ(r) < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ, whereas for Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r) relational
market is again more profitable. The reason for obtaining spanned intervals is as fol-
lows. Different fall-back positions for relational market—spot market or integrated
spot productions—impose diverse costs for ensuring the upstream’s participation.
This further provides the downstream party with different expected profits, and as
a consequence, diverging self-enforcement conditions. Finally observe that the pre-
vious argumentation only applies if Ψ(r) < Θ and Θ < Ψ(r), which in turn depends
on the specific parameter values. Otherwise, there exists only one threshold level of
∆E implying indifference between relational market and relational employment.
To shed more light on the derived self-enforcement conditions, one can show that
(3.56) for 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Ψ(r),Θ} is equivalent to
r̂RM = ∆I −
[
1
4
[
3(∆I)2 − (∆E)2 + 2∆I∆E cosϕ]] 12 . (3.59)
As discussed in section 3.4.5, r̂RM is increasing in the congruity measure ϕ, provided
the downstream’s next alternative is to utilize spot market transactions. Technically,
this applies for the interval (∆E)2 ≤ min{Φ,Θ}. It can be verified that r̂RM is
convex decreasing in ∆E as long as ∆E ≤ ∆I cosϕ, and increasing, otherwise.
The same observation can be made for rRM . An increasing spread of the external
good value ∆E has two opposite effects. First, it imposes a higher floor payment
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PL aimed at ensuring the upstream’s participation. This impairs the profitability
of relational market. As a result, it becomes more beneficial for the downstream
party to renege on ∆P ∗(r) such that r̂RM can be expected to decrease. Second,
a higher spread ∆E reduces the profitability of spot market transactions due to
the upstream’s enhanced bargaining position. Thus, it becomes less beneficial for
the downstream party to renege, which should be reflected by a higher r̂RM . As
(3.59) indicates, the first effect outweighs the second as long as ∆E ≤ ∆I cosϕ,
and vice versa for ∆E > ∆I cosϕ. In the interval Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r) where the
downstream’s alternative is an integrated production, r̂RM is always decreasing in
∆E. The same applies for rRM in the interval Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ.
Finally observe that rRE and r̂RE are increasing in ∆E for Φ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ
and Ψ(r) < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ, respectively. This obtains because the value of the down-
stream’s alternative—utilizing spot market transactions with the upstream party—
is decreasing in ∆E, thereby providing her less incentives to violate the implicit
contract. For Φ < (∆E)2, however, rRE is constant in ∆E because relational em-
ployment, and supervision as best fall-back, are independent of ∆E. The same
observation applies for r̂RE in the interval Ψ(r) < (∆E)2.
Subsequently, let us investigate the effect of side-contracting on the optimal
relational contract and its self-enforcement condition. Keep in mind that the down-
stream party can achieve the collusion-free payoff if r ≤ min{rW , rD}.
Proposition 3.8 Consider the collusion case. In comparison to the collusion-free
case, the cut off interest rates for relational market change to
rRM =

1
8∆I
[∆Iµ−∆Eω]2 , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM
1
2∆I
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SE, (3.60)
and,
r̂RM =

1
8∆I
[∆Iµ−∆Eω]2 , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM
∆I −∆E, if Π˜RM = ΠD|SE.
(3.61)
In contrast, the cut off interest rates for relational employment become
rRE =
∆I
2
− 2
∆I
[
max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE} − IL
]
, (3.62)
and,
r̂RE = ∆I − 2 [max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE} − IL] 12 . (3.63)
Finally, supervision is not implemented for all r.
Proof See appendix.
There are two implications which are important to discuss. Firstly, we know
that supervision is not collusion-proof if r > r̂ S. Instead of employing a supervisor,
the downstream party is compelled to use either less valuable spot market transac-
tions for Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ, or spot employment for Θ < (∆E)2. Due to a higher
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prospective punishment for violating implicit agreements, the downstream party is
less tempted to renege, which in turn is reflected by higher cut off interest rates for
relational market and relational employment. The second important implication is
that collusion-proof supervision is in neither case implemented. The rationale for
this observation is that collusion-proof supervision requires a sufficiently low interest
rate r which contemporaneously guarantees the self-enforcement of either relational
market or relation employment with the efficient incentive schemes for the relevant
intervals. In this case, the downstream party prefers one of the relational contracts
instead of supervision.
3.5.3 Graphical Representation
I emphasized in preceding sections several conditions determining the optimal trans-
actions and contractual arrangements from the perspective of the downstream party.
The purpose of this section is to illustrate, how the optimal organizational form is
(i), influenced by incongruent preferences between the downstream and upstream
party; and (ii), affected by anticipated collusion between the supervisor and either
the worker or the downstream party.
The optimal transactions and contractual arrangements are illustrated in figure
3.1, where the squared spread of the external good value (∆E)2 is on the horizontal
axis and the interest rate r on the vertical axis. This graphical representation applies
for the case Φ,Ψ(r) > Θ and Ψ,Ψ′ ∈ (Θ,Θ), where Ψ ≡ Ψ(r̂RM) for the collusion-
free case, and Ψ′ ≡ Ψ(r̂RM) for the collusion case, respectively. Additionally, it is
assumed that (∆I)2 cos2 ϕ > Θ.18 The subsequent explanations apply in general to
the other cases as well.
First, I briefly discuss how diverging preferences between the downstream and
upstream party for the characteristics of exchanged goods affect the optimal trans-
action. For the sake of parsimony, I restrict the subsequent explanations to the
collusion-free case. Similar observations, however, apply also for the collusion case.
Recall that more congruent preferences—characterized by a smaller ϕ—affect the
downstream’s payoffs in two ways: (i) it diminishes her expected profit for relational
market, and therefore, (ii) mitigates her prospective punishment for reneging on the
promised premium ∆P (r). Both effects are reflected by lower threshold interest
rates rRM and r̂RM . The reversed is true if ϕ increases. Both effects, however, only
apply, if spot market transactions are the downstream’s best alternative. Graphi-
cally, a smaller ϕ causes the line AB in figure 3.1 to shift downwards (dotted line).
Consider the area T1 below the line AB. Here, the downstream party could engage
in a superior long-term relationship with the upstream party (relational market) for
sufficiently incongruent production technologies (high ϕ). If in contrast the technol-
ogy provides sufficiently congruent preferences, the downstream party is compelled
to utilize less profitable spot transactions with the upstream party. Consequently,
the downstream party cannot motivate the upstream party to make relation-specific
investments. The analysis in section 3.4.5 additionally indicates that more congruent
preferences diminish the profitability of relational employment for rRM < r ≤ r̂RM .
18This condition implies that r̂RM is decreasing in (∆E)2 for 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Ψ(r),Θ}.
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Figure 3.1: Optimal Transactions and Contracts
Next, let us turn to collusion and its effect on the optimal organizational form.
In addition to the optimal transactions and contracts for the collusion case, figure
3.1 also exemplifies the downstream’s optimal strategy for the collusion-free case
(dashed lines, where the optimal strategies are parenthesized).19 First consider the
downstream’s best spot transactions, which eventually determine her best fall-back
positions for relational contracts. Spot contracts are chosen in the area above the
lines AB; and additionally CDG for the non-collusion case, andBIJ for the collusion
case, respectively. In these areas, the downstream party cannot credibly commit to
honor implicit agreements such that relational contracts are not feasible. Obviously,
if (∆E)2 ≤ Θ, i.e. the spread of the external good value is sufficiently low, a spot
market transaction is always superior. In contrast, for moderate spreads character-
ized by Θ < (∆E)2 < Θ, the downstream party prefers spot market transactions
when collusion is anticipated, whereas supervision would have been more beneficial
otherwise. Generally speaking, potential collusion forces the downstream party in
this case to adopt less efficient market transactions instead of an integrated pro-
duction. Finally, for high spreads with Θ < (∆E)2, the downstream party prefers
spot employment rather than employing a supervisor in order to prevent collusive
behavior and the associated costs.
Potential collusion has a negative effect from the downstream’s perspective,
whenever employing a supervisor to achieve contractible information would be opti-
19The only exception is area T1 which refers to the exemplified effect of preference congruity
and is not influenced by collusion.
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mal, but the induced costs for preventing side-contracting compromise its profitabil-
ity. Now consider the effect of anticipated collusion on relational contracts. We know
from the previous section that worse fall-back positions as a result of anticipated
collusion may facilitate superior relational contracts for higher interest rates. In the
area T2 in figure 3.1, the downstream party can achieve a sustained relationship
with the upstream party based on implicit agreements, and therefore, can motivate
relation-specific investments, which would have not been feasible otherwise. Like-
wise, anticipated collusion enables the downstream party in the area between the
lines HIJ and FG to provide the worker with a credible relational incentive con-
tract. A further effect is the improvement of the downstream expected profit for
ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RE. This obtains because a worse fall-back position en-
ables the downstream party to provide either the worker or the upstream party with
a more efficient incentive scheme without violating the respective self-enforcement
condition.
Summarizing the previous observations, more congruent preferences for the char-
acteristics of exchanged goods—implied by the upstream’s production technology—
can be disadvantageous for the downstream party with respect to two dimensions:
Firstly, it diminishes her expected profit in case she engages in a bilateral rela-
tionship with the upstream party based on implicit agreements, but the efficient
incentive scheme is not credible (rRM < r ≤ r̂RM). Secondly, it implies a lower cut
off interest rate r̂RM such that for some r, relational market can not be facilitated
anymore and the downstream party is forced to utilize less profitable spot market
transactions. In contrast, anticipated collusion may have two opposite effects on
the efficiency of transactions. First, if superior relational contracts are not feasible,
potential collusion can force organizations to use either less profitable market or
integrated transactions in order to bypass the required costs for preventing side-
contracting. Second, collusion and its harmful effect on the efficiency of integrated
productions can be advantageous for organizations if it facilitates the achievement,
or enhances the profitability, of superior relational contracts. Generally speaking,
collusion as an internal inefficiency can (i), improve the profitability of integrated
and market transactions; and (ii), facilitate the achievement of superior long-term
relationships based on non-enforceable agreements in place of less efficient spot trans-
actions. This also suggests that anticipated collusion within firms may motivate or
improve relation-specific investments in inter-firm trade.
3.6 Availability of Verifiable Signals
So far, I considered only the employment of a supervisor as a device for the down-
stream party to receive contractible information for providing the worker with incen-
tives. The drawback of employing a supervisor is that preventing side-contracting
imposes additional costs which compromise the efficiency of an integrated produc-
tion. I believe it is worthwhile to briefly consider the effect on the optimal transac-
tion if the downstream party receives verifiable but imperfect information about the
worker’s performance. For the sake of conciseness, I restrict the proceeding analysis
and explanations to the collusion case.
3. COLLUSION AND INCONGRUENT PREFERENCES 87
Suppose the downstream party receives a binary and verifiable signal Y ∈ {0, 1},
where Y = 1 is the favorable signal in the sense of Milgrom [1981]. The probability
of realizing the favorable signal is conditional on the worker’s effort and takes the
form
Prob[Y = 1|eW ] = min{τ teW , 1}, (3.64)
where τ = (τ1, ..., τn)t, τ ∈ Rn+. To ensure an interior solution, assume that
τ is characterized such that τ teW < 1 for the second-best effort vector.20 The
downstream part can now provide the worker with the bonus contract
wW =
{
α+ β, if Y = 1
α, if Y = 0. (3.65)
The optimal bonus contract therefore solves
max
α,β,eW
ΠD|SE ≡ IL +∆IµteW − α− βτ teW (3.66)
s.t.
α+ βτ teW − 1
2
etWeW ≥ 0 (3.67)
eW ∈ argmax
e˜W
α+ βτ te˜W − 1
2
e˜tW e˜W (3.68)
α+ β ≥ 0 (3.69)
α ≥ 0, (3.70)
with (3.67) as the worker’s participation, and (3.68) as her incentive constraint.
Furthermore, (3.69) and (3.70) guarantee that the bonus contract is compatible
with the worker’s liability limit.
We can infer from the worker’s incentive constraint that she chooses eW = βτ
in order to maximize her expected utility. In contrast to relational employment
and supervision, her effort allocation depends now upon τ . Then, if there exists a
constant λ > 0 satisfying τ = λµ, the bonus contract on the basis of Y motivates
the worker to implement the non-distorted (first-best) effort allocation. Otherwise,
she inefficiently over- or underemphasizes some tasks relative to others in order to
maximize the probability of obtaining the contracted bonus.
I demonstrate in the appendix that the worker’s optimal bonus contract is char-
acterized by
α∗ = 0, β∗(θ) =
∆I cos θ
2‖τ‖ ,
where θ is the angle between vector µ and vector τ , and ‖τ‖ denotes the length
of τ .21 The angle θ thereby quantifies how congruent the expected signal is with
respect to the probability that the high internal good value will be realized. Since
the expected signal manifests the worker’s effort allocation, θ also characterizes the
efficiency of her effort allocation relative to first-best.
20One can show by using the subsequently derived results that this requires ‖τ‖ < cos−1 θ(∆I)−1,
where θ denotes the angle between vector µ and τ , and ‖τ‖ the length of τ .
21Note that θ ∈ [0, pi/2] since µi, τi > 0, i = 1, ..., n. This implies β∗ ≥ 0.
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By providing the worker with an explicit bonus contract contingent on Y , the
downstream party receives
ΠD|SE(θ) = IL +
1
4
(∆I)2 cos2 θ. (3.71)
The downstream’s expected profit is a function of the congruity measure θ. To
exemplify the particular effects of θ on ΠD|SE(θ), let us first consider the extreme
cases. If θ = 0, the signal is perfectly congruent. Then, the probability to produce
the high internal good value is identical to the probability that the favorable signal
will be realized. Accordingly, the downstream party can motivate the worker to
implement the first-best effort allocation by providing her with a bonus contract
contingent on the realization of Y . This further implies that the downstream party
receives the same expected profit as under relational employment, but this is now
feasible even in a spot environment. In this case, the downstream party chooses
always a spot employment contract contingent on Y , unless ∆E and r ≤ r̂RM are
sufficiently small such that relational market provides her with a higher expected
profit.
In contrast, if θ = pi/2, the signal does not provide any value since it would moti-
vate the worker to implement an invaluable effort allocation. Formally, this implies
Prob{Ii = IH |eW , θ = pi/2} = 0.22 Therefore, it is efficient from the downstream’s
perspective to set β∗ = 0, thereby inducing the worker to implement eW = (0, ..., 0)t.
Accordingly, the availability of Y does not change the downstream’s optimal strategy
as illustrated in figure 3.1 if it is characterized by θ = pi/2.
Next, let us turn to the more interesting case with 0 < θ < pi/2. The more
congruent the signal becomes (θ decreases), the higher is the downstream’s expected
profit. To identify the effect on the optimal organizational form, consider first the
downstream’s preference for either utilizing a spot employment contract contingent
on Y , or a spot market transaction with the upstream party. Standard calculations
give
ΠD|SE(θ) ≥ ΠD|SM ⇔ (∆E)2 ≥ Θ(θ) ≡ (∆I)2 [1− cos2 θ]− 2IL.
A more congruent signal (lower θ) reduces the threshold level Θ(θ), where the down-
stream party is indifferent between spot market transactions and utilizing an inte-
grated production. Graphically, line IK in figure 3.1 shifts leftwards. Nevertheless,
the value of Y and its effect on ΠD|SE(θ) influences the self-enforcement conditions
for relational contracts, whenever spot employment is the downstream’s best fall-
back position. Substituting ΠD|SE(θ) in r̂RM and r̂RE gives
r̂RM(θ) = ∆I −
[
(∆E)2 +
1
2
(∆I)2 cos2 θ
] 1
2
. (3.72)
and,
r̂RE(θ) = ∆I [1− cos θ] . (3.73)
22To see this, recall that eW = βτ . Consequently, Prob{Ii = IH |eW } = βµtτ , which is
equivalent to Prob{Ii = IH |eW } = βτ tτ cos θ. Thus, Prob{Ii = IH |eW , θ = pi/2} = 0.
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Observe that r̂RM(θ) and r̂RE(θ) are increasing in θ. To put it differently, a more
congruent signal (smaller θ) requires a lower interest rate for relational contracts
to be self-enforcing. Furthermore, a decreasing θ contemporaneously reduces the
profitability of both relational contracts for ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RE. This is be-
cause the downstream party needs to adjust the respective incentive scheme aimed
at ensuring its self-enforcement. Accordingly, receiving a costless and sufficiently
congruent signal can be disadvantageous from the downstream’s perspective if it en-
hances the value of her respective fall-back position and thereby either compromises
the viability of superior relational contracts, or diminishes their profitability. This
obtains because the downstream party cannot credibly commit not to use the signal
Y after reneging occurred.
3.7 Conclusion
The theory of the firm literature presents a variety of reasons on why certain firms
utilize market instead of integrated transactions, and vice versa. This essay provides
two supplementary rationales: the eventuality of collusive behavior within, and in-
congruent preferences for the characteristics of exchanged goods between firms.
The analysis in this essay points to the ambiguous effect of collusive behavior.
First, collusion can be harmful for firms since it may force them to use less efficient
market instead of integrated transactions. Second and less apparent, potential collu-
sion can be beneficial whenever it deteriorates the efficiency of alternative integrated
transactions such that superior relational contracts become either more likely to be
feasible, or more profitable. This observation is also a theoretical underpinning of
Tirole’s [1988] argumentation that: "[...] potential collusion is often more important
than actual collusion in understanding organizational behaviour"[p. 462].
Besides elaborating on the impact of collusive behavior on transactions, this
essay further considers incongruent preferences between firms as a source of ineffi-
ciencies for inter-firm trade. Particularly, preferences are referred to be incongruent
between firms, when their requirements for exchanged goods diverge due to poten-
tially alternative usages. This eventually may lead to the exchange of less suitable
goods from demanding firms’ perspective due to either an inefficient level, or lack
of relation-specific investments. As the analysis in this essay indicates, incongru-
ent preferences play only a role for the efficiency of transactions if firms engage in
mutual market transactions based on non-enforceable agreements. In this case, it is
shown that more congruent preferences for the characteristics of exchanged goods
are disadvantageous from the demanding firm’s perspective since this imposes higher
costs to maintain a long-term relationship with the supplying firm aimed at ensuring
relation-specific investments.
This essay demonstrated in a short extension that organizations with access to
sufficiently valuable performance measures are more likely to adopt integrated pro-
ductions rather than utilizing the market. However, the availability of valuable
performance measures can also be disadvantageous in that they deteriorate the fea-
sibility, or the profitability, of relational contracts. Thus, we can observe the initially
counter-intuitive situation where a better internal performance measurement impair
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the efficiency of implicit contracts within and between firms.
Despite the simplicity of the considered framework, I believe it provides powerful
insights in the theory of the firm. This essay proposes a pertinent contribution in
explaining why some firms choose to adopt market transactions, even if an internal
production appears to be more efficient. The general observation is that poten-
tial collusion as an internal inefficiency, and diverging preferences betweens firms
as the downside of market transactions can partially explain the characteristics of
transactions within and between firms.
This essay offered a preliminary glimpse into the linkages between the theory of
the firm and (i) collusive behavior within firms, and (ii), incongruent preferences
for the properties of exchanged goods between firms. However, our understanding
of their consequences on the characteristics of internal and market transactions is
far from complete. For instance, I disregarded the competition among demanding
as well as supplying firms on the market for goods. The degree of concentration in
an industry directly affects the bargaining position of the market participants and
consequently, the value of inter-firm trade. The investigation of how market char-
acteristics influence organizations’ endeavor to prevent internal collusion and affect
relation-specific investments could contribute to our understanding of the nature of
firms. However, I leave this issue for future investigations.
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3.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
First, it is necessary that β > 0 in order to ensure that the worker implements
eWi > 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Consequently, (3.10) is satisfied as long as
(3.11) holds and therefore omits. Assume for a moment that (3.12) is satisfied for
the optimal bonus contract. Recall that µtµ = ‖µ‖2 = 1. Then, the Lagrangian
becomes
L(α, β) = IL +∆Iβ − α− β2 + λ
[
α+
1
2
β2
]
+ ξα. (3.74)
The first-order conditions are
− 1 + λ+ ξ = 0, (3.75)
∆I + β (λ− 2) = 0, (3.76)
and the complementary slackness conditions,
λ
[
α+
1
2
β2
]
= 0, (3.77)
ξα = 0. (3.78)
To find a solution of this problem, suppose for a moment that λ > 0. Accordingly,
α + β2/2 = 0 due to (3.77). Since α ≥ 0, this would imply that α∗ = 0 and
β∗ = 0, and consequently, e∗ = (0, ..., 0)t. Hence, λ > 0 cannot be a solution of
this problem. Consequently, λ = 0, i.e. the worker’s participation constraint is not
binding. Furthermore, we can infer from (3.75) that ξ = 1. Then, (3.78) implies
that α∗ = 0. Re-arranging (3.76) with λ = 0 gives β∗ = ∆I/2. This eventually leads
to ΠD|RE = IL + (∆I)2/4. Substituting ΠD|RE and β∗ = ∆I/2 in (3.12) gives the
cut off interest rate
r ≤ rRE ≡ ∆I
2
− 2
∆I
[
Π˜RE − IL
]
. (3.79)
If r > rRE, the optimal bonus contract violates (3.12). Hence, the downstream party
needs to adjust β such that (3.12) is satisfied for r > rRE. To identify the direction
of the adjustment, define F ≡ IL+(∆I−r)β−β2−Π˜RE. Consequently, the Implicit
Function Theorem gives dβ/dr = −(∂F/∂r)/(∂F/∂β), which leads to
dβ
dr
=
β
∆I − r − 2β . (3.80)
Notice that dβ/dr < 0 in β∗ = ∆I/2. Thus, the downstream party needs to reduce
β∗. Then, the downstream part chooses the maximum feasible β for r > rRE which
satisfies (3.12). Observe further that is optimal to choose the lowest feasible α.
Hence, α∗ = 0. We can infer from (3.12) that β∗ solves
β2 − (∆I − r)β − IL + Π˜RE ≤ 0. (3.81)
Applying the quadratic formula gives
β∗(r) =
1
2
(∆I − r)±
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − Π˜RE
] 1
2
. (3.82)
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Since it is optimal to choose the highest feasible β(r), the upper bound is the relevant
one. Notice that there exits only a solution for β(r) if (∆I − r)2/4 + IL − Π˜RE ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
r ≤ r̂RE ≡ ∆I ± 2
[
Π˜RE − IL
] 1
2
. (3.83)
Observe that the upper bound leads to β < 0, which cannot be a solution. Ac-
cordingly, the lower bound determines r̂RE. As a result, β(r) = 0 if r > r̂RE. For
parsimony, let
φ ≡
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − Π˜RE
] 1
2
. (3.84)
Substituting β∗(r) in the downstream’s objective function gives
ΠD|RE(r) = IL +
∆I
2
(∆I − r) + ∆Iφ− 1
4
(∆I − r)2 − (∆I − r)φ− φ2, (3.85)
which is equivalent to
ΠD|RE(r) = IL +
∆I
2
(∆I − r)− 1
4
(∆I − r)2 + rφ− φ2. (3.86)
Substituting φ and re-arranging eventually lead to
ΠD|RE(r) =
r
2
[
∆I − r + 2
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − Π˜RE
] 1
2
]
+ Π˜RE. (3.87)
Recall that β∗ = 0 if r > r̂RE. Since this induces e∗W = (0, ..., 0)t, it leads to
ΠD|RE(r) = IL.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
Consider condition (3.20) which ensures that the supervisor does not collude. Since
wS = U¯S, the supervisor would always collude if either the worker or the down-
stream party offers to pay T i > 0, i = W,D. Consequently, supervision can be
only collusion-proof if neither the worker nor the downstream party is better off by
engaging in side-contracting. The worker has no incentives to collude if T¯W ≤ 0.
We can see from (3.21) that this is equivalent to
r ≤ EU
W
β
≡ rW . (3.88)
Substituting e∗W , α∗ and β∗ gives r ≤ ∆I/4 ≡ rW . Similarly, the downstream party
has no incentives to collude if T¯D ≤ 0. From (3.22) we can observe that T¯D ≤ 0
requires
r ≤ Π
D|S − Π˜S
β
≡ rD. (3.89)
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Substituting e∗W , α∗ and β∗ leads to
r ≤ ∆I
2
− 2
∆I
[
Π˜S + U¯S − IL
]
≡ rD. (3.90)
Thus, the optimal contracts are collusion-proof if r ≤ min{rW , rD}.
Now suppose r > min{rW , rD}. Condition (3.20) implies that the supervisor refuses
T i if
T i ≤ 1
r
[
wS − U¯S] . (3.91)
At a first glance, the downstream party could raise wS aimed at ensuring that
the supervisor refuses to accept T¯ i, i = W,D. Note that enhancing wS has a
second effect on the downstream’s incentive to collude. To see this, recall that
ΠD|S = E[Ii−wW −wS]. Enhancing wS contemporaneously reduces ΠD|S and thus,
raises T¯D. As a consequence, enhancing wS cannot prevent collusion.
Next, consider the case r > rW . Observe from (3.88) that this implies
r ≤ 1
β
[
α+
1
2
β2
]
. (3.92)
As for the supervisor’s payment wS, setting α > 0 contemporaneously reduces ΠD|S
and thus, raises T¯D. Therefore, α∗ = 0, which implies r ≤ β/2. We know that this
condition is binding for β∗ = ∆I/2 in r = rW . Thus, the downstream party needs
to set β∗(r) = 2r for r > rW in order to detain the worker from side-contracting.
Substituting β∗(r) in the downstream’s objective function yields
ΠD|S(r) = IL + 2r(∆I − 2r)− U¯S. (3.93)
Now consider the case r > rD. Observe from (3.89) that the downstream party does
not collude if
0 ≤ IL + (∆− r)β − β2 − U¯S − Π˜S. (3.94)
Recall that this condition is binding for β∗ = ∆I/2 in r = rD. Hence, the down-
stream needs to adjust β for r > rD. To identify the direction of this adjustment,
define F ≡ IL + (∆ − r)β − β2 − U¯S − Π˜S. The Implicit Function Theorem gives
dβ/dr = −(∂F/∂r)/(∂F/∂β), and consequently,
dβ
dr
=
β
∆I − r − 2β , (3.95)
which is strictly negative in β∗ = ∆I/2. Thus, the downstream party needs to
reduce β∗. Then, the downstream part chooses the highest feasible β for r > rD,
which satisfies (3.94). Applying the quadratic formula gives
β∗(r) =
1
2
(∆I − r)±
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − U¯S − Π˜RE
] 1
2
. (3.96)
Since it is optimal to choose the highest β(r), the upper value of β∗(r) is relevant.
To derive the downstream’s expected profit, let
φ ≡
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − U¯S − Π˜RE
] 1
2
. (3.97)
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Substituting β∗(r) in the downstream’s objective function gives
ΠD|S(r) = IL +
∆I
2
(∆I − r) + ∆Iφ− U¯S − 1
4
(∆I − r)2 − (∆I − r)φ− φ2, (3.98)
which is equivalent to
ΠD|S(r) = IL +
∆I
2
(∆I − r)− U¯S − 1
4
(∆I − r)2 + rφ− φ2. (3.99)
Substituting φ and re-arranging lead to
ΠD|S(r) =
r
2
[
∆I − r + 2
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − U¯S − Π˜RE
] 1
2
]
+ Π˜RE. (3.100)
Recall that collusion-proofness requires to enhance β(r) if r > rW ; and to reduce
β(r) if r > rD. Yet, there are two possible cases: rW < rD and rW ≥ rD. In the first
case, β∗(r) increases in r thereby enhancing rW , but contemporaneously reducing
rD. In the second case, β∗(r) decreases in r, thereby implying that rD increases
and rW decreases. In both cases, the adjustment of β∗(r) eventually implies that
r̂ S ≡ rW (β¯) = rD(β¯). For r > r̂ S, however, collusion-proofness cannot be achieved.
The cut off interest rate r̂ S therefore implies
1
β¯
[
IL +∆Iβ¯ − β¯2 − U¯S − Π˜S
]
=
β¯
2
. (3.101)
Re-arranging yields
β¯2 − 2
3
∆Iβ¯ − 2
3
[
IL − U¯S − Π˜S
]
= 0. (3.102)
Solving for β¯ by applying the quadratic formula gives
β¯(−) =
∆I
3
−
[
1
32
(∆I)2 +
2
3
(
IL − U¯S − Π˜S
)] 12
, (3.103)
and,
β¯(+) =
∆I
3
+
[
1
32
(∆I)2 +
2
3
(
IL − U¯S − Π˜S
)] 12
. (3.104)
If rW < rD, the downstream party chooses the lowest feasible β(r) such that β¯(−)
is relevant. For rD ≤ rW , however, it is optimal to choose the highest feasible β(r)
such that β¯(+) is relevant. Accordingly, we achieve r̂ S by calculating r̂ S = rW (β¯(−)),
which is identical to r̂ S = rD(β¯(+)). Since rW = β/2, we obtain r̂ S = β¯(−)/2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
Since Π˜RM = ΠD|SM , it follows Π¯U = IL/2 + [∆Iµ+∆Eω]2 /8. The downstream
party sets PL such that the upstream’s participation constraint is binding. Solving
for PL and substituting e∗U = ∆Pµ give
PL =
1
2
IL +
1
8
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 − 1
2
(∆P )2. (3.105)
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Suppose for a moment that (3.39) is satisfied for the optimal premium. Substituting
PL and e∗U in the downstream’s objective function yield the following simplified
problem:
max
∆P
ΠD|RM ≡ 1
2
IL +∆I∆P − 1
8
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 − 1
2
(∆P )2. (3.106)
The first derivative leads to ∆P ∗ = ∆I. Hence, the downstream party receives
ΠD|RM =
1
2
IL +
1
2
(∆I)2 − 1
8
[∆Iµ+∆Eω]2 . (3.107)
Substituting ΠD|RM and ∆P ∗ = ∆I in (3.39) eventually gives
r ≤ rRM ≡ 1
8∆I
[∆Iµ−∆Eω]2 . (3.108)
If r > rRM , the optimal premium violates (3.39). As a consequence, the downstream
party needs to adjust ∆P such that (3.39) is satisfied for r > rRM . In order to
identify the direction of the adjustment, substitute e∗U = ∆Pµ and Π˜RM = ΠD|SM
in (3.39), which yields after re-arranging
F ≡ IL/2 + (∆I − r)∆P − (∆Iµ+∆Eω)2/8− (∆P )2/2− ΠD|SM . (3.109)
The Implicit Function Theorem gives d∆P/dr = −(∂F/∂r)/(∂F/∂∆P ), and conse-
quently,
d∆P
dr
=
∆P
∆I − r −∆P . (3.110)
Observe that d∆P/dr < 0 in ∆P ∗ = ∆I. Thus, the downstream party needs to
reduce ∆P ∗. Consequently, the downstream part chooses the highest feasible ∆P
for r > rRM which satisfies (3.39). From (3.39) we can see that ∆P ∗ solves
(∆P )2 − 2(∆I − r)∆P + 1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 − IL + 2ΠD|SM ≤ 0. (3.111)
Applying the quadratic formula gives
∆P ∗(r) = ∆I − r ±
[
(∆I − r)2 − 1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 + IL − 2ΠD|SM
] 1
2
. (3.112)
Since it is optimal to choose the highest feasible ∆P (r), the upper bound is relevant.
Moreover, there exits only a solution for ∆P (r) if
(∆I − r)2 − 1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 + IL − 2ΠD|SM ≥ 0. (3.113)
Re-arranging leads to
r ≤ r̂RM ≡ ∆I ±
[
1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 + 2ΠD|SM − IL
] 1
2
. (3.114)
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Observe that the upper bound leads to ∆P < 0, which cannot be a solution. Thus,
the lower bound of r̂RM is relevant. As a result, ∆P ∗ = 0 if r > r̂RM . For parsimony,
let
φ ≡
[
(∆I − r)2 − 1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 + IL − 2ΠD|SM
] 1
2
. (3.115)
Substituting ∆P ∗(r) in the downstream’s objective function gives
ΠD|RM(r) =
1
2
IL +∆I(∆I − r) + ∆Iφ− 1
2
(∆I − r)2 − (∆I − r)φ
−1
2
φ2 − 1
8
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 , (3.116)
which can be re-arranged to
ΠD|RM(r) =
1
2
IL+∆I(∆I−r)− 1
2
(∆I−r)2+rφ− 1
2
φ2− 1
8
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 . (3.117)
Substituting φ eventually gives
ΠD|RM(r) = r
[
∆I − r +
[
(∆I − r)2 − 1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 + IL − 2ΠD|SM
] 1
2
]
+ΠD|SM . (3.118)
Finally, if r > r̂RM , the principal sets ∆P ∗ = 0. Then, it is also optimal to set
P ∗L = 0 and to engage in spot market transactions. Hence, ΠD|RM(r) = ΠD|SM for
r > r̂RM .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Since Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM , it follows Π¯U = (∆E)2/2. The downstream party sets PL such
that the upstream’s participation constraint is binding. By substituting e∗U = ∆Pµ
in (3.37) and solving for PL, one get
PL =
1
2
(∆E)2 − 1
2
(∆P )2. (3.119)
Suppose for a moment that (3.39) is satisfied for the optimal premium. Hence, we
can substitute PL and e∗U in the downstream’s objective function and achieve the
simplified problem
max
∆P
ΠD|RM ≡ IL +∆I∆P − 1
2
(∆E)2 − 1
2
(∆P )2. (3.120)
The first derivative leads to ∆P ∗ = ∆I. Consequently, the downstream party re-
ceives
ΠD|RM = IL +
1
2
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] . (3.121)
Substituting ΠD|RM and ∆P ∗ = ∆I in (3.39) gives
r ≤ rRM ≡ 1
2∆I
[
2IL + (∆I)
2 − (∆E)2 − 2Π˜RM
]
. (3.122)
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If r > rRM , ∆P ∗ = ∆I violates (3.39). Hence, the downstream party needs to adjust
∆P such that (3.39) is also satisfied for r > rRM . In order to identify the direction
of the adjustment, one can substitute e∗U in (3.39) which yields after re-arranging
F ≡ IL+(∆I−r)∆P−(∆P )2/2−(∆E)2/2−Π˜RM . The Implicit Function Theorem
gives d∆P/dr = −(∂F/∂r)/(∂F/∂∆P ), and consequently,
d∆P
dr
=
∆P
∆I − r −∆P . (3.123)
Notice that d∆P/dr < 0 in ∆P ∗ = ∆I. Thus, the downstream party needs to
reduce ∆P ∗. Therefore, the downstream part chooses the highest feasible ∆P for
r > rRM which satisfies (3.39). We can infer from (3.39) that ∆P ∗ solves
(∆P )2 − 2(∆I − r)∆P − 2IL + (∆E)2 + 2Π˜RM ≤ 0. (3.124)
Applying the quadratic formula gives
∆P ∗(r) = ∆I − r ±
[
(∆I − r)2 + 2IL − (∆E)2 − 2Π˜RM
] 1
2
. (3.125)
Since it is optimal to choose the highest feasible ∆P (r), the upper bound is relevant.
Furthermore, there exits only a solution for ∆P (r) if
(∆I − r)2 + 2IL − (∆E)2 − 2Π˜RM ≥ 0. (3.126)
Solving for r yields
r ≤ r̂RM ≡ ∆I ±
[
(∆E)2 − 2IL + 2Π˜RM
] 1
2
. (3.127)
The upper bound of r̂RM leads to ∆P < 0, which cannot be a solution. Hence, the
lower bound of r̂RM is relevant. As a result, ∆P ∗ = 0 if r > r̂RM . Next, let
φ ≡
[
(∆I − r)2 + 2IL − (∆E)2 − 2Π˜RM
] 1
2
. (3.128)
Substituting ∆P ∗(r) in the downstream’s objective function gives
ΠD|RM(r) = IL+∆I(∆I−r)+∆Iφ−1
2
(∆E)2−1
2
(∆I−r)2−(∆I−r)φ−1
2
φ2, (3.129)
which is equivalent to
ΠD|RM(r) = IL +∆I(∆I − r)− 1
2
(∆E)2 − 1
2
(∆I − r)2 + rφ− 1
2
φ2. (3.130)
Substituting φ and re-arranging yield
ΠD|RM(r) = r
[
∆I − r +
[
(∆I − r)2 + 2IL − (∆E)2 − 2Π˜RM
] 1
2
]
− (∆E)2 + Π˜RM .
(3.131)
3. COLLUSION AND INCONGRUENT PREFERENCES 98
As shown, the downstream party sets ∆P ∗ = 0 if r > r̂RM . Then, it is also optimal
to set P ∗L = 0 and to engage in spot market transactions. Hence, ΠD|RM(r) = ΠD|SM
for r > r̂RM .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
The downstream party can choose between spot employment, spot market transac-
tions, and supervision. In the collusion-free case, ΠD|S > ΠD|SE if U¯S < (∆I)2/4,
which is assumed to be satisfied, see section 3.4.3. Thus, it remains to identify the
cut off Θ implying ΠD|S ≤ ΠD|SM for every (∆E)2 ≤ Θ. Equivalently,
IL +
1
4
(∆I)2 − U¯S ≤ 1
2
IL +
1
4
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] , (3.132)
which can be re-arranged to (∆E)2 ≤ 2 [2U¯S − IL] ≡ Θ.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.6.
We know that collusion always occurs in a spot environment such that ΠD|S = ΠD|SE.
Now, it remains to identify the threshold Θ implying ΠD|SE ≤ ΠD|SM for every
(∆E)2 ≤ Θ. Equivalently,
IL ≤ 1
2
IL +
1
4
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] . (3.133)
Solving for (∆E)2 gives (∆E)2 ≤ (∆I)2 − 2IL ≡ Θ.
Q.E.D.
Comparison of Relational Market and Relational Employment.
Consider first the case Π˜RM = ΠD|SM . Then, ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE is equivalent to
1
2
IL +
1
2
(∆I)2 − 1
8
[∆Iµ+∆Eω]2 ≥ IL + 1
4
(∆I)2. (3.134)
Standard calculations give
(∆E)2 + 2∆I cosϕ∆E + 4IL − (∆I)2 ≤ 0. (3.135)
First, we can treat (3.135) as an equality. By applying the quadratic formula, one
obtain
∆E = −∆I cosϕ±
√
(∆I)2 cos2 ϕ+ (∆I)2 − 4IL. (3.136)
Observe that the upper bound is relevant since ∆E > 0. Thus, ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE
requires
∆E ≤ −∆I cosϕ+
√
(∆I)2 cos2 ϕ+ (∆I)2 − 4IL, (3.137)
which is equivalent to
(∆E)2 ≤
[(
(∆I)2 cos2 ϕ+ (∆I)2 − 4IL
) 1
2 −∆I cosϕ
]2
≡ Φ. (3.138)
Next, consider the case Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM . In this case, ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE is equivalent
to
IL +
1
2
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] ≥ IL + 1
4
(∆I)2. (3.139)
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Re-arranging gives (∆E)2 ≤ (∆I)2/2 ≡ Φ.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.7.
Suppose first that r ≤ ri, i = RM,RE. Then, it is necessary to identify whether the
downstream party prefers both relational contracts in the same interval for different
values of r. First, consider the intervals 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ, where
ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE. Suppose first that rRM ≥ rRE, which is equivalent to
ΠD|RM − Π˜RM
∆I
≥
2
[
ΠD|RE − Π˜RE
]
∆I
. (3.140)
If rRM ≥ rRE, we have Π˜RM = max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|S} and Π˜RE = ΠD|RM , where the
particular value of Π˜RM depends on the respective interval. Then, rRM ≥ rRE is
equivalent to
ΠD|RM −max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|S} ≥ 2ΠD|RE − 2ΠD|RM , (3.141)
and consequently,
3ΠD|RM ≥ 2ΠD|RE +max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|S}, (3.142)
which is always true for 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ. Thus, rRM ≥ rRE.
Since ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE in the considered intervals, the downstream party implements
relational market if r ≤ rRM .
Now, consider the intervals Φ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and Φ < (∆E)2, where ΠD|RE > ΠD|RM .
Suppose first that rRE ≥ rRM , thereby implying Π˜RE = max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|S} and
Π˜RM = ΠD|RE. Consequently, rRE ≥ rRM implies
2
[
ΠD|RE −max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|S}] ≥ ΠD|RM − ΠD|RE, (3.143)
which is equivalent to
3ΠD|RE ≥ ΠD|RM + 2max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|S}. (3.144)
This is satisfied for Φ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and Φ < (∆E)2 since ΠD|RE ≥ ΠD|RM . Con-
sequently, rRE ≥ rRM . Due to the fact that ΠD|RE ≥ ΠD|RM , the downstream
party chooses relational employment if r ≤ rRE. Finally, the self-enforcement condi-
tions can be obtained by substituting the downstream’s respective fall-back profits
emphasized by proposition 3.5 in rRM and rRE.
Next, consider the case ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RE. Recall that ΠD|RM(r) ≥ ΠD|RE(r)
in the intervals 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r) and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r). Note that the cut offs
Ψ(r) and Ψ(r) are valid for all r ∈ (ri, r̂ i], i = RM,RE.
Finally note that the values of relational contracts are decreasing in r for ri < r ≤ r̂ i,
i = RM,RE. Consequently, it is necessary to identify the cut off interest rate r¯
where the downstream party is indifferent between the respective relational contract
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and the best spot alternative. Consider first relational employment. Hence, r¯ implies
ΠD|RE(r¯) = Π˜RE. Accordingly,
r¯
2
[
∆I − r¯ + 2
[
1
4
(∆I − r¯)2 + IL − Π˜RE
] 1
2
]
+ Π˜RE = Π˜RE, (3.145)
which can be transformed to
1
4
(∆I − r¯)2 + IL − Π˜RE = 1
4
(∆I − r¯)2 . (3.146)
Recall that for the collusion-free case Π˜RE = max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|S} > IL. Conse-
quently, (3.146) cannot be satisfied. This implies that r̂RE is the relevant cut off
such that the downstream party receives max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|S} if r > r̂RE. Finally,
consider relational market, where r¯ implies ΠD|RM(r¯) = Π˜RM . By applying the
same approach as for relational employment, one can show that the downstream
party receives max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|S} if r > r̂RM .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.8.
Note that the downstream’s optimal transaction may only change for (∆E)2 > Θ,
where supervision is the superior spot contract in a collusion-free environment, see
proposition 3.5. Now consider the interval Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ, where ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE.
Suppose first that rRM ≥ rD, where rD refers to the condition ensuring that the
downstream party has no incentives to collude, see proposition 3.2. Recall that
rS = min{rW , rD}. Hence, rRM ≥ rD would imply that rRM ≥ rS. Next, observe
that rRM ≥ rD is equivalent to
ΠD|RM − Π˜RM
∆I
≥
2
[
ΠD|S − Π˜S
]
∆I
. (3.147)
If rRM ≥ rD, it follows Π˜RM = max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE} and Π˜S = ΠD|RM , where
the particular value of Π˜RM depends on the downstream’s best fall-back. As a
consequence,
ΠD|RM −max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE} ≥ 2ΠD|S − 2ΠD|RM , (3.148)
and equivalently,
3ΠD|RM ≥ 2ΠD|S +max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE}, (3.149)
which is always true for Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ since ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE > ΠD|S. There-
fore, rRM ≥ rD, which further implies that rRM ≥ rS = min{rW , rD}. Since
ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|S, the downstream party implements relational market if r ≤ rRM .
Next, consider the interval Φ < (∆E)2 where ΠD|RE > ΠD|RM . Assume for a moment
that rRE ≥ rD. Again, rRE ≥ rD also implies rRE ≥ rS since rS = min{rW , rD}.
Note that once the downstream party either reneged on β∗ or colluded with the su-
pervisor, the worker refuses to accept a contract from the downstream party based
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on implicit agreements. Accordingly, supervision cannot be the fall-back for rela-
tional employment, and vice versa. This implies Π˜RE = Π˜S = max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE}.
As a consequence, rRE ≥ rD is equivalent to
ΠD|RE −max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE} ≥ ΠD|S −max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE}, (3.150)
which is always true for Φ < (∆E)2 since ΠD|RE > ΠD|RM . Thus, rRE ≥ rD,
which additionally implies that rRE ≥ rS = min{rW , rD}. Since ΠD|RE ≥ ΠD|S,
the downstream party chooses relational employment if r ≤ rRE. Finally, the self-
enforcement conditions can be achieved by substituting the downstream’s respective
fall-back profits from proposition 3.6 in rRM and rRE.
It is further necessary to identify whether the downstream party is better off by
implementing collusion-proof supervision for r > rRM and r > rRE, respectively.
First consider the case rW < rD, which implies r̂ S < rD. The preceding derivations
in this proof indicate that the downstream party prefers either relational market or
relational employment for every r ≤ rD. Next, consider the case rW ≥ rD, which
implies r̂ S ≤ rW . For this case, it is necessary to identify whether the downstream
party chooses collusion-proof supervision for r > rRM and r > rRE, respectively.
First, consider the relevant intervals where relational market is the superior relational
contract. Suppose for a moment that rRE ≥ r̂ S. This is equivalent to
ΠD|RM − Π˜RM
∆I
≥ Π
D|S(r̂ S)− Π˜D|S
βS∗(r̂ S)
, (3.151)
where βS∗(r̂ S) is the optimal bonus under supervision for r = r̂ S. If rRM ≥ r̂ S, it
follows Π˜RM = max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE} and Π˜S = ΠD|RM , where the particular value of
Π˜RM depends on the downstream’s best fall-back. As a consequence,
ΠD|RM −max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE}
∆I
≥ Π
D|S(r̂ S)− ΠD|RM
βS∗(r̂ S)
, (3.152)
which is equivalent to
ΠD|RM
∆I
+
ΠD|RM
βS∗(r̂ S)
≥ Π
D|S(r̂ S)
βS∗(r̂ S)
+
max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE}
∆I
. (3.153)
Since ΠD|RM > ΠD|S(r) and ΠD|RM > max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE} for the relevant in-
tervals, it follows rRM ≥ r̂ S. Thus, the downstream party receives ΠD|RM(r) for
r ≤ r̂RM , and max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE}, otherwise. Next, consider the intervals where
relational employment is the superior relational contract. As demonstrated in proof
of proposition 3.7, rRE ≥ rRM if ΠD|RE > ΠD|RM . Recall that rRM ≥ r̂ S. Conse-
quently, rRE ≥ r̂ S for the relevant intervals where ΠD|RE > ΠD|RM . As a result,
the downstream party receives ΠD|RE(r) for r ≤ r̂RE in the relevant intervals, and
max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE}, otherwise. In sum, if supervision is collusion-proof, it is more
profitable to implement either relational market or relation employment. Finally,
the self-enforcement conditions can be obtained by substituting the downstream’s
respective fall-back profits from proposition 3.6 in r̂RM and r̂RE.
Q.E.D.
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Availability of Verifiable Signal.
First, it is essential that β > 0 in order to motivate the worker to implement eWi > 0
for at least one i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Thus, (3.69) is satisfied as long as (3.70) holds and
therefore omits. Using these observations, the Lagrangian becomes
L(α, β) = IL +∆Iβµtτ − α− β2τ tτ + λ
[
α+
1
2
β2τ tτ
]
+ ξα. (3.154)
The first-order conditions are
− 1 + λ+ ξ = 0, (3.155)
∆Iµtτ + βτ tτ (λ− 2) = 0, (3.156)
and the complementary slackness conditions,
λ
[
α+
1
2
β2τ tτ
]
= 0, (3.157)
ξα = 0. (3.158)
First suppose λ > 0. In this case, α + β2τ tτ/2 = 0 due to (3.157). Since α ≥ 0,
this would imply that α∗ = 0 and β∗ = 0, and consequently, e∗ = (0, ..., 0)t. Hence,
λ > 0 cannot be a solution of this problem. For this reason λ = 0, i.e. the worker’s
participation constraint is not binding. Moreover, (3.155) implies that ξ = 1. Then,
(3.158) leads to α∗ = 0. Re-arranging (3.156) with λ = 0 gives the optimal bonus
β∗ =
∆Iµtτ
2τ tτ
. (3.159)
Since µtτ = ‖µ‖‖τ‖ cos θ, ‖µ‖ = 1, and τ tτ = ‖τ‖2, where θ is the angle between
µ and τ , β∗ can be re-written as
β∗ =
∆I cos θ
2‖τ‖ . (3.160)
Finally, substituting α∗ and β∗ in the downstream’s objective function leads to
ΠD|SE = IL +
1
4
(∆I)2 cos2 θ. (3.161)
Q.E.D.
Summary
The preceding three essays analyze several issues related to incongruent preferences
for effort allocations in multi-task agency relations. The main emphasis is thereby
on the provision of incentives aimed at improving the agent’s effort allocation across
relevant tasks.
The first essay illustrates how the provision of incentives incorporates agents’
task-specific abilities. As demonstrated, task-specific abilities determine the effi-
ciency of the agent’s effort allocation in addition to the congruity of her performance
evaluation. This essay highlights four important observations: First, when agents
differ with respect to their task-specific abilities, it is optimal to provide them with
various incentive contracts so as to take advantage of their respective abilities. This
also includes the optimal aggregation of multiple performance measures. Second,
the value of employing specific agents for particular tasks does not depend exclu-
sively on their task-specific abilities, but is rather determined by the relationship
between these abilities and the characteristics of the available performance mea-
surement. Third, different types of agents can be equally valuable for performing
the same set of tasks. However, their respective incentive contracts are nonetheless
adjusted to their individual capabilities. This essay therefore provides a theoretical
underpinning of the observation that agents are allocated to various jobs; and that
they potentially receive different incentive contracts, even if they are employed for
performing identical tasks and are assessed by the same information system. Fi-
nally, the value of information in multi-task agency relations depends—besides on
their precision—on their information content with respect to the implemented effort
allocation relative to the agent’s task specific abilities. Accordingly, one cannot use
a generic criterion to rank information in multi-task agencies, which is independent
of the agents’ characteristics. It is rather pivotal to refer to particular agents and
their individual characteristics.
The second essay considers the costly acquisition of performance measures aimed
at offering the agent more congruent incentives in the sense that she is motivated to
implement a less distorted effort allocation. It contrasts two alternatives for the prin-
cipal: (i) to centrally invest in the acquisition of additional performance measures;
and (ii), to delegate the information acquisition to a supervisor, thereby inducing
a second moral hazard problem. This essay demonstrates that the profitability of
delegation depends on the relationship between the precision of the supervisor’s per-
formance evaluation, her relative measurement efficiency, and the congruence of the
costless information system. This essay indicates that the two subsequent conse-
quences arise if the supervisor’s performance evaluation is sufficiently precise. First,
the principal generally favors delegation if the costless information system is suffi-
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ciently incongruent because it imposes less requirements on the supervisor’s relative
measurement efficiency. Accordingly, it is presumably that a potential supervisor
is able to meet this prerequisite. Second, the principal prefers in general a central-
ized investment if the costless information system is sufficiently congruent. This
is because delegation would impose high requirements on the supervisor’s relative
measurement efficiency in order to be favored by the principal. This in turn is less
presumably to be achievable by a potential supervisor. The reversed implications
apply if the supervisor’s performance evaluation is sufficiently imprecise.
The third essay employs a multi-task agency framework to investigate the op-
timal transactions within and between firms, and the corresponding application of
either explicit or implicit contracts. The main emphasis is on how (i) incongru-
ent preferences for effort allocations between firms as an inefficiency of using the
market; and (ii), potential side-contracting as an inefficiency of integrated produc-
tions, determine the optimal transactions and type of contracts. Incongruent pref-
erences for effort allocations are thereby rooted in the discrepancy of requirements
for the properties of produced and exchanged goods. This essay demonstrates that
more congruent preferences impose additional costs for demanding firms to ensure
relation-specific investments. In contrast, incongruent preferences do not affect the
value of spot market transactions since the acquisition of less desirable products is
compensated by lower transfer prices. This essay further illustrates that the effect
of potential collusion is two-fold. First, collusion compromises the efficiency of in-
tegrated productions and therefore, may force firms to employ market transactions,
even if integrated productions would have been more efficient otherwise. Second,
potential collusion can be advantageous if it deteriorates the efficiency of integrated
productions as best fall-back alternative for relational contracts. In this case, antic-
ipated collusion can facilitate the achievement, or improve the efficiency, of superior
relational contracts within and between firms. In addition, this essay illustrates
that firms with access to sufficiently congruent measures about their employees’
performance are more likely to adopt integrated productions rather than engag-
ing in market transactions. However, receiving sufficiently congruent performance
measures can improve the profitability of integrated productions as best fall-back
alternative for relational contracts. Then, the availability of these measures can be
disadvantageous in two ways: (i) it can compromise the feasibility of superior rela-
tional contracts; or (ii), it can deteriorate their profitability. Consequently, access to
adequately congruent performance measures can impair the efficiency of relational
contracts within and between firms.
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